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In a 2015 study of the scholarship surrounding Nietzsche’s Free Spirit works, Duncan 
Large notes that the topic of aesthetics is almost universally passed over1. In works 
dealing expressly with this trilogy of books – Human, All Too Human (1878-1880) Dawn 
(1881) and The Gay Science (1882)- discussions of art and the aesthetic are notably sparse, 
with critics seemingly minimising the role that these topics had to play in the works2. 
Studies on the status of art in Nietzsche’s broader corpus offer an insight into why this 
might be. With the notable exception of Aaron Ridley3, scholarship on Nietzsche and 
the arts has tended to adopt the line that the publication of Human marked a dramatic 
about face in Nietzsche’s relationship with the aesthetic4. Where his early works – most 
notably The Birth of Tragedy (1872) – had put aesthetics at the heart of their 
philosophical worldview, Human saw Nietzsche piling scorn on artists and seemingly 
condemning art as regressive and dangerous. Where the former works has seen the 
aesthetic as a bulwark against ‘Socratic optimism’ – the quasi-religious/moral belief in 
the power of science and the absolute value of knowledge – Human saw Nietzsche 
declaring the start of a new project geared towards a heroic ‘quest for knowledge’. More 
than a simple shift in priorities or approach, the start of the Free Spirit project is 
interpreted as Nietzsche turning his back on three great ‘pillars’ of his early thought: 
Richard Wagner, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Greek art and culture.  
                                                 
1 Large 70-2 
2 Ruth Abbey’s Nietzsche’s Middle Period Works (Oxford UP, 2000) and Paul Franco’s Nietzsche’s 
Enlightenment (University of Chicago Press, 2011) are notable examples of this tendency. Other studies make 
heavy use of the “aestheticism” thesis offered in Alexander Nehamas Nietzsche, Life as Literature, Harvard UP, 
1985. Michael Ure, Nietzsche’s Therapy, Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2006 is an example of a work that builds 
upon Nehamas’ thesis.  
3 Nietzsche on Art and Literature, Routledge Press, London, 2007 
4 Besides Philip Pothen and Julian Young, two principal interlocuters for this study, we also have Matthew 
Rampley’s Nietzsche, Aesthetics and Modernity, Cambridge UP, 2007 which does not forward the same thesis as 
Young and Pothen, but which nevertheless sees the Free Spirit works as offering scant pickings for readers of 
Nietzsche’s aesthetic thought. 
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By this narrative, the 1876 Bayreuth festival – unquestionably a turning point in 
the thinker’s life - is taken to have caused Nietzsche to break faith with art and the 
‘pessimistic metaphysics’ that underpinned his early aesthetic philosophy. Then, in 
1878, we see this new-found antipathy set in print, with a work that declared a radical 
about-face, a declaration for science that was to last at least until the publication of his 
own ‘philosophic artwork’, the prose poem Thus spoke Zarathustra. This grand narrative 
offers a compelling explanation for the changes in priority, focus, and style that 
Nietzsche’s work underwent after Bayreuth, and a compelling reason to continue to 
accept the orthodoxy that has been built up around it. However, as Human argues, the 
fact that a belief is compelling does not in the least speak to its truth; the pathos of 
narrative feeling should not be allowed to cloud the suspicion we, as scholars, need 
always hold for stories about clean breaks, about beginnings and ends. The ‘Dionysian 
insight’ offered by Zarathustra is that all boundary stones are illusions (Z §III:5). They 
were placed there by us and should only remain if they continue to prove their worth. 
It is time we questioned the received wisdom that the Free spirit radically opposes the 
early works’ aesthetic philosophy. 
 In this study, it will be my concern to examine the argument for a discontinuity 
between Nietzsche’s early and ‘middle’ period writings. Specifically, I will address the 
notion that these earlier works represent something that had, by 1878, become 
intolerable for Nietzsche: life-denial. The typical reading of The Birth of Tragedy 
presents it as a work of Schopenhauerian pessimism, which offers the art of beautifying 
illusion as the only possible means to escape the relentless horror of existence. 
Scholarship in the last 20 years has worked against this interpretation, and yet no 
scholar – perhaps with the exception of Michele Haar5 - has been able to fully endorse 
the claim made by Nietzsche in his 1886 preface to the work, “An Attempt at Self-
Criticism”: that Birth offered aesthetics as a remedy to life-denial. It was in the name of 
opposing this ethos – which Nietzsche most famously aligned with Christian and 
Buddhist asceticism – that the Free Spirit works were to wage their war against 
metaphysics and to denounce the ‘afterworldsmen’ (Hinterweltlern) who turn their back 
on life and seek for meaning in the Beyond. Through a reading of Birth, as well as its 
                                                 
5 Nietzsche and Metaphysics, trans. M. Gendre, NY State UP, 1996 
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draft texts – “The Dionysian Worldview” and “The Greek Music Drama”-, the works’ 
proposed follow up Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, and the lectures series 
this latter was based on (The Pre-Platonic Lectures) I will argue for an alternative 
interpretation. From a Naturalist reading of these early texts and their ‘Aesthetic 
interpretation of Life’, I seek to trace a line of continuity that extends into the Free Spirit 
works.  
 I will primarily be arguing against the readings of Nietzsche’s relationship with 
the aesthetic offered by Julian Young (Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art) and Philip Pothen 
(Nietzsche and the Fate of Art). Young’s reading of Birth and its aesthetic outlook as 
essentially metaphysical will be the main thesis that the first half of this study will argue 
against. In doing this, I will seek to build up a picture of an aspect of Nietzsche’s thought 
that is radically misunderstood in the literature - owing in no small part to the influence 
of Young’s reading. This element is the “Dionysian Artist of worlds” which Nietzsche 
forwards as the crux of his claim that the world is ‘justified’ when viewed as an aesthetic 
phenomenon. This has typically been read as Nietzsche offering an amoral ‘theodicy’ – 
one that fails in its task by virtue of its nature as a metaphysical construction. Through 
engagement with Tragic Age and with Peter Sloterdijk’s reading of redemption (Thinker 
on Stage: Nietzsche’s Materialism) I will argue that Nietzsche uses his vision of 
aesthetics to radically re-orientate the notion of ‘theodicy’, ‘justification’, and 
‘redemption’ to arrive at a god-less, anti-metaphysical doctrine. I shall examine the way 
Nietzsche constructs his readings of Greek theatre and literature to promote a 
‘Dionysian Aesthetic’ that seeks to break down the boundaries between subject and 
object, artist, spectator, and spectacle and to thereby render obsolete the idea of a law-
based knowledge of objects and concepts. Tracing the development of this idea through 
Nietzsche’s engagement with physics, biology, and philosophy of mind, I will show how 
the ‘science’ that Nietzsche adopts in the Free Spirit works finds its roots in his early 
interest in the aesthetic. From the vision of the world these theories engender, it will be 
seen that ‘the knowledge’ that the Free Spirit is called to dedicate her life to grew out of 
Nietzsche’s aesthetic interpretation of life. Far from representing a rebuttal to and 
disavowal of his early aesthetic thought, I wish to show that the Free Spirit represents a 
development of this outlook: one that seeks to remedy certain problems that Nietzsche 
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had identified in thinkers of the past, and that he was, by the time of the first Bayreuth 
Festival, starting to identify in his own outlook. 
 Since this study will largely concern the line of continuity between early works 
and the Free Spirit, I have chosen to focus my engagement with the latter works 
primarily on the first volume of Human, All Too Human. This choice was made for 
several reasons, not least of which was the tendency on behalf of scholars to simply 
write the work off as the most self-evidently anti-aesthetic of Nietzsche’s writings. By 
focusing on this transitional work and its critique of the concept of ‘genius’ I highlight 
the relationship between the Free Spirit concept of Knowledge, and the aesthetic 
worldview that grounded Nietzsche’s early scientific formulations. Through this, I argue 
that the sort of stark reversal of commitments emphasised by Young and Pothen is not 
only a dramatic oversimplification, but one that does damage to our understanding of 
a critical element of the Free Spirit philosophy.  
A contextualisation of this continuity, between aesthetics and knowledge, allows 
us to better understand the role of knowledge in these later works, bridging a critical 
gap between the themes of self-knowledge and self-creation, and the more broadly 
scientific understanding of knowledge as concerning our epistemic relationship to the 
world around us. By re-enforcing the emphasis on a blurring of self and world that is 
central to the Nietzsche’s Dionysian Aesthetic, I frame the quest for knowledge as a 
means to negotiate this interrelation in a way that keeps a respectful and critical eye on 
the ‘macrocosm’ problem: a distortion of philosophical enquiry by subjective ‘states of 
will’ that Nietzsche sees as central to the genesis of metaphysical thinking. My 
discussion of the early aesthetic writings will show that the Free Spirit is still held by 
the epistemic framework set out in these works, and that the ‘means’ to knowing this 
leaves us with precludes the possibility of viewing knowledge as the objective ‘grasping 
after’ objects in our world. However, even before his break with Wagner, Nietzsche had 
begun to question whether the naturalistic and intuitive approach to our relationship 
with the world and with our ‘self-ness’ that his earlier thought had emphasised was not 
counterproductive: stifling rather than liberating the creative intellect. It was as a means 
to once more push for a free and creative relationship to our self-ness and our existences 
that Nietzsche advocated for a ‘cooling’ of our natural aesthetic drives. It was to aid and 
supplement these drives, rather than to dismiss them that Nietzsche advocated for a 
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knowledge of self that would allow, in time, for a more authentic knowledge of the 
world.  
 
 In the first chapter of this study, I will begin to address the arguments offered by 
critics against tracing a continuity between the early and Middle period writings. Taking 
“An Attempt at Self-Criticism” and the scholarship surrounding it as a jumping off point, 
I will seek to frame Birth and its aesthetic worldview as Nietzsche’s answer to the 
metaphysical pessimism that informed the aesthetic philosophy of his ‘great antipode’ 
Arthur Schopenhauer. In answer to the critical and dismissive approach taken by 
scholarship to the claims made in the “Attempt”, I will argue that the aesthetic vision 
offered in Nietzsche’s presentation of Dionysus resists the metaphysical duality of 
worlds that he was to later see as inextricably bound up with a hatred for existence. This 
chapter will examine the conception of life denial and affirmation in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy and set the groundwork for an examination of the ‘aesthetic justification’ 
that was the core of Nietzsche’s early aesthetic philosophy. Through close textual 
readings of Tragic Age and Birth, I will demonstrate, contra Pothen and Young, that 
Nietzsche’s early thought is already geared towards a project of ‘vindicating’ life in the 
face of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical denunciations.  
Far from being a defining characteristic of the ‘break’ between these early 
writings and the Free Spirit project, this shared commitment reveals the damage that is 
done to a reading of both period’s writings if we post such a sharp disjunction. This 
chapter will engage with broader scholarship on the Birth of Tragedy and incorporate 
into our understanding of it a reading of the oft-overlooked Tragic Age manuscript, 
arguing that this uncompleted ‘sequel’ work contains much that fleshes out and 
dramatically re-contextualises Nietzsche first book. In light of this, and of close readings 
of Birth and its drafts, I argue for a ‘naturalist’ reading of the early aesthetic writings. 
Naturalism is a well trodden path for Nietzsche scholarship in general terms6, but 
studies forwarding such a reading almost entirely gloss over the early writings. The 
heavy reliance upon nature imagery in the Birth writings are ripe for examination by 
                                                 
6 See for e.g. Christoph Cox, Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation, UC Press, 1999, Christian Emden 
Nietzsche’s Naturalism, Cambridge UP, 2014, Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity, ed. C. Janaway, S. 
Robertson, Oxford UP, 2012 
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this light, and Nietzsche’s engagement with Schiller’s humanistic ‘naïve’ nature 
philosophy offers crucial insight into Nietzsche characterisation of the ‘natural aesthetic 
force’ that human artistry is held to ‘participate’ in. If it was a central commitment of 
the Free Spirit to ‘re-integrate’ the human back into nature, then Birth can be seen as 
the starting point of this project.  
Central to the first chapter’s argument is the claim that the breakdown of the self 
we see in the Dionysian aesthetic constitutes an appreciation of our existence as an 
element of nature. In chapter two, I will examine and argue against the prevalent 
counter narrative. This reading holds that the dissolution of self in Nietzsche’s 
aesthetics constitutes an ascetic and transcendent rejection of the physical world as an 
illusion. By this understanding, Nietzsche’s aesthetic takes its cue from Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysic of the Will and understands the loss of self to be a salvation abandonment 
of this illusion. This reading takes Nietzsche as offering a form of ‘aesthetic theodicy’ in 
his vision of a god-like artist responsible for the continual creation of the world. It is 
understood that Nietzsche offers a ‘justification’ of life’s suffering on the grounds that 
it manifests a pleasing spectacle for this artist. Furthermore, we are apparently offered 
access to this ‘justification’ through a transcendent dissolution of self which allows us 
to ‘become one’ with this god figure. This justification is held to be untenable by the 
bounds it sets itself, and critics frequently cite the illusory nature of any possible 
identification with the world artist’s metaphysical perspective as grounds for dismissing 
the worth of the aesthetic justification thesis. As will become clear over the course of 
chapter one and its discussion of Life denial, this interpretation must be argued against 
if we are to claim that the Free Spirit works represent an evolution of the aesthetic 
writings.  
To this end, I will offer an alternate reading of the world artist thesis and of the 
notion of aesthetic justification. Through an examination of Nietzsche’s relationship 
with theodicy, I will argue that he presents his Heraclitean aesthetic world view in direct 
opposition to theories that demand a ‘metaphysical other’ to stand as guarantor for life’s 
value. I will do this through extensive engagement with Nietzsche’s reading of 
Heraclitus, which I shall use to inform a reading of Nietzsche’s aesthetics of music. 
Against a thesis offered recently by Daniel Came, I present a Heraclitean vision of 
musical harmony and its relation to dissonance that underlines a critical element of 
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Nietzsche’s aesthetics – the resistance to determinate identity. This reading will build 
upon the explication of Nietzsche’s lyric aesthetics undertaken in chapter one and feed 
a further development of the central aspect of this theory: the elimination of the subject 
and object distinction. To this end, I will also examine Nietzsche aesthetics of the tragic 
stage to demonstrate how Nietzsche works to collapse a central tenet of the ‘modern’ 
aesthetics he saw as wholly antithetical to the Greek sensibility: the concept of 
‘spectatorial distance’ and ‘disinterested contemplation’. It is through this idea that I 
will seek to argue against critical interpretations of the world artist as an ‘appreciative 
spectator’ to the ‘artwork’ of life, which I identify in Nietzsche’s work with the 
philosophy of Anaxagoras.  
Having argued against the religious/metaphysical interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
aesthetic in the first two chapters, I dedicate the second half of the work to tracing the 
way this aesthetic interweaves with Nietzsche’s engagement with science. In the third 
chapter on the concept of ‘self-ness’, I examine how Nietzsche’s aesthetics and their play 
with the integrity of the subject/object boundary informed Nietzsche’s approach to 
physics and biology. A significant source for this critical exegesis will be the unpublished 
notes for Nietzsche’s proposed doctoral thesis (On the Concept of the Organic since 
Kant) and those he composed during the writing of Tragic Age and “On Truth and Lies 
in an Extra-Moral Sense”. In the former of these, we see Nietzsche undertaking a critique 
of Kant’s teleology through an engagement with Kantian aesthetics. We see how 
Nietzsche used his understanding of aesthetics to radically undermine the grounding 
supposition of the self, through an attack on the validity of the idea that living things 
exist as purposive unities. Through this, I go on to examine a central element of 
Nietzsche’s engagement with aesthetics – the concept of purposeless ‘play’. I show how 
Nietzsche used this idea to undermine the Kantian telos, and, through an engagement 
with Schiller, examine the origins of Nietzsche’s search for the ‘innocence of becoming’ 
in the Dionysian aesthetic. Nietzsche’s debt to Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of 
Man is another pregnant area of enquiry that scholarship has almost entirely 
overlooked, and one which this study will seek to make a small but insightful 
contribution to. 
Interwoven with discussions of Nietzsche’s theory of biology, I will also use this 
chapter to examine the emergence of a Nietzschean physics that would, by the end of 
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the Free Spirit period, have evolved into the doctrine of the ‘Will to Power’. Notes from 
Nietzsche’s 1872/3 notebooks reveal a fascinating but fragmentary early formulation of 
this theory, one that builds on the ‘dynamic physics’ of R.J. Boscovich and on the 
insights of his biology and of the Dionysian aesthetic. I argue that it is this theory that 
grounds Nietzsche’s Free Spirit conception of knowledge. In laying out a world that 
radically resists identity thinking, Nietzsche continues to scorn the accumulative, 
teleological understanding of scientific knowledge that Birth argued so forcefully 
against. Instead, I argue that the works forward an understanding of knowledge as a 
‘practice’, one that negotiates the illusory but necessary boundary between ‘self-ness’ 
and the world. I frame this physic as Nietzsche’s attempt to generate a scientific version 
of the world artist thesis. The ‘force world’ doctrine offers a model of a self-ordering 
‘game’ of sapient (but non-sentient) force interactions that exemplifies the primary 
characteristics Nietzsche ascribed to his world artist: it is a meeting of ‘necessity’ and 
random ‘play’ in which the ‘artist’ and the ‘art-work’ exist together as a mutually 
engendering unity.  
Having laid the foundations for an understanding of Nietzsche’s approach to 
science, I dedicate the last chapter to an engagement with Human, All Too Human 
interspersed with discussions of the other Free Spirit works. These will serve to expand 
upon discussion of ideas I identify in the first work of the Free Spirit trilogy. Against the 
canonical portrayal of Human as ‘anti-aesthetic’, I offer a reading of the work as 
concerned to ‘purify’ the creative aesthetic relation we have to ourselves and our world. 
In light of the argument developed across the previous three chapters, I frame the 
concept of knowledge as Nietzsche’s means of negotiating the fluid boundary between 
self and world, learning to identify the ‘body’ that we have as our sole access to the rest 
of the world in all its subtleties and nuances. Framed in terms of Nietzsche’s critique of 
the genius, of the idea that certain people can uncritically immerse themselves in the 
art of world interpretation, I offer a reading of knowledge as a necessary process of 
honing and developing the ‘organ’ responsible for that aesthetic act. By understanding 
the self – the boundaries that society and physics generate that mark the limits of what 
is and is not ‘us’ – we understand the world. Knowledge is framed as a process, one in 
which scientific rigour and aesthetic creativity combine to generate a living ‘art-work’: 
a self that is endlessly interpreting itself and its world into aesthetic forms.  
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 I conclude this final chapter with a brief discussion of the implications that this 
new reading has for what is arguably the most dominant reading of the role of aesthetics 
in Free Spirit scholarship: Alexander Nehamas’ ‘Aestheticism’ thesis. I offer my own 
reading of Nietzsche’s conception of aesthetics as answering a pressing concern that 
this thesis raises: the matter of ‘heroic autonomy’. Critics such as Michael Ure, Keith 
Ansell-Pearson and Ruth Abbey have cited the problematic reliance upon an 
autonomous, heroic self-governing self in theories that read Nietzsche’s Free Spirit 
works in terms of artistic creation. Against this, I offer a reading of Nietzsche through 
Adorno’s aesthetic theory that sees the aesthetic as a means of displacing and ‘de-
centring’ the autonomous artistic subject. It is my hope that this will prove fruitful and 
fertile ground for further exploration of the Free Spirit works as artistic applications of 
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Chapter 1: On Dionysian Affirmation 
 
In “An Attempt at Self-Criticism”, published as an introduction to the 1886 re-issue of 
The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche presents his first major philosophical opus as offering a 
“suggestive (anzügliche) proposition”: that a ‘purely aesthetic outlook’ on the world 
would justify existence by offering an antithesis to moral interpretations of worth (AC 
§5:8-10). The moral worldview, which reached its apotheosis in “Christian, that is 
absolute, morality” before seeing its fatal, logical culmination in Schopenhauerian 
pessimism, is framed as a form of sickness, embodying “hostility to life, the wrathful and 
vengeful disgust at life itself […] essentially and fundamentally the aversion felt by life 
towards itself” (§5:9). And it was Birth’s concern, according to this essay, to offer an 
antidote to this illness. By this light, the work represents Nietzsche’s first attempt to 
resist what he would come to call ‘the denial of life’ and to offer a philosophic outlook 
that might, eventually, lead to a program of recovery. The essay speaks of an affirmative, 
life-praising energy that “spoke to me” against the spirit of resignation and despair, and 
that Nietzsche subsequently “baptized… with the name of a Greek god” (§5:10). 
Dionysus; the dismembered god, the ‘voice’ that speaks from the heart of nature, 
through all living things. What that voice speaks, according to the “Attempt”, is the 
‘affirmation of life’ in the face of sickness, apathy, and despair.  
It would not be overly reductive to say that this endeavor - the attempt to 
diagnose and treat a profound ‘soul sickness’ afflicting modern humanity- was the goal 
of Nietzsche’s entire philosophic project. “The trust in life has gone: life itself has 
become a problem”, and it is the responsibility of philosophy to prove that “even love of 
life is still possible” (GS 3:7). If we can take seriously the claim that Birth and its aesthetic 
outlook represents a “fundamental counter-doctrine and counter-valuation” of life, 
opposed to doctrines of life-denial, then this approach becomes critical for 
understanding that project moving forward. Unfortunately, it has been the almost 
unanimous assessment of critics engaging with the work that we cannot, with good 
intellectual conscience, take the “Attempt” at face value7.  
                                                 
7 For an overview of critical receptions to the “Attempt at Self-Criticism” as an interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
argument in The Birth of Tragedy, See Came 2016 1n. 
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The essay is one among a number of introductions that Nietzsche appended to 
reissues of his works that year, all of which sought to ‘contextualise’ his early writings 
as contiguous points along a singular trajectory. For this reason, critics almost 
universally regard it as something like a ‘virtual history’ of Birth and its intellectual 
commitments: an interpretive narrative which, when retroactively applied to the work, 
transforms it into something it was not originally intended to be, and is not capable of 
being without significant contortions. And, indeed, it is hard to take the essay’s 
principal claim - that Birth represents an opposition to moral understandings of the 
world, and a rejection of the denial of life – as anything other than intellectual 
revisionism. It would seem evident to any informed reader that this claim is nothing 
more than an attempt on Nietzsche’s part to ‘exorcise’ an undeniable presence from the 
work; to efface, as far as is possible, the grim shadow of The World as Will and 
Representation. Arthur Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of suffering and deception, and his 
morality of ascetic abnegation would seem to pervade the work to such an extent that 
no amount of ‘whitewashing’ could ever clear away its ‘damned spot’. Even Nietzsche, 
at the end of his life, admitted that the ‘graveyard stench’ of Schopenhauer still came to 
his nostrils when he read over the work8. How then can we take seriously the notion 
that Birth forwards a rejection of Schopenhauer, and an antidote to the dark, pessimistic 
hatred for existence?  
 Scholarship surrounding the essay largely falls into one of two camps. However,  
the division between the two is not drawn according to whether or not we are to believe 
Nietzsche’s claims. Rather, the question is if we should reject the essay tout court. Critics 
on the more generous side of this divide like Philip Pothen argue that the “Attempt”, 
while transparently anachronistic, remains an important document for Nietzsche 
scholarship. To Pothen, the Dionysian ideal described in the “Attempt” is “almost 
unrecognizable” when placed against the formulation offered in Birth. He sees in Birth’s 
Dionysus nothing but a precipitate of distilled Schopenhauerianism: an avatar of 
metaphysical ‘redemption’, standing against the horrors of life as “some panacea, some 
principle beyond life that might seduce to redeem” (Pothen 26). The figure presented 
in the essay and the post-1886 works is wholly incompatible with this initial 
                                                 
8 See Ecce Homo §3:47 
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formulation. The later revision of the Dionysian ideal tells us nothing at all about Birth. 
But it does provide a contrasting construction of an important formulation in 
Nietzsche’s thought and thus stands as a useful resource for understanding the shifts in 
concerns and commitments that Nietzsche went through between 1872 and 1886. 
Against this understanding, we have the perspective of those critics such as Julian 
Young, J.P. Stern, and Ivan Soll9 who council us to a wholesale dismissal of the “Attempt” 
and other ‘revisionist texts’ such as Ecce Homo10. These are held up as “patently a bit of 
rhetoric” aimed at re-writing Nietzsche’s own intellectual genealogy, an endeavor that 
“grossly, grotesquely understates and represses” the influence of Schopenhauer on his 
philosophy (Soll 1990, 105)11. 
 This viewpoint stands in line with historic assessments offered by the likes of H.L 
Mencken12 and Bertrand Russell13, who hold Nietzsche to be always and irreducibly a 
Schopenhauerian philosopher. Some claim of inheritance is, by itself, clearly justified -
at least to an extent14- and Nietzsche for his part never denied that Schopenhauer was 
his principal ‘Educator’. But these claims go beyond Stern’s already over-simplifying 
assertion that Schopenhauer was “far and away the most important influence” upon 
Nietzsche (Stern 1981: 222). Rather, it is argued that Nietzsche in fact never escaped the 
Schopenhauerian orbit, that “Nietzsche regarded himself, rightly, as Schopenhauer’s 
successor” (Russell 760), and that we see “the unity of the two philosophers […] proved 
a thousand times by Nietzsche’s own discourse” (Mencken 37). To Both Soll and Young, 
                                                 
9 See Julian Young, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art, (1992),  J.P. Stern, Frederic Nietzsche (1979), Nietzsche on 
Tragedy (1981), Ivan Soll “Schopenhauer as Nietzsche’s ‘Great Teacher’ and ‘Antipode’” (2013) “Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche, and the Redemption of Life (1998), “Pessimism and the Tragic View of Life” (1990).  
10 See esp. the chapter on The Birth of Tragedy (48-53) 
11 Soll’s (1990) critique, in this instance, is more specifically aimed at the chapter in Ecce Homo, which similarly 
minimises the Schopenhauerian dimension in Birth through its claim that it is a work “in which the cadaverous 
perfume of Schopenhauer stick only to a few formulas”: an assessment which re-iterates, through its evocation of 
the grave-yard stench, the association made in the “Attempt” between Schopenhauer and the negation of life. 
Young also piles scorn upon the claims made in EC– “a mendacious, deluded book”- and contrasts its method to 
that of his own study “which aims at truthfulness” (Young 2) 
12 The Philosophy of Frederic Nietzsche (1913)  
13 The History of Western Philosophy (1945) 
14 Brian Leiter for example makes the case that, though less obliquely referenced, Nietzsche’s encounter with 
Greek and recent Empiricist thought “as much as Schopenhauer, shaped Nietzsche’s sensibility and demarcated 
the range of problems which concerned him. Indeed, in many respects Schopenhauer simply reinforces ideas and 
sentiments that Nietzsche would have found in [these] other sources” (2015 42). Christian Emden (35-40) and 
Claudia Crawford (1997) also make compelling arguments for viewing Schopenhauer  as little more than a conduit 
trough which Nietzsche drew together the influences of recent naturalist scientists and behaviourists. Kevin Hill, 
for his part, seeks to show that both Kant and his Neo-Kantian interpreter Kuno Fisher were as important as 
Schopenhauer for Nietzsche’s early thought- if not more so (see Hill §1:7-20, §3, esp. 80-2, 94-7) 
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the “Attempt” is little more than a transparent and petulant ploy to hide the profound 
debt that Nietzsche’s entire philosophy owes to the ‘appalling old grouch’ of Danzig15 - 
“part of a general campaign to dissociate himself from those that had most influenced 
him”, undertaken as “a means to establish […] autonomy against the threat posed by a 
domineering figure” (Stoll 1998, 79-80). In its most extreme iterations, this vein of 
critique dismisses the essay as nothing but a laughable (perhaps pitiable) and wholly 
groundless attempt on Nietzsche’s part to pretend that Birth stood for quite the 
opposite of the world-view it was written to promote. And, often, this is understood as 
resulting from the most cynical of motivations. 
 Mencken’s poetical description of the thinker’s early works as “burnt offerings 
upon the altar of the great pessimist” captures something of the attitude that these 
critics ascribe to Nietzsche, and his ‘ploys’ to pretend that he had no real relation to the 
mentor “who was destined to remain his hero, if not his god, until the end […] he and 
Schopenhauer were ever as one” (Mencken 32). Nietzsche’s ‘rebellion’ against 
Schopenhauer is often cast as just another example of his need to strike out at whatever 
idol he came across, or, worse, an act of impetuous self-aggrandisement. Stern 
diminishes it as a form of sophistry16; Young sees Nietzsche’s ‘middle period’ works as 
left floundering and groundless by the ‘pretense’ of this rejection (Young 58-62) - and it 
was a realisation of this fact that meant that “in the end, reluctantly and with every 
rhetorical effort to disguise this from us and, more importantly from himself, 
[Nietzsche] came back… to pessimism” in his later ‘mature’ works (3). And, to Soll, the 
entire claim is a somewhat childish attempt on Nietzsche’s part “to represent himself as 
an extremely original thinker… a campaign that increased in hyperbole and shrillness 
as time passed and his works did not receive the attention they deserved” (Soll 1998, 
80). The implication of this is clear. Nietzsche’s anti-Schopenhauerian ‘pretentions’ are 
to be understood as rhetorical, born of intellectual insecurity (Soll 1990, 107; 1998, 80) 
and ego-centric self-delusion (Young 3). But while this is an extreme position to take, 
close examination shows it to be little more than an outgrowth of a basic supposition 
                                                 
15 Characterisation provided by P.G. Wodehouse. See Carry on Jeeves, Arrow Books, London, 2006 
16 “While he [Nietzsche] insists upon contradicting some of his tenets […] it is still Schopenhauer he is 
contradicting” (Stern 1981, 222. emphasis added). Philosophical differences between the two are really just an 
argument for the sake of argument, a mere tit-for-tat contradiction laid bare by the realization that he is still 
arguing very much on Schopenhauer’s own grounds. 
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shared by the more moderate critics: the “fairly widespread assumption that the Birth 
incorporates without modification Schopenhauer’s metaphysics” (Young 26).  
 The idea that Birth is incoherent and unthinkable outside of a Schopenhauerian 
context has, for the most part, been taken as read since the work’s initial publication17 
and English speaking receptions of Nietzsche’s thought have been particularly 
susceptible to this interpretation18. In this field, as in many others, Walter Kaufmann 
fought an early ‘advance guard’ against the prejudices of readers in his adopted 
language. Despite this effort however, it would seem safe to say that, for the most part, 
Birth is still viewed –as it was in Kaufmann’s time- as the accretion of an “unswerving 
disciple” of Schopenhauerian thought19. And, indeed, as a perspective this seems 
intuitive. With all its talk of ‘illusion’ and ‘suffering’, the ‘metaphysical truth of music’, 
and ‘redemption’ through art, it is hard not to see Birth as woven entirely out of the 
fabric of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics and dualistic metaphysics. However, the fact that 
we can see the shadow of Schopenhauer’s thought all over Birth does not mean that we 
should simply write it off as a work of discipleship. Claims that Nietzsche’s thought owes 
its lineage to Schopenhauer are too easily taken to imply a continuity between their 
projects. And though it is hard to disagree with Young when he says that “it is impossible 
to read Nietzsche apart from Schopenhauer” (27), this concession does not preclude the 
option of reading him in opposition to Schopenhauer. Daniel Came’s 2016 study of the 
“Attempt” stands alongside Beatrice Han-Pile’s 1999 work in arguing that, while 
Nietzsche doubtless makes use of Schopenhauer’s system -employing its terms and 
certain of its principles- closer examination shows that the end result “should, overall, 
be construed as non-Schopenhaurian” (Han-Pile 374). 
 In this chapter we will undertake just such an examination, offering support of 
the claim made by these latter critics that it is actually when we read Birth as a 
straightforward Schopenhauerian text that “many difficulties, and even contradictions 
                                                 
17 See for example Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff’s contemporary review – “FUTURE PHILOLOGY! a 
reply to FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE’S Ordinarius Professor of Classical Philology at Basel” - which characterized 
the work and its aesthetic philosophy is little more than a confused bundle of “metaphysical dogmas” derived 
from “Schopenhauer’s ‘eternal truths’” (4).  
18 This arguably owes a lot to the early advocates of Nietzsche in the Anglophone sphere. Mencken’s influence 
as one of Nietzsche’s great advocates in the USA points to this, and Bohlmann (40 -44) similarly highlights the 
important role played by Thomas Common and W.B. Yeats in Anglophone adoption of Nietzsche’s thought. Both 
these men understood Nietzsche to be essentially a disciple of Schopenhauer’s.  
19 Kaufmann 131 
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appear” (Han-Pile 373). Ultimately, this argument will be undertaken in the name of a 
more radical assessment of Birth than is to be found in either of these prior studies. 
While both agree with Nietzsche’s assertion that Dionysus affirms instead of denying 
existence, they both also find themselves compelled to posit an ineffaceable division 
between Birth and Nietzsche’s later works. This is because they cannot find their way 
clear to exonerating the work of the problem highlighted by Aaron Ridley when he calls 
Birth’s affirmative element “metaphysically compromised” (2007 30-31). Came and Han-
Pile both see the work as fundamentally concerned to offer a metaphysical justification 
for existence through its aesthetic worldview- something that the later, more mature 
Nietzsche sees as fundamentally incompatible with affirmation. This chapter will thus 
seek to argue, along with R. Kevin Hill and Michael Haar, that Nietzsche’s split with 
Schopenhauer was “operative even before The Birth of Tragedy and was an initial, rather 
than a belated, occurrence” (Haar 37), and that this split extends to a rejection of (what 
Nietzsche idiosyncratically labels) metaphysics as well.  
 Through this examination it will hopefully become clear that the possibility of 
disentangling Nietzsche’s aesthetic project from metaphysics is critically important if 
we are to resist the claim that these early aesthetic formulations can have little or no 
significance for the thinker’s “post metaphysical project” (Rampley 4). The process of 
drawing a line between Nietzsche’s aesthetic worldview and the metaphysical aspects 
of its presentation in these early works will be a complicated process- and perhaps one 
that cannot wholly be achieved. Nevertheless, it remains the contention of this study 
that in the ‘aesthetic worldview’ we find the initial blue-prints for Nietzsche’s ongoing 
attempt to resist metaphysics and the denial of life. But in order to close in on this, and 
provide context for the present study, it is first necessary to gain a clearer picture of just 
what it was that Nietzsche claimed to overcome with his aesthetic interpretation of life. 
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§1.1: ‘To Be or Not to Be’:  Morality, Metaphysics, and the Denial of Life.  
 
In “We Fearless Ones”, the fifth Book of The Gay Science, Nietzsche returns to address 
a principle concern of The Birth of Tragedy; the problematic faith in scientific optimism 
(GS §344). Just as in his first work, Nietzsche is concerned to question the grounding of 
our belief in the inherent value of scientific exploration; a conviction –uncritically 
presupposed- that “Truth” is something inherently good and worth seeking in and for 
itself. Though scientific method commands that we do away with all convictions 
(particularly religious and cultural ones) it nevertheless relies upon our conviction that 
the process of scientific discovery itself is worth devoting our lives and energies to.  This 
belief draws its power “from the thousand year old faith, the Christian faith, that was 
also Plato’s faith, that God is truth; that truth is divine” (GS §344:201). In this sense, 
Nietzsche objects that the Enlightenment spirit has failed to break free of the religious 
worldview which preceded it, so that “We knowers of today, we godless anti-
metaphysicians” remain bound to its critical underlying supposition: “a principle that is 
hostile to life and destructive”. This principle is the moral interpretation of existence, 
the notion that the world and all of life should be regarded as subservient to the ends 
of morality.  
 Continuing the Socratic legacy, modern science seeks after truth as a moral 
imperative- in searching for ‘truth’, we seek ‘god’20. The Gay Science represents a 
culmination of Nietzsche’s increasing interest in the problem of morality throughout 
the works of his ‘middle period’: an interest reflected in chapter titles such as “On the 
Origins of Moral Feelings” (Human All Too Human I) and the subtitle of Dawn: 
“Thoughts on the Presumptions of Morality” (Gedanken über die Moralischen 
Vorurteile). More than anything else, we can see the connection between morality and 
the ‘hostility towards life’ as the motivating imperative behind this preoccupation. The 
psychological studies offered in Human and Dawn pre-empt the genealogical project of 
Nietzsche’s later work in seeking to understand why the human would develop a way of 
assessing life that must, inevitably, condemn its existence as meagre and undesirable. 
                                                 
20 See Nietzsche’s formulation of Socratic optimism: “Knowledge is virtue; sin is the result of ignorance;  the 
virtuous man is the happy man” (BT §14:78) 
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The “Attempt” tries to claim that this interest began with Birth and that this work had 
already formulated the supposition that we find laid out in GS §344: that moral 
interpretations of the world result from, and perpetuate, a hostility towards life. By 
erecting morality as the supreme arbiter of value, Nietzsche claims that we “thereby 
affirm another world than that of life, nature, and history; and in so far as [we] affirm 
this ‘other’ world, […] [we] by the same token deny its counterpart, this world, our 
world” (GS §344: 201). This duality of worlds, the assumption of a more metaphysically 
‘real’ world standing ‘before’ and ‘above’ our own (the immanent, physical world of 
nature) is identified by Nietzsche as the central tenet of all moral systems.  
 Obvious examples of such a dualistic relationship can be found in the Judeo-
Christian belief systems which see the transcendent God as the source of all morality, 
and in the Socratic/Platonic system in which an eternal ‘Good’ exists beyond the 
differentiated world of physical objects as the source of all that is Good in the world. 
But these are not merely specific manifestations of a general tendency. Rather, as Kant 
had more contemporaneously noted, they reflect the very conditioning possibility of 
morality itself: the division (going back to the early days of Greek philosophy) of 
existence between the distinct realms of “nature” and “freedom” (morality) (CPrR 2).  
Kant pays explicit homage to the Socratic school in his attack upon the possibility 
of a Eudaimonic ethics, one that allows ethical action to be dictated by the ends of 
contingent human benefit (CPrR 287). To admit of even the touch of desire, of ‘interest’ 
arising from bodily drives, means the utter collapse of moral action. Since desires arise 
from the physical functions of the body, they are mechanically determined by nature 
and thus regarded as ‘unfree’: what is forced cannot be moral. Perhaps more 
importantly, Eudaimonic ethical imperatives are also relative and changeable in a way 
that no ‘True’ moral action could be. If something is morally right, it is always right, 
regardless of contextual mitigation. Kant thus maintains that there can be “no genuine 
supreme principle of morality but what must rest simply in pure reason (metaphysics) 
independent of all experience” (26). Morality must be unerring and unchanging, and 
since nothing in the physical world is exempt from change, or is unconditioned by 
relative considerations, morality must take its imperatives from another realm distinct 
from the physical: it must be grounded in the metaphysical.  
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 Kant thus understands morality as a “pure conception of duty, unmixed with any 
foreign addition of empirical attractions” (27). Nature - expressed through self-
preservation, individual interest, and the demands of the body - must be wholly 
excluded from moral consideration. Anything else would not be morality: “the 
consequence is the euthanasia of morality” (289). This is no mere hollow, formal 
distinction; the division between freedom (undetermined action) and nature 
(mechanically, causally determined physical existence) that lies at the heart of morality 
is necessary if we are to allow for the possibility of moral action. Kant’s rejection of 
Eudaimonia is fundamentally grounded in the belief that the only moral actions are 
those freely decided upon, without coercive influence. In Kant’s eyes, moral action is 
the only manifestation of freedom in an unfree world, a gleam of hope in an otherwise 
causally bound existence. But Hill shows that what is really at stake here reveals the 
obvious parallel between Kant and the religious moral tradition: 
“Metaphysical explanation shows how action can be morally accountable despite the 
determinism of nature by exploiting the phenomenal/noumenal contrast and locating the 
will [moral agency] outside of nature. This metaphysical setting then paves the way for a 
‘practical’ commitment to the existence of God as guarantor of a moral order outside of 
nature” (Hill 196). 
The ‘utopian hope’ of a supreme moral order outside of nature goes hand-in-hand with 
culpability and blame - factors that are, for Nietzsche, the true heart of morality.  
 If we are to be considered as morally accountable creatures, both the moral order 
and the moral agent must exist outside of the determined world of physical immanence. 
Nature is mechanically determined and its creatures are guided only by drives and 
desires that arise as part of this mechanism. But the human has one foot outside of this 
system and is thus ‘free’ to make moral choices. This has the effect of ‘dividing’ the 
human between a ‘free’ metaphysical essence- a ‘spirit’ or ‘will’- and its unfree life as an 
embodied creature. The latter, and the world it inhabits, is radically alien to the 
metaphysical realm of the moral: physical nature is inherently amoral. For Kant, this 
ostensibly just means that nature does not register on the moral spectrum; animals 
cannot be ‘evil’ in the way that humans can, earthquakes cannot be censured for the 
destruction they cause. But Nietzsche sees something far more insidious at play here. 
We locate freedom, virtue, ‘that which is best’ in ‘another world’ and banish it entirely 
from our own: “before morality (in particular Christian, that is, absolute, morality) life 
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must continually and inevitably be condemned, because life is something essentially 
amoral”21. Where Kant’s philosophy tries to emphasise the positive valuation of moral 
choice - we are ‘free to be good’ - Nietzsche claims that morality has always been nothing 
more than the disguised belief that as physical creatures we are inherently evil. Morality 
is the freedom to blame us for our wants and desires, for our very existence as physically 
embodied creatures.  
In Nietzsche’s eyes, to posit a ‘pure’ moral truth irreducibly distinct from physical 
nature implies that physically embodied drives and desires are the ‘enemy’ of moral 
action. This relation is obvious when we look at ascetic religion’s condemnation of 
sexual pleasure and other physical desires22, or at the Socratic inheritance of 
Parmenides’ claim that physical sense is the source of all delusion. We see it also in 
Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, which discusses how the desires bound up in bodily 
functioning – most notably food and sex - can be brought into line with moral good by 
removing all heed for their pleasurable dimension, and instead subjugating them to 
‘pure moral right’. Nietzsche traces all this back to a fundamental disposition to hate 
and distrust nature and our existence as physical entities:  
[morality is] essentially and fundamentally the disgust and aversion felt by life towards 
itself, concealed and masquerading under the belief in an ‘other’ or ‘better’ life. Hatred of 
the ‘world’, a curse upon the affects, fear of beauty and sensuality, a world beyond, 
invented in order to better slander this world (AC §5:8) 
This view is perhaps extreme, given that in their specifics both Kant and the Judeo-
Christian theologians allow a place for pleasures of the flesh, if approached correctly. As 
Christine Battersby notes: 
In Christianity, flesh is bound up with both evil and good: with the ‘sins of the flesh’ and 
also with ‘God made flesh’. The Hebrew texts do not at the start single out flesh as the 
source of moral corruption; it is only after the fall that flesh is represented as debased and 
evil (Battersby 143).  
Similarly for Kant, we find that emotion “since it is natural, is not in itself morally evil”, 
simply “childish and weak”23. It is doubtful, however, that these objections would carry 
much weight for Nietzsche. Indeed it is likely that he would seem them as re-enforcing 
rather than weakening his stance on the matter. 
                                                 
21 AC §5:9. See also GS §344:201: “why morality at all; if life, nature, and history are ‘immoral’. 
22 As discussed at length in GM II. 
23 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, cited Battersby 65. 
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 The idea that flesh only ‘becomes’ evil after ‘the Fall’ is the ascetic position par 
excellence, embodying fully the moral message inherent in Kant’s condemnation of 
man’s ‘weak’ and ‘childish’ inclinations. Morality exists to ‘redeem’ us from flesh’s 
failures and miss-steps. Physicality may not be ‘evil’ per-se, but it is wholly inferior and 
subservient to the higher, greater realm of morality. Our nature as ‘human animal’ is, at 
best, immaterial when contrasted to the only thing of ‘True worth’- the summum 
bonnum offered by morality24. At worse – and Nietzsche is generally inclined to 
emphasises this aspect- our animality is a deadweight (even an enemy) keeping us from 
the ‘better life’ prescribed by morality. We can thus see why he came to believe that any 
emphasis on the moral necessarily brings with it a condemnation of the physical world. 
The desire to ‘blame’ humans for being humans- human ‘animals’ rather than divine, 
pure human ‘souls’- is baked into the very skeleton of the moral worldview. The Kantian 
idea of ‘radical evil’ -the belief that passions, though natural, become “properly evil” if 
they are not brought under the control of moral reasoning25- translates ‘sin’ and 
‘temptation’ into the philosophical lexicon. This ‘negative’ moral outlook- the notion 
that the world is to be condemned purely by virtue of its amoral nature, its existence as 
not the realm of highest good- is critical for understanding Nietzsche’s rejection of 
morality. 
 At its core then, Nietzsche’s objection to morality is that it pre-supposes the 
existence of “an ‘other’ or ‘better’ life” contrasted to the life that encounters us- the 
world of physical immanence, of ‘nature’ and ‘history’. Kant is quite clear that morality 
requires and presupposes such a contrast (the realm of freedom, of ‘highest good’) in 
order to exist (CPrR 287-9). But for Nietzsche, it is precisely the postulation of such a 
world that is the ‘moment’ of life-denial in moral systems. To his eye, the ethical systems 
built upon this division are a ‘masquerade’: a pretence erected after the fact to justify 
the idea that this world is inferior to another, more ‘real’, more important metaphysical 
realm. Systems of moral action merely serve to validate these fantastical creations and 
to re-enforce their elevation of importance above the physical world. They are thus a 
secondary result of the need to believe in another world - born of the desire to reduce 
                                                 
24 For further discussion of morality as the True worth’ that justifies nature, see §3.2 of this study  
25 Battersby 64-5. See also Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Metaphysics of 
Morality. 
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the significance of this world: to deny immanent, physical life. The “Attempt” presents 
a pathological view of the belief in a metaphysical beyond, interpreting it as a form of 
‘neurotic imbalance’ in living creatures, an “aversion felt by life towards itself” arising 
from “the deepest sickness, fatigue, disgruntlement, exhaustion, impoverishment of 
life” (AC §5:9)26. This “secret instinct of annihilation” and “principle of decay” is 
important to bear in mind moving forward, for in its simplest form, it is this that 
Nietzsche means when he speaks of ‘life-denial’: the hatred for existence as it confronts 
us, and that illnesses’ symptomatic manifestation: the elevation of another, imagined 
world to a position of eminence over our own. 
 
The World Beyond. 
 
We arrive here at a problem. The claim offered in the “Attempt”, that Birth is a work 
that resists life-denial, runs up against an evident objection given the preceding 
description. If the work adopts (as it appears to) the Schopenhauerian metaphysical 
schema - with its division of the world into ‘false’ immanent Representation and ‘True’ 
transcendent Will - then it is clearly not a work of life-affirmation27. For Nietzsche’s 
critique of morality is, in the same breath, a critique of metaphysics in the very specific 
meaning that Nietzsche affords the term. In Human All Too Human, Nietzsche offers 
the definition arrived at by “rigorous logicians”: “the concept of the metaphysical as 
what is unconditioned” (HAH I §16:26). The meaning of this definition, and its profound 
significance, will become clearer shortly. But for now it should be said that the concept 
of the metaphysical that Nietzsche sets out here, in the first of the ‘Free Spirit’ works, 
identifies all metaphysical realms as irreducibly ‘other’ to the physical world: having 
arrived at this definition, philosophy thereby “denied every connection between the 
unconditioned (the metaphysical world) and the world known to us”. The concept of 
‘metaphysics’ is far too complex to offer a thoroughgoing justification of this 
understanding, but for the sake of clarity this study will work on the assumption that 
                                                 
26 Emphasis on the element of ‘sickness’ in metaphysics can be seen mirrored in  §2 of the preface for GS (5) and 
in GS §345. 
27 And this is putting aside the evaluative content of the work, which seems to cast even greater doubt upon the 
idea that Birth praises and affirms life. 
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when Nietzsche speaks of ‘metaphysics’, he means to evoke this definition: a 
transcendent world, ‘meta’ – in the Poetic Greek sense of ‘above and beyond’- the 
physical.  
 It thus becomes hard to reconcile the claim that Birth resists life-denial with the 
admittance, made in almost the same breath, that the work is concerned to offer a 
metaphysical explanation of the world. Given Nietzsche’s apparent opinion as to the 
inextricability of metaphysics and morality (and his notion that the latter exists 
secondary to the former) it seems odd that Nietzsche would be so concerned to distance 
the work from Life-denial while freely admitting its grounding in a philosophical 
precept that he so closely identified with the denial of life. And this is not the only time 
during this period (mid to late 1880’s) that Nietzsche aligned the work with a 
metaphysical understanding of the world: Zarathustra similarly admonishes himself for 
the time "I too once cast my delusion beyond the human, like all believers in a world 
Behind, Beyond” (Z I §4). It would seem then that Nietzsche himself regarded the work, 
even at the time he was writing the “Attempt”, as bound up in the “craving for some 
Apart, Beyond, Outside, Above” (GS 5)28. Should we not take these words to be an 
authoritative admission, as Young does (52-3)? As reason to put this argument to rest? 
If Nietzsche is admonishing himself for denying life and forwarding a transcendent 
metaphysic, then who are we to argue with this portrayal?  
We have here a clear dilemma, the resolution of which will determine the 
significance of Birth (and the aesthetic worldview that grounds) for Nietzsche’s overall 
project. If the work promotes a Schopenhauerian metaphysic, then its author was a 
pessimist and a life-denier. If this is true, then the rest of Nietzsche’s project, and 
especially the Free Spirit, really are reactions against the early aesthetic writings. In 
order to argue the opposite, and thus to redeem the aesthetic project forwarded in these 
works from irrelevance, it must be shown that the Nietzsche of this early period was 
indeed concerned with the question of how to affirm life – and thus that life-denial 
already registered for him as a significant philosophic problem. It must also, therefore, 
be shown that this ‘early’ Nietzsche already recognized the root of this problem: the 
                                                 
28 Note the capitalization that both passages apply to the adverbs used to evoke this ‘other world’. Much as with 
the link between capitalized and un-capitalized versions of the word ‘truth’, Nietzsche is here directing us to see 
these words as essentially synonyms for ‘the Great I-Am’ (God, Truth, Being etc.). 
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desire to look to a metaphysical ‘Beyond’ for a justification that life is regarded as 
lacking. Other Commentators have undertaken a good deal of leg work towards the later 
end already. Harr, Han-Pile, Ridley, and Peter Poellner have all drawn attention to the 
unpublished early essay “On Schopenhauer” as proof that long before Birth, Nietzsche 
had already embraced the Neo-Kantian metaphysical skepticism that he would later 
publically adopt with Human (I §9, 16, 21). Hill Further contextualizes this in terms of a 
project that will become profoundly significant to this study as it unfolds: the unfinished 
doctoral dissertation on teleology (as well as in terms of his formative readings of 
contemporary biologists and the Neo-Kantians) (Hill 75-98)29.  These contextualising 
elements offer justification the “Attempt” and its claim that the reason we are prone to 
read Birth as a work of Schopenhauerian pessimism result from its ‘Schopenhauerian 
language’: the fact that “I labored to express in terms of Schopenhauer and Kant new 
and unfamiliar evaluations, which ran absolutely counter to the spirit, as well as the 
taste, of Schopenhauer and Kant” (AC §6: 10). 
 Read through the lens of this assertion, we can see a different meaning to 
Zarathustra’s assessment of Birth. The prophet’s description of that work’s central thesis 
(the aesthetic justification of life) as “a drunken pleasure for its imperfect creator” (Z I 
§4) becomes a description of the work itself: an imperfect creation “born of my fire and 
my ashes”. Mencken’s “burnt offerings” find a parallel here. But to Zarathustra, the sad 
ashes of this ὁλόκαυστος (holókautos) are what remained of a failed attempt to worship 
before a god he never believed in. He tells us that he is ashamed of this “phantom”, 
birthed of the “suffering and impotence- that created all afterworlds (Hinterwelten)”, 
but that it was precisely from these embers that “I made for myself a brighter flame” (Z 
I§4). The metaphysical phantom ‘fled’ once the fire was allowed its proper form, fed by 
solitude and the ‘mountain’. The metaphysical trappings of the aesthetic worldview 
were a mistake- but this was just a bad dream and never the essence of that worldview. 
It was a sickly, vaporous pall emitted by a fire burning off impurities introduced by pain 
and exhaustion- a fire that grew into Zarathustra. But now we must justify this claim, if 
we are to present the aesthetic understanding of the world offered in Birth as an 
embryonic but impure form of the project Zarathustra was to round off. In order to make 
                                                 
29 Additionally, see n.4 
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the first steps towards this, we now turn to Nietzsche’s study of Philosophy in the Tragic 
Age of the Greeks - a prematurely abandoned ‘sister work’ of Birth. In this manuscript 
we find evidence to support what is perhaps the most roundly rejected of the claims 
made by the “Attempt”: that the early works already had an eye on the problem of life-
denial. Moreover, it shows that Nietzsche already saw denial as intrinsically linked to 
both morality and to metaphysics, and that he envisaged his own project as an attempt 
to resist it.  
 
‘Condemned to perish’: the άδικία of γιγνόμενον30   
 
 Tragic Age is arguably less a scholarly examination of Pre-Socratic thought than a 
highly idiosyncratic narrative constructed around the birth of philosophy. Each of the 
figures touched upon stand as forefather of a certain aspect of philosophy31, with 
metaphysics represented by Anaximander, whose formulation of the Aperon (indefinite) 
is seen as “equal to the Kantian Ding an Sich” (§4: 47). He is presented as the first 
philosophical ‘Hinterweltlern’, the first of this new breed of thinkers “no longer dealing 
with the question of the origin of the world in a purely physical way” (48). He is also 
portrayed as the first moral philosopher, driven to formulate the metaphysical beyond 
by a question: “the profoundest problem in ethics… how can anything pass away that 
has a right to be?” The Greek understanding of Being as ‘that which truly is’ leads 
Anaximander to the reasoning that nothing physical has True existence, since 
everything in the physical world appears to change. How can something that truly is 
ever not be? He is led to conclude that Being “cannot possess definite qualities, or it 
would come-to-be and pass away like all other things” (47) and thus that the world must 
therefore be divided between all that comes-to-be and passes away, and True Being 
“that is devoid of definite qualities that would lead to its passing. Hence its name, ‘the 
indefinite’ (Aperon)”. 
                                                 
30 ‘the injustice of coming-into-being’ 
31 Parmenides is the father of Logic (PTA§9:72), Anaxagoras the originator of mechanistic materialism (§17:117) 
etc. 
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  Here in this work, written immediately following Birth, we have a vision of the 
birth of metaphysical dualism that already displays much that would become central to 
the critique of life-denial. Since everything that is physical changes (comes-to-be and 
passes away) True Being must be located outside of the physical in order to be exempt 
from change and finite specificity. The moral dimension of this equation comes in with 
the claim that it is justice, the inherent nature of existence, which appears to demand 
the undoing of all that is finite: “where the source of all things is [the indefinite “womb 
of all things” (47)], to that place they must also pass away, according to necessity, for 
they must pay penance and be judged for their injustices, in accordance with the 
ordinance of time” (45). If something passes away, the reasoning goes, it must be right 
that it passes away. It must deserve to pass away. And since “everything that has ever 
come-to-be again passes away” (46), everything that has ever physically existed must 
deserve to be destroyed by justice as “an illegitimate emancipation from eternal Being”. 
“[The] primal Being is superior to that which comes to be” - both ontologically (as the 
‘womb of all things’) and ethically (since it is ‘eternal’ and thus ‘deserves’ to exist, where 
the physical does not) (47). Against this ‘perfect Being’, all physical matter is judged as 
inferior, indeed morally reprehensible, for its finite nature. In this formulation, we can 
already see much that Nietzsche was later to denounce in his idea that morality and 
metaphysics are integrally concerned to slander the physical world.  
 The link between this depiction of the twin birth of metaphysics and morality, 
and the arguments made in the “Attempt”, is furthered by Nietzsche’s presentation of 
the ‘path’ that lead to the dawn of metaphysics. It may seem that the relation between 
metaphysics and morality is reversed here, if Anaximander took a moral supposition as 
his starting point for arriving at a metaphysical one. But if we look closely, we see that 
it was in fact a specific attitude towards the world that served as the nucleus for these 
new philosophies. Nietzsche says that it is in the principle of injustice, of ‘deserved 
punishment’ that we learn why “Anaximander was no longer dealing with the question 
of the origin of the world in a purely physical way”- it was “when he saw in the 
multiplicity of things a sum of injustices that must be expiated” that he was compelled 
to look Beyond for the source of Truth (48). Reading the relentless torment and evil of 
our fleeting, finite lives “in the physiognomy of our common human lot” (46), 
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Anaximander is compelled by his hatred for life to ask the question that gave birth to 
metaphysics: 
“How can anything pass away that has a right to be? Whence that restless, ceaseless 
coming into being and giving birth, whence that grimace of painful disfiguration upon 
the continence of nature, whence the never-ending dirge of all the reams of existence? 
From this world of injustice, of insolent apostasy from the primal-oneness of all things, 
Anaximander flees into a metaphysical fortress from which he leans out, letting his gaze 
sweep the horizon. At last, after long pensive silence, he puts a question to all creatures: 
“What is your existence worth? And if it is worthless, why are you here? Your guilt, I see, 
causes you to tarry in existence. With your death, you shall expiate it” (PTA §4:48). 
A great deal of Nietzsche’s understanding of the ‘Hinterweltlern’ as despisers of 
the world can already be found enunciated here. Unable to stomach existence, they ‘flee’ 
from it into metaphysical fantasies, from there to rain their scorn upon life and call for 
its morally mandated end. Anaximander looks to the “self-contradictory, self-
consuming and negating character of the many [immanence]” and sees there something 
horrifying and revolting to him; as such “its existence becomes for him a moral 
phenomenon. It is not justified but expiates itself forever through its passing” (49). And 
it is this fear and distrust of the ‘self-contradictory’, ‘self-negating’ character of life that 
Nietzsche wishes us to understand as the true impetus behind life-denial. Anaximander 
demands a justification for ‘restless, ceaseless giving birth’ and identifies our continued 
existence with ‘guilt’, a refusal of the demands of justice to cease-to-be and return to 
the eternal ‘womb of Being’. Nietzsche places into his mouth the words of Schopenhauer 
from “Additional Remarks on the Doctrine of the Suffering of the World”:  
human beings […] are really creatures that should not exist all and who are doing penance 
for their lives by their manifold sufferings and their death […] Are we not all sinners under 
sentence of death? We do penance for our lives first by living, and then by dying (PTA 
§4:46). 
How is it that we ‘do penance by living? Because the very nature of the physical world, 
its manifestation as “becoming”, as change, impermanence, ephemerality etc. are (to 
Anaximander/Schopenhauer) evil and pain themselves. Death, loss, change - these are 
the source of all suffering and uncertainty in the world, and they are the ‘essence’ of a 
world that has ‘sinned’ against justice by the very fact of its existence. And it was the 
rejection of this world of change and suffering that lead Anaximander to his “acceptance 
of a metaphysically true Being, a world in opposition to Becoming and the transient 
physical world” (PP § 7:37). 
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 The opposition between a world of harrowing change and one of static eternal 
peace is profoundly importance to Nietzsche conception of the ‘sickness’ that is life-
denial. Metaphysical systems are regarded as ‘symptoms’ of “fatigue, disgruntlement, 
exhaustion” with life’s constant demands and uncertainty, manifesting in “a yearning 
for nothingness, for the end, for rest, for the ‘Sabbath of all Sabbaths’” (AC §5:9). Worn 
down by life, broken and demeaned by its constant struggles, “crushed under the weight 
of contempt and the eternal No, [life] must finally be felt unworthy of desire, 
intrinsically without value”. The element of meekness and cowardice that Nietzsche 
wishes to evoke when speaking of those who ‘flee’ from life into protective fantasies of 
peaceful nothingness can be read in the description of Anaximander’s flight from the 
world. We might also see something of the ‘despiser of the body’ in Nietzsche’s 
description of his solemn, acetic, tragic way of being (PTA §4:49). But Nietzsche 
nevertheless attributes to his writings a sort of joyous “innocence and naiveté” (45). The 
notes for the Pre-Platonic Lectures similarly seem to exculpate Anaximander of the same 
kind of deforming bitterness and loathing that characterizes Nietzsche’s later portraits 
of metaphysicians as a class. But in Tragic Age, as well as in the lecture notes, we also 
see the realisation that these naïve first steps were to give birth to a monster: “May the 
path that lead to it now still be so harmless and Naïve” (PP §7:34).  
  In the closing of PTA §4, we already see the first signs of this chthonic monster’s 
emergence in the “deep shadows” and “gigantic ghosts”32 that Anaximander’s 
metaphysical/moral worldview spawned. And “the closer men wanted to get to the 
problem of how the definite could ever fall from the indefinite, the ephemeral from the 
eternal, the unjust from the just, the deeper grew the night” (PTA §4:50). The message 
is clear. The further we followed Anaximander down his path- the more we sought to 
understand why we suffer in terms of guilt, the more we sought beyond our immanent 
world for Goodness and Truth- the more we were haunted by the phantom that 
Zarathustra later spoke of. But the next section of Tragic Age presents a direct ‘counter-
valuation’ to this morbid, moralistic loathing: 
                                                 
32 In referring to Anaximander/Schopenhauer’s metaphysical system as a ‘ghost’, we can perhaps see a 
foreshadowing of the phantom that haunted Zarathustra (see p.15) – a connection made all the more pregnant by 
the way that the ‘prophet of the lightning’ Heraclitus is depicted as resisting this spirit.  
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 “Straight at that mystic night in which was shrouded Anaximander’s problem of 
Becoming, walked Heraclitus of Ephesus and illuminated it with a divine stroke of 
lightning” (PTA §5:50) 
This passage’s associations with the Free Spirit works’ iconography should be evident: 
the illumination of metaphysical darkness in Dawn, Zarathustra as “a prophet of the 
lightning” (I prologue 4)33 etc. But it is Heraclitus’ special place in the early writings, and 
particularly in Nietzsche’s formulation of his aesthetic worldview that is of more 
immediate relevance. Framing Heraclitus’ project as aimed directly at dispelling the 
gloom and darkness of his predecessor can be seen as a programmatic declaration on 
Nietzsche’s part - encoded, but undeniable. Here, in the work intended as a direct follow 
up to The Birth of Tragedy34, Nietzsche ‘tells the story’ of a philosophy which ‘sees 
nothing but becoming’, which denies the metaphysical duality of worlds and emerges 
to challenge the moral/metaphysical worldview. As this study progresses, as we are able 
to examine how closely Nietzsche bound his aesthetic worldview to Heraclitus’ thought, 
it will become clear that this was the first example of what Sloterdijk was to call 
Nietzsche’s ‘divine arrogance’: the ‘lightning’ he is ‘prophesying’ here is his own 
project35.  
 The significant contortions that Nietzsche undertakes in order to present this 
narrative to us can be seen, in a small way, as supporting this idea. It has been noted 
that Tragic Age should not be read with an eye to gleaming an accurate picture of the 
early Greek philosophers. The same can be said of the Lectures. But in contrast to 
Heidegger, who appears to see nothing either original nor faithful about Nietzsche’s 
reading of the early philosophers36 we can, if we care to look, see a number of telling 
omissions or ‘quirks’ of translation in the text. The idea that Anaximander represents 
the dual birth of both morality and metaphysics is arguably just such a contortion. As 
Greg Whitlock notes, the idea that Thales’ heir was concerned with reality’s inherent 
guilt derives from a deviation between Nietzsche’s translation of Simplicus and “the 
                                                 
33 Tragic Age also pairs Heraclitus with Zoroaster as his ‘Oriental’ counterpart (29). The ‘lightning’ that will reach 
our eyes one day with the news of god’s death (GS§145) is another point of connection. 
34 Cowden 4 
35 Harrison, Robert, “Peter Sloterdijk on Friedrich Nietzsche: An Interview”. Audio Blog Post. “Entitled 
Opinions”, Stanford University Radio,  Dec 15, 2016, web, accessed May 22, 2018  
36 Early Greek Thinking, Heidegger, 13-5 
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received text”: most notably his omission of the word άλληλοις37. Inclusion of this 
qualifier would mean that the two realms (Being and Becoming) pay their ‘penances’ to 
one another. Walter Burket notes that this notion of reciprocity places Anaximander’s 
treatment of birth and destruction in the context of the cycles of the days, years, and 
seasons (68) making him far closer to Heraclitus then Nietzsche is willing to admit. He 
remains, to Burket, an ‘ethical thinker’, at least in so far as framing the natural processes 
in terms of human ethical concepts38.  But it is a jump to begin with this ethical analogy 
and end with a pessimistic doctrine of the world’s guilt. This ‘little translation error’ has 
the effect of radically changing the story of early Hellenic thought in a way that ‘co-
incidentally’ adds significant weight to the importance of the affirmation/denial 
dichotomy set up between Nietzsche’s ‘avatar’ (Heraclitus) and Schopenhauer’s 
(Anaximander). 
 In mitigation of this it should be conceded that Nietzsche was far from alone in 
excluding this line: As Charles Kahn notes, it was absent from early translations and 
despite the fact that it was re-introduced to translations subsequent to 1838, many of 
the 19th centuries critical engagements with the Pre-Socratics continued to ignore the 
word39 But Nietzsche undertook his own translations of many of these texts, and this is 
far from the only distortion to be found in Nietzsche’s translations in both the Lectures 
and Tragic Age40: distortions that we must assume are deliberate and programmatic 
given that they come from the man Frieidrich Ritschal called “the best philologist in 
Germany” (Whitlock 2000 xxxvii). It seems clear that we should understand this as less 
of a historic, scholarly reading of the birth of philosophy, and more an attempt on 
Nietzsche’s part to write his own ‘titanic struggle’ against darkness into a mythic, 
philosophical past.  
  Having hopefully thus provided at least a reasonable grounding for examining 
Birth in terms of the project of life-affirmation, we must now turn to the work itself. If 
                                                 
37 PP §6:33.n.14 
38 Gary Shapirpero takes this up to analyse Anaximander in terms of the ethics of debt presented in On the 
Genelogy of Morals. From this he argues that Anaximander’s ‘moral’ worldview holds relevance for Nietzsche’s 
anti-metaphysical project, and the aim of returning ‘innocence’ to Becoming. But since it is precisely the ethics 
of debt that are seen as the genealogical forbears of the metaphysics of both guilt, and of the soul (as ‘culpable 
agent’) (GM II), this line of argument appears problematical.  
39 Charles Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology 194. See also Whitlock 2000 191-3. 
40 See Whitlock’s Introduction to The Pre-Platonic Lectures, esp §II. 
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Nietzsche’s narrative is justified, and we can indeed say that his “entire intellectual 
career can be seen as an attempt to find a way of affirming life in the face of 
Schopenhauer’s pessimistic challenge” (Gemes and Janaway, 289), then it must be to 
The Birth of Tragedy that we should look to see the first (perhaps faltering and 
uncertain) steps in that undertaking. 
 
§1.2: Hellenism and Pessimism; Nietzsche on the Horrors and Absurdities of 
Life 
 
When addressing the issue of life-affirmation in The Birth of Tragedy, we must perforce 
begin by touching on what is perhaps the most evidently Schopenhaurian element of 
the work. The words “suffer” and “suffering” appear no less than forty nine times in the 
main body of the text. This clearly displays a significant pre-occupation with the theme, 
and while around thirty three of these mentions are in reference to the specific suffering 
of some actual, mythical, or literary individual or group, the fact remains that “the 
suffering inherent in the world” (§16) is, quite evidently, a central theme. Nietzsche 
makes frequent reference to the “primal suffering of the world” (§21) and refers to 
existence as “eternally suffering and contradictory” (§4). This seemingly negative 
portrayal of existence must be reckoned with; how can Nietzsche be said to praise 
existence if his representation of it is characterized by something so intrinsically 
negative?  
The answer to this might be sought in Daniel Came’s reading of the 
Schopenhaurian element in Nietzsche’s work. Came mirror’s Han-Pile in presenting 
what might be termed a ‘soft’ claim of parental association, highlighting the importance 
of the Schopenhaurian premise for Nietzsche’s thought while simultaneously framing 
that thought as a rejection of Schopenhauer’s conclusion. Nietzsche begins by accepting 
the pessimistic claim about the ubiquity of suffering to life, but does not accept the 
claim that existence is, ergo, centrally and essentially characterised by suffering: that, as 
Young puts it, existence “is a world of terror and suffering” and thus that “its 
membership is a curse and not a blessing” (Young 7). In elaborating upon this 
distinction, Came divides the pessimistic worldview into descriptive pessimism -which 
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merely highlights the systemic ineradicably of suffering in a finite world of Coming-to-
be and passing away- and evaluative pessimism, which takes this description as the basis 
for judging, and necessarily rejecting, existence (2016 7-13). This is a profoundly useful 
framework, one which highlights the lack of critical veracity inherent in the simple 
assumption that suffering is automatically ‘evil’. But Came does not, regrettably, go far 
enough in applying this principle. He significantly opens the possibility of interpreting 
Birth as an affirmative work in his claim that in it “Nietzsche remains under the spell of 
DP [descriptive pessimism] whilst trying in particular to find a way to resist EP 
[evaluative pessimism]” (2016 8). This shows, as he rightly points out, the defining gulf 
between the two thinker’s attitudes towards existence. But his overall assessment allows 
entirely too much of the evaluative form of pessimism to adhere in his understanding 
of the descriptive form.  
In both essays dealing with the question of pessimism and affirmation, Came 
seems to concede the argument made by Young that a simple, honest description of 
reality leads inevitably to an evaluative pessimism: that “in the fullness of knowledge, 
one would not affirm life as worth living” (Young 48). Thus, while Came agrees that 
Nietzsche’s goal is to resist evaluative pessimism, he is forced to the conclusion that this 
is possible only through falsity and self-deception; 
“The affirmation of life that tragedy produces, then, is not really an affirmation of life at 
all- the object of affirmation is not unvarnished reality- but rather an affirmation of a 
diluted and hence falsified image of reality” (Came 2013 215). 
This stance leads Came and others such as Poellner (1995 64-8) to read the affirmation 
of existence in terms of a mythic obfuscation41. Yet as Han-Pile notes in her engagement 
with Poellner, this need to erect the mythic in opposition to the real -as a world capable 
of receiving the affirmation which our non-disguised reality cannot instill in us- is still 
based upon a Schopenhaurian conflation of description and evaluation. She holds that 
a need to posit deception as the only means of facilitating (a therefore false) affirmation 
is raised only by the assumption that the ubiquity of suffering in life therefore condemns 
life as “terrible” (391). This slippage is precisely what Came appears to have set out to 
avoid in drawing a DP/EP distinction. Having noted the failure of critical veracity that 
leads to a conflation of these two stances – a) life will never not contain suffering, and 
                                                 
41 See also Gemes 2013,  
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b) life will never not be terrible- Came then proceeds to replace conflation with 
necessary correlation: a necessarily leads to b, unless something can be done to divert 
this passage. 
Bernard Reginster asserts that it was precisely his attempt to break this 
‘necessary’ passage from a to b, from DP to EP, that motivated Nietzsche’s rebellion 
against his ‘god’. Though he remained admiring of Schopenhauer’s “unconditional and 
honest atheism” (GM, III, §11), Nietzsche never-the-less criticised his forebear’s failure 
to follow that atheism through to its final conclusion. Schopenhauer remains “stuck” in 
the religious perspective because “he still subscribes to the Christian view that suffering 
is evil and to the ideal of a life free from suffering” (Reginster 161). This hedonistic 
principle- that suffering is to be considered universally and unequivocally as a moral 
evil- is fundamental to the perspectives of the acetic religions, as well as to philosophies 
of ‘resignation’. In moving past this automatic relation, Nietzsche can be seen to 
‘complete’ Schopenhauer’s atheistic project by questioning the acetic doctrine’s most 
(apparently) self-evident premise. But to Reginster, this project comes only later in 
Nietzsche’s career. And it is difficult to argue with the idea that Birth represents life as 
inherently ‘evil’ on the grounds of suffering’s ubiquity: especially given the famous –and 
arguably programmatic- preaching of the ‘wisdom of Silenus’ in §3. The satyr’s powerful 
address to the “wrenched ephemeral race, children of chance and toil” that “what is best 
for you is completely unobtainable; to not have been born, to not to be, to be nothing”42 
seems to make clear that life in its reality cannot be affirmed. Coming from the mouth 
of the “stiff and motionless daemon” who stands outside the world of human illusion 
and sees all, this condemnation of ‘coming to be’ seems to be presented as a true and 
honest representation of life. The human animal is portrayed as “wretched” for its 
ephemerality – for its existence as “Eintagsgeschlect”; the ‘one-day-race’- and for its 
birth from the twin parents of chance and toil. This seems to unequivocally showcase 
the ‘life-denying’ ideology of the work. A human’s very birth is an ‘illegitimate 
emancipation’ from the Good – non-existence, nothingness- that can be redeemed only 
(and only partially) by a speedy death. 
                                                 
42 BT §3 – my translation. 
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Given this presentation, and its place as something of a ‘epigraph’ for the work 
as a whole, it difficult to argue with Poellner assertion that a Schopenhaurian 
condemnation of life as an intrinsic evil remains the “unquestioning presupposition in 
the Birth” (1998 67), the grounding principle of the entire work. And it is against this 
backdrop that the argument about the ‘truth’ of Birth’s redemptive claims is often 
measured. The immediate answer offered to this ‘folk wisdom’ is the world of the 
Apollonian Gods, the “hallucinatory image” of a world of beauty. As the sum of 
“powerfully misleading delusions” placed between the human and the world of ‘Truth’- 
(“a realm of Titans […] monsters)- this world of beauty represents “triumph over the 
horrific depths of contemplation” (BT §3:29). It offers “the only adequate theodicy” (28) 
in the Pantheon of Olympus, ‘reflected images’ of humans that revel in life-as-beauty-
and-luxury, serving to distract us from our “great mistrust of the Titanic powers of 
nature” by recasting life as something divine and wonderful. Against this world is set 
the Dionysian reality of a universe indifferent to human suffering, a world that echoes 
with the ‘shrill’, mocking laughter of the forest god. Encounter with this ‘vortex’ leads 
to a vertigo as we face, with nauseating horror, the sheer depths of meaninglessness in 
the abyssal gaze of “that fearful swirling compulsive process of annihilation which goes 
by the name of world history” (BT §7:46). Pulled out from the comfort of our illusions 
by this vortex, we experience an “acetic mood” of lethargy, in which everyday reality is 
“experienced for what it is with disgust”. In this state, the result of having “cast a true 
glance into the essence of things”,  
“existence, together with its glittering reflection in the world of gods, is negated. 
Consciousness of the truth once glimpsed, man now sees all around him only the horrific 
or the absurd aspects of existence” (BT §7:46). 
 It would seem that an encounter with the ‘Truth’ of reality does indeed, 
necessarily lead to hatred and disgust, a rejection of life. Given these presentations of 
the dichotomy between Truth and illusion, it would seem evident that the only means 
of “overcoming pessimism, of avoiding the pessimist’s judgment of life is self-deception, 
telling oneself ‘lies’” (Young 48). This, it would seem, is the task of the artist. The 
Appoline artist covers over the horror of life with pleasurable illusions. She contorts 
life’s Truth, transforming the “horror and absurdity of life” into a “metaphysical 
consolation” which “seduces us into continued life” (BT §7:48). Tasked with applying 
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“the curative balm of a blissful illusion” (§21:114) the Apollonian reveals its answer to the 
question of affirmation: life, in its undiluted reality, is not affirmed. At best it is endured, 
at worse we flee from it. In this context we cannot speak of a true and actual affirmation 
of life. Though the Hellene chose to embrace her existence, it was not in fact ‘Life’ that 
she embraced, but a false and deluded distortion of it. If this is to be accepted, then we 
remain very much in Anaximander’s worldview. The ‘compulsive’ vortex of world 
history – of change, struggle, suffering- is something that the human cannot live with 
and must be saved from: 
“Even now, fire is destroying your world; someday it will go up in fumes and smoke. But 
ever and anew, another such world of ephemerality will construct itself. Who is there that 
could redeem you from the curse of coming to be?” (PTA §4:48).  
Against the Schopenhaurian answer, Nietzsche seems to indicate that there is no ‘real’ 
and lasting salvation for this crime. To flee from life into death is merely to give in to 
the wheel’s endless turning, and unlike his Buddhist-inspired forebear, Nietzsche seems 
to offer no lasting peace at the end of an acetic death through slow, painful denial of the 
life urges.  Rather it would seem that life itself offers the only salvation we might find: 
“appearance, madness, error, interpretation, contrivance, art”, all these are intrinsic 
elements of life, and the answer that it gives to hatred and despair (AC §5:8). 
 But we may well ask if this is sufficient. The deeply Schopenhauerian idea that 
these ‘compensations’ are themselves a part of life’s horrifying nature- that they count 
as ‘seductions’ keeping the ‘process of annihilation’ running- will need to be addressed. 
But before that it should be pointed out that the dichotomy just established- between 
horrifying Dionysian Truth and redemptive Appoline illusion- is by no means as straight 
forward as it initially appears. Closer reading of the presentation of Dionysus in §7, 
alongside contextualising features found in early drafts of Birth’s thesis like “The 
Dionysian Worldview” and “The Greek Music Drama”, cast the relation of the two divine 
brothers in a somewhat more nuanced light.  
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‘Where the brackish sea/ washes the beaches […] stranger and Greek 
comingled…’43 
 
Martha Nussbaum joins Came in highlighting the importance of the literary and 
historical element in Nietzsche’s presentation of Dionysus as an ‘encounter’ between 
east and west, and between civilization and nature. Came points to the fact that both 
Birth (§2) and “Worldview” (I) present the cultural importance of the relation between 
the two gods by framing their meeting in terms of a historical encounter between the 
Appoline Greeks, and a “grotesque barbaric Dionysian force” sweeping from the east 
(BT §2:25)44. Re-purposing Euripides Bacchae as an historical moment, Nietzsche 
presents us with a vision of Apollo vs. Dionysus in the context of a meeting of cultures, 
peoples, and most importantly attitudes. The sickness that attends the Dionysian 
moment is re-cast, in this light, as the result of a traumatic encounter with ‘the real’ for 
a people too rapt in their own blissful visions of divine power and importance: 
“With their terrifyingly primitive music and wild sexual abandon, the Bacchic revelers 
tore apart the ‘artful edifice’ of Apollonian culture […] In the Dionysian ecstasy, the Greeks 
were exposed to the full force of nature’s ‘artistic violence’ […] Faced with the truth of the 
human condition, the Apollonian illusions could no longer suffice to protect them” (Came 
2013 214) 
This wound, inflicted upon a people by their encounter with the undiluted truth of 
existence, appears to be directly related to their cultural and individual relation to that 
which Dionysus undermines: the Olympian illusion of beauty and order.  
The importance of this cultural, contextual understanding of the acetic sickness 
that attends Dionysus’ coming is underlined in Nietzsche’s presentation of the 
divergent manifestations of the god across different cultures. In the Babylonian Sacaea 
and the more ‘primitive’ civilizations of Asia Minor, we are presented with a Dionysian 
which manifest in madness and violence, “a repulsive mixture of cruelty and sensuality” 
(BT§2 24) in which we see the “regression of man to the tiger and the ape” (25). 
Nietzsche is keen to highlight “the vast gulf that separates the Dionysiac Greek from the 
Dionysiac Barbarians” and does this by characterizing the primitive’s encounter with 
Dionysus in terms of an orgiastic blackout, a “crude, grotesque manifestation of the 
                                                 
43 Euripides, The Bacchae Dionysus’ monologue pp.191-3 
44 See Came 2013 214 
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Dionysiac” in which weak and ill-defined social boundaries demarcating the human 
from the animal simply dissolve: “all social and political bonds were ruptured […] in the 
destruction of every family feeling through unlimited prostitution” (DW I:84). This state 
of madness, pleasurable though it is to the revelers, is destructive for civilization, which 
is swept away in a storm of “effusive transgression” as the human reverts back to “none 
other than the wildest beasts of nature” (BT§2:24). On the other end of this spectrum, 
we are told that the “Asian nature cult” had a quite different effect on the more ‘formally 
advanced’ civilizations of the east. Dionysus brought them the same horror and nausea 
which is presented as having assailed the children Helios, but they escaped the ‘barbaric’ 
decent into orgiastic violence through a retreat from the encounter into a hatred for 
existence and the “longing for a Buddhist negation” (BT §7:46). The Hellenes, on the 
other hand, are shown to have exhibited a much different response. Between the 
madness and degeneration of the primitive, and the acetic despair of the ‘Oriental’, they 
were able to turn the Dionysian into “festivities of world redemption” in which “nature 
first attains its artistic adulation” (§2:25). 
Their resistance to despair and violence is claimed to have arisen “from the 
deepest roots of the Hellenic character itself”- that fundamental craving for life that lead 
to the creation of their Olympian gods and the Homeric epics, in which the only evil is 
being called from the banquet of the world to feast instead on vapors and blood in the 
underworld45. We see from these differing outcomes that it is in fact not the Dionysian 
itself that generates an acetic mood but rather the attitude or ‘character’ of the one who 
encounters it. Nausea, repulsion, depression: embodied moods that arise in us from the 
encounter- or more specifically, once “everyday reality returns to consciousness” 
(§7:46). It is not the Dionysian that leads to pain and nausea: it is the slipping of nature’s 
beautiful ‘mask’ once the veil returns and the reveler sees beauty as just that, an ill-
fitting mask. Once we have seen that beauty is just a lie, we find ourselves like Schiller’s 
young traveler: “Ever from his heart/ Was fled the sweet serenity of life/ […] ‘Woe- for 
she never shall delight him more! [...]’”(Schiller 2009 190-97). Those for whom the spell 
of beauty has been dispelled by the face beneath the veil see only horror and emptiness 
in the ‘everyday world’ now made pale and hollow by its absence. But this is shown by 
                                                 
45 see Homer 1996 §11, BT §3:28-9 
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Nietzsche to be an effect born of affect. Nothing has materially changed for the reveler 
on her return to ‘the everyday’, only her perspective; her ability to perceive beauty as real 
and to take comfort from it has fled, as she “now sees all around her only the horrific 
and absurd aspects of existence (BT §7:46 emphasis added). What has changed here is 
nothing but the weight of emphasis she applies to the various aspects of the world that 
surrounds her. Where before she saw life as beautiful and wondrous, she now sees only 
horror and absurdity. It was this ‘collapse’ of the ability to look upon life as ‘good’ and 
meaningful that confronted the Hellenistic world, as it had confronted the Oriental 
world. 
To Nietzsche, it was a testament to their profound inner strength that the 
‘descendants of the sun god’ were able to resist this dissolution and disillusionment, 
and instead to arrive, thought the encounter, at their festivities of ‘world praise’. He is 
emphatically clear that this is not the result of ‘cheerfulness’ on their part; they were 
decidedly not idyllically ignorant of life’s hardships. Rather the strength to look into the 
void and to return from it with something they could praise and affirm was the result of 
the character that had given birth to Apollo in the first place: the ‘will’ in them to see 
the world as good and great that had always “struggled against the artistically correlative 
talent for suffering” that was also strong within them (BT §3:29). This dichotomy was 
underlined by Nietzsche in the subtitle he appended to Birth in the 1887 edition that 
also affixed the “Attempt” to the work: Hellenism and Pessimism. The parallel relation 
between a talent for glorification and one for suffering shows these two responses to an 
encounter with life to be opposing sides of the same coin. Hellenism and pessimism: 
two different flowers growing from the same stem; one radiant and full of life, the other 
full of rot and ‘negation’. In this perspectival division we see the answer to a true 
separation of evaluative and descriptive pessimism. The Ancient Greeks are portrayed 
as profoundly aware of the hardships of a fleeting, ephemeral life. But they have chosen 
not to allow that to feed their natural ‘talent’ for suffering. This speaks to a distinction 
highlighted by Giles Deleuze as a critical element of Nietzsche’s philosophy- one which 
marks the vastness of the gulf between him and Schopenhauer. 
Deleuze draws a line between suffering and pain in Nietzsche’s thought (12). 
While acutely aware (like his Greeks) that the world necessarily contains “struggle” and 
“agony” (BT §17:91), this does not, for Nietzsche, automatically translate into the idea 
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that suffering –a human relationship to this reality- is also intrinsic to the world. Pain 
has, for Nietzsche, no pre-given existential or metaphysical value as it does for 
Schopenhauer. Rather it is given ‘value’ only through its manifestation in our ‘worlds’; 
the system of valuations that we invest events with in order to interpret our relation to 
existence. This is why Nietzsche felt it appropriate to speak of the ‘artistic’ talent for 
suffering. Pain must be placed into a schema of our relation to the world, for it is a 
pressing enactment of the world upon us. The choice the Greeks were forced to make 
was between interpreting that pain into a world of suffering they should flee from, or to 
use their artistic power to turn pain into something they could affirm. 
 
 ‘folded in love that fears no morrow’ 
 
How is it possible, though, to speak of affirming pain? Critics of Nietzsche’s claims to 
affirm life in The Birth of Tragedy point to the idea that to be happy about pain and 
hardship necessarily involves self-deception. Surely it can only be an act of willful self-
kidding that would lead me to understand, say, a punch to the face, or the loss of a loved 
one, or the systematic abuses of children spoken of by Ivan Karamazov as something 
‘good’ or ‘desirable’46, something to be ‘affirmed’? However, as Deleuze points out, this 
absolute thinking still presupposes a hedonistic assumption that the ‘highest good’ is to 
be found in the avoidance of pain, and that pain automatically equals suffering. If we 
can question this belief, putting its claims to natural self-evidence under scrutiny, then 
we might very well say that not all pain is necessarily evil. Nietzsche’s later genealogical 
project was to undertake this scrutiny by means of an enquiry into just why it should be 
that pain is regarded as evil prima-facia, given that it is so inseparable from the human 
condition. The answer he arrives at in On the Genealogy of Morals is much the same as 
the assertion offered in the “Attempt” and Zarathustra’s meditation upon the 
‘Hinterweltern’. The belief that pain cannot be good, and that the existence of suffering 
proves the world to be evil, comes from those who have become too weakened, 
sickened, and broken by life’s tribulations to be able to affirm them: to continue to love 
                                                 
46 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, Book V, Ch. 4. The matter of affirmation and suffering raised 
by Dostoyevsky’s atheist nihilist will be returned to and elaborated upon further in §2 of this study.  
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life for what it is, pain and all. It is as a result of this that they demonize suffering and 
hardship and formulate their metaphysical Beyond as places free from pain. But not 
only free from pain...  
If we look once again to Tragic Age, we find another thinker of Being, of the 
metaphysical Truth behind our immanent reality in the figure of Parmenides. Unlike 
the Buddha and Anaximander, “The Parmenidean escape was not evoked by a profound 
religious conviction as to the depravity, ephemerality, and accursedness of human 
existence” (PTA §11:81). Rather, he fought both his age, and Anaximander’s illogical but 
‘all-too-human’ moral bile against life, to escape into “schematism and abstraction” -
driven by a “terrible, energetic striving for certainty in an epoch which otherwise 
thought mythically and whose imagination was highly mobile and fluid”. It was in 
pursuit of this goal that he “[grasped] the firm and awful hand of tautological truth 
about being” and “[climbed] down into the abyss” (§11:77).  
For Nietzsche, what Parmenides sought was “peace in being” (§11:81): an escape 
from the “painful” world of humans beset by “irrationality […] glorified in playful 
antimonies” which he found excruciating and “incomprehensible”, raising from him 
maddened screams (pp.77-8). His starting point was different, but his path was the same 
as Anaximander’s. He too sought an escape from the suffering inherent in a world of 
change and ephemerality, a world that must be ‘un-True’ because its ephemerality and 
uncertainty caused him to suffer. To that end he dreamt up the world of Being, of un-
changing certainty, and cried his prayer to the universe: 
“Grant me ye gods but one certainty…take away everything that comes-to-be, everything 
lush, colourful, blossoming, illusory, everything that charms and is alive. Take all of these 
[…] and grant me but one poor, empty certainty” (PTA §11:81) 
Thus, he flees “from an overabundant reality” into “the rigor mortis of the coldest, 
emptiest concept of all, the concept of Being” (pp.80-1). In searching for respite from 
Life, he turns to the peaceful arms of non-existence. This is not death (which retains a 
place in the cycle of change), but the abdication of life disguised as the embrace of a 
‘better life’. In the name of peace and rest, all that life contains – colour, lustrousness, 
growth, joy- are re-cast as worthless and illusory. They are ‘mere appearance’ before the 
Truth of Being; “All the manifold colourful world known to experience, all the 
transformations of its qualities, all the orderliness of its ups and downs, are cast aside 
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mercilessly”, as the corrupt trappings of “this false deceitful world […] faked into lying 
existence by the senses” (PTA §11:79). Certainty, consistency, intelligibility, peace, ease, 
a freedom from pain and loss; these are ‘good’ and ‘divine’ to the life-denier, for they are 
the things that the weakened and broken wish for. And all else - struggle, hardship, 
change, disappointment and the frustration of desires - is evil. But as Parmenides “house 
of cobwebs” shows, to cast away these ‘evils’ is to wish away Life itself. This is not mere 
poetics on Nietzsche’s part, a sentimental, romantic attachment to the beauty of life. 
Rather, as we shall see in Chapter two of this study, Nietzsche believed precisely that 
life can permit of nothing eternal.   
 Where does this leave us on the question of affirmation? It leaves us with two 
sets of evaluative criteria by which to judge life. If we look to the world and try to find 
there the ‘good’ embodied by the world of Being, then we will see at best an imperfect 
and corrupt world in which ‘good’ is tainted by its admixture with ‘evil’. This is not 
surprising, since the ideal against which life is being measured is precisely ‘not life’; a 
world specifically constructed to embody those traits that the ‘otherworldly’ have failed 
to find in the physical one. But if we exclude these metrics, specifically formulated in 
order that we might find Life wanting and unworthy, then Nietzsche appears to claim 
that we find something else, something that is worthy of our praise. That something has 
already been alluded to in the discussion of Parmenides. That something is ‘everything’- 
everything that exists. More specifically, it is Life itself -as an indivisible, inseparable 
unity of everything- that Nietzsche offers as the worthy object of our adulation. In The 
Birth of Tragedy this is embodied through representations of nature and its symbolic 
figure, the god Dionysus. This is why we find, alongside images of gloom and suffering 
and despair, rhapsodic presentations of the Dionysian as the locus of joy and 
wonderment.  
BT §1’s depiction of the “chariot of Dionysus” should be regarded as a pair with 
§7’s description of the nauseating look into the Dionysian void discussed above. Both 
appear prominently in “Worldview” and “Music Drama” in forms that make it clear that 
Nietzsche was significantly invested in tweaking and re-drafting these sections. §1 seems 
to have been a well into which Nietzsche poured a great deal of creative energy in order 
to formulate, just so, his vision of the ecstatic “glowing life” that overtakes the human 
in her encounter with the god (BT §1:22). In contrast to this state, regular humans 
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appear “cadaverous and ghostly” as they look on in incomprehension, or “from stupidity 
turn away in contempt and pity”. Overtaken by a joyous “shuddering”, those enthralled 
to the god are possessed by the feeling in them of “dancing […] aloft to the heights”, as 
gravity and care fall away (23). The scene is contextualized in terms of the climax to the 
Ode to Joy/Opus 125: mankind, as one, sinks to its knees, crying rapt and “awestruck in 
the dirt” (22) before the “Dionysian artist of worlds […] do you fall to your knees, 
multitudes? World, do you sense your creator?’” (23).  
There is little of the grim and despairing Dionysus-as-Schopenhauerian-Will to 
be found in this presentation. Nietzsche’s ecstatic flight into elegiac language speaks to 
the passion he clearly invested in this tableau and the idea it was meant to evoke. In co-
opting Schiller and Beethoven’s supremely powerful artistic presentation of the voice of 
divinity speaking through the chorus, Nietzsche clearly intended this passage to 
‘transport’, or perhaps transpose, his reader into the midst of the ecstatic spectacle. 
Added to this touchstone reference, we might see the continual, emphatic repetition of 
‘now’ (jetzt)47 across successive lines of the description to recall the rhythmic, driving, 
impassioned form of the original Greek odes48. Taken together we might be tempted to 
claim that this was the ‘true’ face of the Dionysian for Nietzsche, the vision that he set 
out to ‘preach’ through the work49. But such a judgement - between this vision of the 
Dionysian as an experience of the “most intense blissful satisfaction of the original 
Unity” (BT §1:23), and the horrifying vortex of ‘world history’ - need not be made. Both 
are the Dionysian experience. Nussbaum points to The Bacchae’s presentation of the 
living-god to show how this apparent contradiction was the ‘core’ of Dionysus as he 
appeared to the ancient Greeks: 
 
Cruel, excessive, amoral […] the Play shows the human Dionysian energies to be both 
glorious and terrible, transfiguring and pitiless, fertile and fatal […] the cruelty and 
                                                 
47 Appearing five times in the closing paragraph of §1.  
48 This repetition also serves to chronologically and linguistically re-center the passage in a manner that speaks to 
Nietzsche’s conception of the mythic: of the ‘timelessness’ of myth that makes the present the nexus of all 
temporality. For discussion of the relation of myth and temporality, see Porter (esp. pp.94-104, 148-163), Poellner 
1998.  
49 if for no other reason than that we see here some of what Nietzsche may have meant when he lamented the 
work’s prose style : “It should have sung, this ‘new soul’- rather than spoken” (AC §3:6) 
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arbitrariness of life are shown to be inseparable from its mysterious richness. The 
strangeness of this conjunction is neither condemned nor praised (Nussbaum 1998 51)50. 
In the text of Birth this dichotomy is embodied in the figure of the Satyr, who 
stands against the ‘insulting’, “sanitised fabrication” of the shepherd and the bucolic 
Idyll (BT §8 pp.47-8). Where the Idyllic shepherd reclines in peaceful repose, 
surrounded by a tame and munificent nature, the satyr dwells in the forest, not 
‘surrounded by nature’ but -as it were- ‘within it’. Half man, half animal, but not “ape”, 
not something primitive and regressed. His is instead “the architype of man” itself: man 
as ‘human animal’. Delight and suffering, sublimity and comedy, beauty and savagery 
combine in the uncontrollable ‘wild man of the forest’, before whom any idea of a safe, 
sanitised, motherly Nature is washed away as “a counterfeit of the sum of cultural 
illusions”. This is not humanity ‘regressed’ back to primal savagery, as we saw in the 
regressive Babylonian variance of the phenomena. Rather we see here the conjunction 
of ‘animal’ and ‘god-animal’: ‘Tier’ and ‘uber-Tier’51 and a “wise prophet from the depths 
of the breast of nature […] symbol of the sexual omnipotence of nature”, as well as of its 
violence and cruelty. 
 Against the notion that it is only illusion and self-deception that can lead us to 
affirm life, we are told that “the Dionysian Greek desires truth and nature in their 
highest power” (BT §8:48) and that she revels in the sight of nature “unadorned” and 
“un-atrophied”52. Apollo offers ‘mere beauty’ and his solitary rule ensured the “radiant 
glorification of the eternity of the phenomena” and a vision of  “triumph over the 
suffering which is inherent to life” (§16:90). In him, “pain is effaced from the features of 
nature by a lie”. But against the arrival of the ‘Roaring One’, “a world built up like this 
and artificially protected” (DW §2:88) could not stand. Confronted with “nature in the 
omnipotence of its being […] the most terrible instinct to existence (Trieb zum Dasin) 
and at the same time the continued death of all brought into existence” Apollo’s spell 
wavered and was in danger of collapsing: “nature disclosed herself and spoke of her 
secrets with terrible clarity, with a tone against which the seductive illusion almost lost 
                                                 
50 See also Nussbaum 2003.  
51 See also WP §1022. 
52 “auf den unverhüllten und unverkümmert grossartigen Schriftzügen der Natur weilte sein Auge in erhabener 
Befriedigung” – “on the unadorned and unattrophied grand handwriting of nature dwelt his eye in  sublime 
satisfaction” (BT §8. My translation.) 
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its power” (DW §2:86). But the unique constitution of the Hellenes meant they were 
able to stand up to the terrible chthonic voice their Olympian gods had been created to 
drown out. Their gaze returned from the beautiful distraction of their dreams of 
‘humans-as-gods’ and looked into the abyss of nature. And the unique weapon they had 
honed and turned into their sun-god allowed them to return from the abyss with an ‘art’ 
that allowed the ‘truth’ of nature to speak in human (or near-human) voices through 
the satyr chorus. It is this ‘truth’ that the Dionysian holds up as an object of affirmation. 
Against the Parmenidian prayer for an end to the epileptic succession of colours and 
sensations, joys and woes, Dionysus offered “a new and higher means of existence” in 
“the birth of tragic thought”; a worldview in which “the complete excess of nature 
discloses itself in pleasure and suffering and insight all at once […] ‘excess’ is revealed as 
truth” (§2:88).  
 
 
§1.3: Dionysian Affirmation: “Flowers […] for emblems of the day against the 
tower” 
 
Jill Marsden (in her introduction to English edition of “The Greek Music Drama”) makes 
much of Nietzsche’s continual use of nature imagery, and of the evocation of surging, 
‘throbbing’ sexual fecundity and potency he invests it with53. The Dionysian festival is 
claimed to embody, in its ecstatic, spasmodic state of rapture, “the powerful drive of 
spring-time when it bursts forth, a storming and raging in a mixture of emotions” (GMD 
14). Buds and flowers bloom, animals multiply, the bees swarm, and all around we find 
the world overflowing with “the countless forms of existence which crowd and push 
their way into life” (BT §17:91). In this mad rush of new life fighting and tripping and 
clawing its way into the world, we encounter, embodied and objectivated, “the 
overwhelming fertility of the world-will”. The Dionysian is claimed to crystallise this in 
the tragic work of art, and to use this vision “to convince us of the eternal joy of 
existence”. But the ‘sexual omnipotence’ of nature, its endless power to create new forms 
                                                 
53 See Marson, esp. 4-9  
~ 47 ~ 
 
of life, is here represented ‘unadorned’, without the prettifying deception that 
transforms nature into something passive and idyllic.  
The confrontation with nature Dionysus forces on us in one in which we see the 
teeming, overflowing, explosive outpouring of life’s energy into individuated forms, a 
spectacle that brings with it a simultaneous realisation: that “everything that comes into 
being must be prepared for a painful demise” (91). In presenting nature unadorned, the 
Dionysian shows both these facets of existence to be inseparable: that which lives, 
suffers and dies. But Dionysian Hellenism differs from Schopenhauerian Pessimism in 
the way it interprets this inseparability. For in raising ‘excess’ as the truth of nature, 
Nietzsche offers a counter to the metaphysical/moral worldview that can only interpret 
the world in terms of privation, of lack or absence.  
 To Schopenhauer, The Bacchae’s presentation of nature reveals, in its vision of 
orgiastic pleasure and violence, an “[honest] description of the terrible side of life”54. 
Tragedy embodies a pressing reminder of 
The unspeakable pain, the wretchedness and misery of mankind, the triumph of 
wickedness, the scornful mastery of chance, and the irretrievable fall of the just and the 
innocent […] here is to be found a significant hint as to the nature of the world and of 
existence (WWR I §51:252).  
Between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, we see two visions of the same world: one that 
is at once endlessly creative and endlessly destructive. But the valuations they place 
upon that world are radically different. Schopenhauer’s worldview will be addressed in 
greater detail in the conclusion to this chapter, but we may pre-empt something of this 
discussion by drawing attention to the ‘star’ which orientates Schopenhauer’s 
ontological, metaphysical, and moral worldview: the notion that suffering is the only 
‘positive’ (which is to say substantive or present) attribute of the world. To his thought, 
all existence is willing and striving, and what we call ‘happiness’ is nothing more than 
the absence of willing, momentarily achieved when willing is satisfied. When we ‘will’, 
we are driven by tortuous desire. When we are satisfied, the desire that was oppressing 
us disappears for a moment, and we experience ‘happiness’- the lifting from our 
shoulders of the suffering that flows from unfulfilled desire. To live is to be driven by 
needs and desires, and to desire is to suffer. Therefore, to live is to suffer.  
                                                 
54 WWR I §51:252. For more on the relation of Schopenhauer to Dionysus, see Nussbaum 1998, 49-52. 
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Happiness, for Schopenhauer, offers no objection to suffering, since it is not 
anything ‘real’ or ‘substantive’ in the first place. It is nothing more than an ‘absence’ in 
the world of willing, serving to remind us that what is ‘good’ – to escape suffering- is 
anathema to a world that is nothing but suffering (and its occasional suspension). This 
position is based on an idea that the world is driven by ‘lack’. Desire lacks its object of 
satisfaction and this tortures us. We are driven by this lack to strive, and when our goal 
is achieved, we lack a definitive motivating desire; this is experienced as happiness. But 
this cannot last, for the subject itself, indeed all of existence, is lack. Desire is a void that 
seeks forever objects to fill it, to cancel its lack. But this can never happen, and always 
something to desire and to strive for still remains, so that the game may be kept up in the 
constant transmission from desire to satisfaction, and from there to fresh desire […] and 
so that this game may not come to a standstill, [the absence of specific desire manifests] 
as a fearful, life-destroying boredom, a lifeless longing without definitive object, a 
deadening languor (WWR I §29:164). 
To Schopenhauer, this cycle of torment can only be escaped in the ‘metaphysical 
transcendence’ offered by “pure, will-less knowing” (aesthetic contemplation), whereby  
The storms of passions, the pressure of desire and fear, and all the miseries of willing are 
then at once calmed and appeased […] we have stepped into another world, so to speak, 
where everything that moves our will, and thus violently agitates us, no longer exists […] 
happiness and unhappiness have vanished (WWR I §38:197) 
Since only willing exists in our world - and willing is always frustrated desire - the only 
way to escape is to pass beyond willing and to thereby transcend the immanent world. 
But Nietzsche offers a different vision, one that arises from his objection to a glaring 
flaw to be found in Schopenhauer’s theory of desire. Claudia Crawford traces this to 
Nietzsche’s formative readings of Eddard von Hartmann, whose psychology of the 
unconscious emphases the unity of pleasure and pain under the headings of ‘feelings’:  
strivings of the will that are not understood in the opposition negative (displeasure) and 
positive (pleasure) but rather as degrees of satisfaction or non-satisfaction of the will as 
they are manifest in […] accompanying representations (Crawford 1997 74).  
Put simply, pleasure and displeasure are the same thing - feeling, sensation - interpreted 
differently according to the degree to which their ‘accompanying representations’ align 
with the desires of our will. For Nietzsche, as for Von Hartmann, “pleasure and 
displeasure are in themselves only one thing in all feelings”.  
This small difference mounts up to a radically different understanding of life for 
Nietzsche, and of what it means to exist as a physically embodied creature. In the 
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Schopenhauerian schema, the only ‘real’ and ‘substantive’ bodily feeling (‘state of will’) 
is privation, the torturing ‘want’ of desire. Its opposite is not ‘real’, being nothing more 
than the pleasurable absence of feeling. But for Nietzsche there is no such thing as an 
absence of feeling55. Rather, pleasure is the feeling of one’s individual will being 
forwarded, and displeasure is the feeling that arises when the world does not conform 
to our willing.  
 Under this schema, the life of the embodied creature transforms. In the 
Schopenhauerian world, the drives of the body manifest as an endless lack that can only 
temporarily be suspended. The world around us can never be anything more than 
fodder for these cravings, which can never give true release. Desire seeks to fill a ‘gap’ 
within ourselves- always drawing in and devouring objects of desire in the hope of 
momentarily slaking the thirst of Tantalus. But in Nietzsche’s understanding, desire is 
not a ‘drawing in’, but an ‘overflowing’: a need, not to fill a lack within us but to alleviate 
the excess of longing that threatens to spill out from us. Slavoj Žižek characterises this 
in terms of the Lacanian ‘encore’, the cry of ‘more’ during the sexual act which “stands 
for more of the same, for the full acceptance of pain as inherent to the excess of pleasure 
which is jouissance” (30).  
Zizek locates this orgasmic impetus at play in the “Intoxicated song” of 
Zarathustra – “sing yourself the song whose name is ‘once more’” (Z IV §19:333) - but we 
see it already symbolised in Nietzsche’s evocation of spring and its association with the 
myth of Dionysus. The Zagreus, the dismembered one, faces an endless cycle of painful 
birth and rending, disintegrating, agonising death; burnt to ash in his mother’s womb, 
torn apart and eaten by Titans, ripped to shreds by his murderous adoptive family, etc 
(BT §10). Yet ever and anew, Dionysus returns, chooses to return, to the world of 
torment and joy. Always the god reforms, always is he “transformed in multiple 
affirmations, rather than being dissolved in original being or reabsorbing multiplicity 
in primal depths” like, for example, the Christ (Deleuze 12)56. The god knows that to live 
is to suffer. Yet because to live is to experience suffering and joy, he chooses to embrace 
                                                 
55 This doctrine carries over into Nietzsche’s concept of choice and valuation: there is no such thing as ‘not making 
a choice’ see Z III §12 
56 For an overview of the Dionysian myths and their connection to themes of dismemberment, reconstitution and 
transformation see Robert Graves 103-7. See also Nietzsche’s reference to the titan myth as exemplar of 
“dismemberment, the properly Dionysian suffering” (BT 59) 
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that pain again and again in its unity with joy. As the seasons turn, so Dionysus comes 
back ‘content to live it all again’ like Yeats’ samurai57. And, because this ‘again’ will 
involve the most horrific suffering and death, Dionysus’ thirst for new life offers an 
example to humanity and “affirms all that appears, even the most bitter of suffering” 
(Deleuze 16).  
 The Dionysian ritual, for Nietzsche, symbolize the univocal cry of ‘more’ that 
arises in all the ‘creations’ and ‘gestures’ of nature. Its tragedies evoke screams and 
weeping laments from the audience, which are simultaneously exclamations (or 
perhaps ejaculations) of rapture: 
Out of the highest pleasure rings the cry of terror, the longing cry of lament for an 
irreparable loss. Abundant nature celebrates her saturnalia and her feat of death at the 
same time. The affects of her priests are mixed in the most wondrous way, pain awakens 
pleasure, jubilation tears agonising tones from the breast. The god, the ‘liberator’ has set 
everything free from himself, everything is transformed” (DW 2:84).  
This transformation is achieved when we look to the god’s death and see not a hatred 
for the world that has so tormented him, but a longing and a craving for its return58. 
Through this lens, the explosive fecundity of nature blossoming into spring is 
experienced by the reveller as Life’s “unbridled craving for existence and joy in 
existence” and this understanding contextualises the suffering that nature also craves 
when it thirsts after new life: 
the struggle, the agony, the annihilation of phenomena now seems necessary to us… we 
are pierced by the raging thorn of their agonies in the same moment we have become one 
as it were with the immeasurable original joy in existence and we sense the 
indestructability and eternity of this pleasure in Dionysian rapture (BT §17:91). 
Where Schopenhauer looked to the infinite succession of willing and saw only an 
endless parade of torment, Nietzsche sees an endless excess of everything, torment and 
pleasure. Both men look, as it were, upon the same world: one in which desire can never 
come to an end. But in Nietzsche’s world this is because there can never be enough to 
                                                 
57 “Dialogue of Self and Soul” is, quite brazenly, Yeats’ poetic homage to Dionysus and the eternal return; with 
its images of nature and colour set against the ‘winding stair’ of the broken tower that calls the soul away from 
the earth, towards non-existence. Its answer to the nihilism of telos and transcendence (embodied in ‘the tower’ 
that calls us to the “breathless starlit air” and “that quarter where all thought is gone”) provides the title for this 
section. 
58 The close parallels between Dionysus and the Christ that Nietzsche would so play on can be seen embodied 
here, mirroring the parallels between himself and Schopenhauer: two near identical visions, two near identical 
acts, radically different outcomes. Where the Christ ‘loves’ humanity and suffers his torment as a means of 
offering them an escape from the world, Dionysus truly loves the world and teaches an embrace of the earth. He 
is thus reborn as a human, rather than receiving eternal life ‘beyond’ the reaches of death.  
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satisfy the endless longing for ‘more’ that we see manifest in the teeming, swarming, 
flowering spring. This drive, that can never be capped, can never find enough to grasp 
for and to long for “is to be opposed to being-towards-death: it is the eternity of the 
drive against the finitude of desire” (Žižek 30). The drive seeks more, but not to satisfy 
and thus end (if only temporarily) its craving. Rather it wills so that it might go on 
willing, that its satisfaction (here desired to be fleeting) might quickly give rise to more 
willing, more experiences and relations, more encounters with the external world of 
‘life’ to satisfy or torment it.  
‘Of dalliance with a Demon thing’59 
 
 The vision of nature as maddeningly excessive and fecund, as a continually 
overflowing fountain of Life-as-‘more’, offers an alternative to the gloomy 
Schopenhauerian vision of happiness always felt as absence. As the conclusion to this 
chapter will argue, this vision of happiness exiled from the ‘penal colony’ of life is 
inseparable from morality and metaphysics as Nietzsche understood them. Zarathustra 
admonishes himself for following this example in Birth, for placing happiness ‘beyond’ 
the physical world. And indeed BT §17 appears to confirm this when it declares that “we 
should seek this joy not in phenomena but behind phenomena” (91). I would argue, 
however, that in Birth and its drafts we find a presentation of the natural world which 
already gestures towards the opposite, towards that which Zarathustra claims to have 
only subsequently replaced this ‘beyond’ with: the body (Z I §3 - 5). In looking to nature 
and the Bacchanalia for images of life’s self-affirmation, Nietzsche relocates ‘good’ in 
the imperatives of the body. The moral man says that ‘good’ is in the avoidance of pain. 
But if we look to the natural drives of the body, with the sexual impulse as their 
architype, we see that as embodied animals we endlessly seek out ‘more’. And since pain 
is always an element of ‘more’ - indeed is identical with pleasure in the heart of its most 
intensive moments, those which the drives appear to seek most longingly - we see that 
there is nothing necessarily ‘good’ about avoiding pain, since it means avoiding ‘more’.  
                                                 
59 Yeats, W.B. “The Wanderings of Osin”  
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The undercurrent of sexual politics in The Bacchae is pregnant with these 
implications. The image of the daughters of Thebes “driven from their places at loom 
and shuttle by the madness of Dionysus” (strophe III, 195) speaks to the awakening and 
embrace of personal, bodily desire in the face of an order that seeks to subjugate and 
oppress it. Pentheus’ promise to the disguised Dionysus60 -that the women who fled the 
city to dance, naked and covered in blood, in the mountain pastures, “those partners in 
crime you brought along with you, we will sell them off or keep them here as slaves, 
working our looms” (Act 2) - should be contrasted with his Mother Agave’s speech as 
she confronts her father carrying her son’s severed head: “I have left behind my shuttle 
and my loom, and risen to great things, catching wild beasts with my bare hands” (Act 
6). 
 Naked, dripping with gore, jumping between sleeping, feasting, and dancing, 
Agave and her sisters are carried along by their desires. Leaving the city and its 
subjugation of their animal bodies, they embrace what it is be embodied creatures. The 
explicitly ‘feminine’ element of this is coyly masked by Nietzsche in the image of the 
Bacchae nursing wolves and doe at their breast, (Euripides pp.215-19, DW 2:84) but this 
serine picture of motherly care is soon juxtaposed (in the play) with a depiction of Agave 
tearing apart her own son to rapturous howls of triumph. The Bacchae’s killing frenzies, 
described in a manner so reminiscent of packs of lionesses dragging down their prey, 
locates the women as animals in the most profound sense, as creatures of birth and 
death in inseparable unity. As she brags to her father that her ‘pride’ hunted down 
powerful beasts “not with spears, or javelins, or by using nets; we caught this beast by 
hand, tore it apart- using our own hands” (pp.234-7) we hear the echo of her exclamation 
upon seeing her son among the revellers: “From whom was this man born? / he was not 
born of woman’s blood-/ he must be some lionesses whelp” (228). Violence and serenity 
trip over one another in the mountain scenes of The Bacchae as peace and rest give way 
to activity, tenderness to brutality. And both sides of the equation are satisfactions, deep 
and pure and blissful, of animal desires- to sleep, to feed, to exercise strength and 
physical power. And just as these urges spring up suddenly and violently in the 
                                                 
60 Nussbaum similarly notes the politics of sexual repression at play in the Bacchae, especially in the messenger’s 
report and Pentheus’ response to it (1998 51-2).  
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daughters of Camus, so nature overflows with sudden sources of satisfaction for these 
desires: 
a knock of the thyrsus upon a rock and water gushes forth; a knock of the staff upon the 
ground and a fountain of wine rises up. Sweet honey drips from the branches, when 
someone touches the ground with only a fingertip, snow-white milk rises up (DW 1:84) 
It would be tempting to read this passage, as well as similar ones in Birth that evoke the 
tiger and the panther yoked or speak of “nature voluntarily [giving] up its spoils while 
the predators of cliff and desert approach meekly” (BT §1) in terms of the biblical Eden. 
But in contrast to these ‘lamb laying with the lion’ evocations, which Nietzsche claims 
to be wholly alien to the Hellenic mentality (BT §8), we should resist the urge to 
interpret these scenes as nature ‘prostrating herself’ in the service of a spoilt human 
master.  
 The ‘return’ of the Bacchae to nature should be read against the backdrop of 
Nietzsche’s critique of ‘natural man’ found in his readings of Rousseau61 and Schiller. 
Birth’s discussion of “On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry” is particularly instructive here. 
Images of a serine and peaceful nature ‘surrounding’ man “assumes the existence of an 
original age of man when he lay at the heart of nature and in this natural state had 
simultaneously achieved the ideal of humanity” (BT §19:104). In the Idyll, mankind 
stands as the centre and purpose of creation, “the spoilt favourite child of nature” and 
must only follow its innate, primitive humanity “with good-natured confidence” back 
to that “harmony of nature and ideal” which is Empyrean - the human ‘restored’ to its 
special place at nature’s breast. Nietzsche heaps scorn upon this “fantastically silly 
flirtation” and states that “all those capable of measuring it against the fearful 
seriousness of true nature […] would be obliged to shout out in disgust: Away with this 
phantom!” (§19: pp.104-6). So how are we then to interpret Nietzsche’s Dionysian vision 
of “a completely magical world” where “nature celebrates her atonement with mankind” 
(DW 2:84)? In the presentation that Birth offers of this “gospel of world harmony”: of 
the human “not only reunified, reconciled, re-incorporated, and merged” with all other 
living things, “but genuinely one” with them (§1:23). The human is not ‘reconciled’ in 
the world of nature but recognises itself as insolubly a part of it.  
                                                 
61 See for e.g. BT §8:29.  
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The Idyll, Schiller’s “spontaneously dreamed harmony between man and nature” 
(Haar 169) manifests as the paradisiacal hope that nature will one day conform to ‘idea’: 
that the human will one day find in the natural world what it believes it ought to find 
there. Though this ‘ought’ originally grew out of opposition to the religious notion of a 
corrupt and ‘evil’ world of nature, it did so in the name of ‘humanism’; of forwarding the 
notion of an inherently good ‘human nature’. It thus redeemed the ‘natural’ only by 
subordinating it to the human, placing it as the ‘lost home’ and ‘greatest meaning’ of a 
“good Man” (BT §19:102). The ‘naturally good’ human sees its ‘vision’ of nature as the 
goal of the natural world.  From the mourned ‘loss’, Eden can be restored to both man 
and nature if the human conforms to its ‘good nature’ (and if it “discard certain things 
in order to regard ourselves once again as this primitive” (BT §19:104)) and nature 
returns from its state of ‘loss’- of non-conformity to that which the ‘good’ and ‘divine’ 
human knows it should be (or rather what its metaphysical moral insight tells her it 
should be). The Dionysian, on the other hand, counters this humanism- born of nothing 
but the human’s need for its own “optimistic glorification” (§19:102)62- with a naturalism 
that does away with all ideas of ‘ought’ and takes as its guide the idea of human “as satyr, 
as nature being among nature beings” (DW §3:94). 
 Michele Haar locates something of this in the presentation of Sophocles found 
in “Worldview”: “reconciliation with reality because it is incomprehensible! Aversion to 
solving riddles because we are not gods!” (DW §3:91)63. While Haar’s close reading of 
this passage seems too selective to follow much further64, these lines do indeed serve as 
an instructive gesture towards the values of the Dionysian. Oedipus seeks for ‘truth’ 
because he does not understand the “limits of man” and believes that ‘truth’ and 
‘comprehensibility’ are values that the world intrinsically respects and defers to (DW 
§3:91). The hybris inherent in his vision of himself as the seeker of truth and the solver 
of riddles leads the tyrant to his downfall and to his eventual reconciliation with nature 
(as fate/world-order): the acceptance that he is controlled by the ‘ruthless Moriah’ who 
rule over all living things. We see here an image of ruin arising from the human’s 
                                                 
62 See also D §31 
63 See Haar 169-72 
64 The passage goes on “joyful living in the contempt of life! Triumph of the Will in its annihilation”, marking 
this interpretation of the great tragedians as grounded in Schopenhauer’s theory of ‘tragic resignation’  
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demand that nature conform to its ideals. Oedipus finds peace only when he accepts his 
place, seeing (in his final blindness) “the worth of man and his limitations” before “the 
wisdom of the world order” (DW §3:90). An affirmation of life (Tyrannus’ choice to go 
on living as a blind outcast) finally arises when he chooses to give up the ideal his eyes 
symbolised, and to defer instead to the wisdom that speaks from nature through blind 
Tiresias. Life is finally affirmed for what it is – incomprehensible and indifferent - when 
the ideals of what it ‘should be’ are abandoned.  
Here we see the importance of naturalism as a counter to both metaphysics and 
humanism. For in both these perspectives, we see manifest a claim that naturalism 
cannot permit of: the claim that the “Human being possess something extra-natural 
(whether consciousness, mind, spirit, rationality, language, or morality) that sets it 
apart from, and places it above, other natural creatures” (Cox 75). Naturalism, on the 
other hand, claims that there is nothing that does not flow from nature and thus nothing 
about the human perspective that would validate its belief that ‘good’ lies in the exercise 
of these supposedly supra-natural faculties. Where philosophy had previously claimed 
a special place for reason and morality on the grounds that they were unique to the 
‘highest’ creature in the world – and thus constituted the God-given tools for seeking 
after ‘true value’ - Nietzsche’s naturalism denies that anything in our world has its origin 
in anything except the workings of nature. And, as Oedipus came to realise, even the 
greatest of humans are as bound to fate as the lowliest animal. Nothing exists that is not 
bound to the world-order. 
 Nietzsche’s ‘declaration’ of the need to “begin to naturalise us humans in terms 
of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature” (GS §109) is only specifically 
formulated towards the end of the Free Spirit arc. But this was only to put into words a 
methodological imperative underlying both Human and Dawn’s investigation of moral 
phenomena and of the value of reason: the understanding that “everything we know as 
the Socratic virtues- are of an animal nature” (D §26). I wish to argue that this imperative 
was already present in Nietzsche’s early works, manifesting as the notion of an ‘aesthetic 
justification of existence’. This notion will be taken up and explored fully in chapter 2; 
but by way of laying groundwork for this, I point to a partial, yet instructive analysis of 
Nietzsche’s deployment of the aesthetic offered by Christoph Cox.  
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Cox points to the aesthetic as an ideal ally for the naturalist perspective because, 
as a category, it “affirms sensuousness, materiality, multiplicity, becoming, historicity, 
creativity, and the irreducibility of interpretation” (6). The original definition of the 
aesthetic was offered by that branch of philosophy’s founder65 as the science of 
‘perception of the objects of sense’: “[in contrast to] the object of logic, the aistheta are 
the subject of the episteme aisthetike”66. This marks the aesthetic as a category 
grounded in the sensate body, in contrast to the ‘Noeta’: “what can be cognized through 
the higher faculty”67. If we keep this definition in mind, it will cast Nietzsche’s interest 
in the aesthetic as a means of re-focusing the human on the sensate. Of course, it is far 
from immediately evident that this is what Nietzsche meant by the aesthetic, and we 
will shortly conclude this chapter by examining a glaring opposition to the naturalist 
interpretation that arises from Birth’s treatment of the notion. But if we are to take up, 
just for a moment, the partial sketch of the aesthetic offered by Cox -as a sort of 
‘constellation’ of associated ideas orientated around the experience of the sensate 
creature in an ever-changing world- then we can narrow in on what it might mean to 
establish nature as a ‘locus’ of value.  
 As Cox avers, Naturalism is intrinsically anti-metaphysical, in that it not only 
“denies supernatural entities (souls, Forms, God, etc.) [but also] Extra-natural 
(disembodied, a-historical, non-contextual, foundational, infallible) points of view” (6). 
Talk of nature as the ‘locus’ of value run the risk of straying into a form of the latter: 
into ‘onto-theology’ as Heidegger and Derrida called it68. The idea that nature represents 
something of a ‘God’ or divinity in Birth is difficult to circumvent, but we can go some 
way towards this task with the help of this notion of ‘aisthetike’. The ‘newly redeemed 
nature’ that the Free Spirit works sought as the locus of human value is specifically a 
“de-deified” one (GS §109). The claim that humans can obtain their values from nature 
would appear to mark it as just another form of Being- an eternally self-same essence 
“untouched by becoming, context, or difference” (Cox 6) to serve as a normative ‘guide’. 
                                                 
65 Alexander Gottlieib Baumgarten 
66 Baumgarten Meditationes §CXVI 
67 Ibid 
68 See Heidegger What is Metaphysics, Identity and Difference. For commentary on Derrida’s contribution, see 
Coward. Haar, for his part, holds that “despite his opposition to traditional metaphysics and theology, Nietzsche 
repeats traditional onto-theological structures” (Williams 330. Cf. Haar 164).  
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But if we interpret ‘nature’ along the lines offered by this understanding of the aesthetic, 
we can arrive at an idea of it as, similarly, a ‘constellation’, or perhaps rather as a ‘field’ 
or ‘stage’.  
Nature simply means everything that exists for the physically embodied animal; 
all the world of sight and sensation and desire, change and growth, life and death. It 
should be contrasted to the idea of, for example, ‘human nature’ forwarded by Hume. 
Nothing grounded or essential is implied. It is just the ‘play’ of forces on one another, 
and the impressions these forces leave on our bodies. In opposition the idea that we 
receive our values from nature (with all the implications of a deferential subject bowing 
before its God), naturalism with respect to values is simply the claim that we form values 
as a part of that unbroken natural unity, and that our values should reflect that fact. In 
formulating our values thusly, we turn away from the denial of Life: which is to say, the 
tendency to formulate our values in opposition to life, or at the very least to formulate 
them in terms of a world that is not life.  
 The Dionysian is claimed to provide, through its insight into the ‘sexual 
omnipotence of nature’, a contextualisation of suffering as simply one perspective on a 
world that is “at the same time supreme suffering and supreme pleasure” (Haar 39). The 
image of nature’s undying thirst for ‘more’, even if this means more suffering, inspires 
the human to be as Dionysus, and to overcome a focus on pain and negativity in the 
name of embracing the thirst for ‘more’ that runs through her as well. However, this 
inspiration only works if we accept the world of sensate feeling as all that there ever 
could be. If we imagine, as Schopenhauer and the other ‘hinterweltern’ did, the 
existence of a place where pain could somehow be distilled and removed from existence, 
then that world would doubtless be preferable. The absolute unity of pleasure and pain 
that Dionysus points to shows this to be impossible in a sensate world. It is because of 
this impossibility that those who cannot handle ‘more’ if it means more pain, create for 
themselves ‘other worlds’; beyond the play of sense, of pleasure and pain. Understood 
from the perspective of nature however, these creatures are not ‘higher’, as they like to 
believe. Rather they represent a ‘malfunction’ of the world, a creature that still desires 
‘more’, but has invented for itself a fantasy through which to seek imagined versions of 
it; impossible ‘satisfactions’ that can paradoxically exist disentwined from their other 
interpretive ‘identity’ as pain.   
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This fantasy requires the creature to negate and dismiss the world of sense which 
is satisfaction’s only real locus; the animal turns away from life. As Zarathustra 
formulates it: 
Even in your folly and contempt, you despisers of the body, you serve your [animal] Self. 
I tell you: your Self wants to die and turn away from life. Your Self can no longer perform 
that act which it most desires to perform: to create beyond itself […] And therefore you 
are now angry with life and with the earth. An unconscious envy lies in the sidelong glance 
of your contempt (Z I §4).  
Naturalism presents an opportunity to recognise that any claim to be serving an interest 
‘higher’ than those that could be derived from the earth and the world of nature is a 
sham. And, as The Bacchae’s vision of nature giving forth succour and delights is 
intended to show, the world can provide for this-worldly needs. When the honey of life 
turns to ash in the mouth of the self-loathing Self, when it cannot find in the world what 
it desires, it looks to other worlds for pure and easy satisfactions that cannot exist. But 
such satisfactions will only ever be pale shadows of what the embodied creature truly 
desires, things that only the world it has turned its back on can offer. As Deleuze puts 
it, if “life takes charge of justification”, if life is allowed to provide the metric by which 
it judges itself, then it “makes suffering an affirmation” and “affirms even the harshest 
suffering” (15)69. Conversely if life is excluded, and another, transcendent metric is 
permitted, then suffering becomes “a convulsion, a numbness… a means of accusing life, 
of contradicting it”. Life, judged by its own standards, affirms suffering in its identity 
with joy. But if our metaphysical fantasies of a world without pain are to be placed 
against a life that is entirely pain, as it is entirely pleasure, then life can only ever be 
condemned - for failing to be what was dreamt up as its antithesis.  
 Life as the metric for judging life, the denial of any other possible world against 
which to compare it and find life wanting; this is the way Nietzsche conceived of his 
affirmative interpretation of existence. Central to this task: the goal of “translating man 
back into nature” as a means of making the human “deaf to the siren song of old 
metaphysical bird catchers who have been piping at him too long; ‘you are more, you 
are higher, you are of different origin’” (BGE §230). But is the doctrine of ‘life judged by 
                                                 
69 This reference may appear to contrast the earlier definition of suffering as distinct from pain. However, this 
should be understood through Deleuze’s assertion that pain manifests as either positive suffering “suffering from 
an abundance”- the painfully over-fecund desire for life- and the negative suffering of privation (12-6). 
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its own metric’ (reliant as it is upon the denial of the metaphysical) what we in fact find 
in The Birth of Tragedy? Does the ‘corpse smell’ of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics not 
undermine this, dispelling naturalism and with it the affirmation embodied in 
Dionysus? 
Conclusion: Day and Night; Duality and the Problem of Affirmation.  
 
Against the arrangement given so far -which foregrounds the rhapsodic presentations 
of Dionysus-as-nature and the evident enthusiasm exuded by the tripping, ‘Rausch de 
Gefuhle’ infused prose in which they are presented- it should always be recalled that 
Birth is also filled with equally poetic flights of mourning for a world contorted by gloom 
and misery. Philological arguments tracing the development of the former imperative 
across the successive drafts of the work are all very well. Henry Staten’s keenly observed 
insight as to the gradual modulation of the word ‘Will’ into less ‘loaded’ terms in the 
final draft should be recalled (192). But so should Ridley’s reservations about reading 
the work in, as it were, two halves (2007 pp.29-31). The pessimistic gloom that frequently 
overtakes the piece provides more than ample grounding for Ridley’s (“admittedly 
hazy”) feeling that the work still embraces a redemptive metaphysic, which sees 
salvation in an escape from the world of individuation. As Ridley shows, this seems to 
go hand-in-hand with the psychological thesis by which Staten seeks to ground Birth in 
a wholly immanent materialism. The two are knotted together to such an extent that it 
to read the work as schizophrenically split between its ‘true’ intentions and the 
Schopenhauerian ‘façade’ it felt required to maintain, reduces both sides to 
incomprehensibility.  
 Unless we can find a way of explaining the apparently metaphysical distinction 
between unity and differentiation in non-metaphysical terms, we are left with the 
inescapable conclusion that Birth fails Nietzsche’s own test of offering an affirmative 
view of life. We are forced to concede that the work continues to substantively divide 
reality between a world of suffering – physical immanence- and one of ‘hope’ – ‘The 
Beyond’. And if this is correct, then we must accept that aesthetics merely stands in for 
morality- as a ‘path’ to that Beyond- instead of offering the means to efface and dispel 
it. The apparent ‘inversion’ of this schema offered in BT §3 (immanence as the salvation 
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from the ‘torment’ of the beyond) does little to undermine this problem. Either Life -by 
its very existence as individuation- is the source of all evil (“we should regard the state 
of individuation as the source and original cause of suffering, as something 
objectionable in itself” (BT §10: pp.59-60)), or differentiation is a balm, by which the 
‘primal unity’ – “eternally suffering and contradictory”- finds “redemption from itself” 
(§4: pp.30-1). Either the answer is to flee individuation, or to hide in delusion from the 
horrors of reality. In neither case are we offered an ‘affirmation’. And in both instances, 
aesthetics offers the path of salvation, either towards or away from the metaphysically 
‘True’. 
 The problem of reading Birth as a work of affirmation is nicely captured in 
Deleuze’s inconsistent presentation of the work and its ‘affirming’ god. In what is clearly 
intended as a metonymic evocation of both Birth, and of Nietzsche’s career as a whole, 
we are told that “from the outset, Dionysus is presented as the affirmative and affirming 
god. He is the god who affirms life, who must affirm life” (12). Nietzsche sets out to 
vindicate life. But immediately after the claim that Dionysus “affirms the pains of 
growth, rather than reproducing the sufferings of individuation” -and is as such a 
symbol for “the affirmation of life instead of its higher solution or justification”- we are 
told that “Under Wagner and Schopenhauer’s influence, the affirmation of life is still 
conceived in terms of resolution of the suffering at the heart of the universal, and a 
pleasure which transcends the individual” (Deleuze 13).  
Staten offers a comparable summary, casting the Dionysian redemption as a sort 
of ‘Thanatos’, drawing on historic accounts of the Dionysian mysteries and the cultic 
notion that we might “die into eternal life” (114). The reading offered previously- of 
Dionysus choosing life over permanent dissolution- is inverted, as the rending death of 
the god comes to represent the birth of the individuated world: Will rent apart in agony. 
The ‘rebirth’ of the ‘Zagreus’ into a complete human body conversantly represents “the 
bliss of ceasing to be”. This metaphoric construction is problematic, and Staten admits 
as much- though he puts this down to a problem of authorship. The ‘death drive’ is the 
fundamental imperative behind the Dionysian rapture, but it is communicated through 
a metaphoric structure that Nietzsche “never fully controls” (115), preventing this insight 
from fully crystalizing in the work.  
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The obvious objection to this would be that the problem lies with Staten and his 
willingness to contort the Dionysian to conform to a Freudian framework: one that casts 
the god as symbol of hysteria and castration anxiety (pp.116-19). But the claim of a ‘will 
to death’ underlying Birth, and the theme of a unity dismembered, must be confronted. 
This point is touched upon as a profound problem by Deleuze, who observes that  
The supra-personal element always accompanies the affirming element and finally takes 
on its benefits... Demeter learns that she will give birth to Dionysus once again; but this 
resurrection of Dionysus is only interpreted as the ‘end of individuation’ (Deleuze 13).  
There is no doubt that Birth speaks in what Young calls “apocalyptic terms” (46) of a 
“hope” for the end of the phenomenal world; “a joyful hope that the spell of 
individuation is to be broken”, manifesting the “only…ray of joy” that might “cross the 
face of the world which is torn asunder and broken into individuals” (BT §10:60). This 
does not sound like an affirmation of the world.  
 The life-denial inherent in eschatological visions of ‘the end of individuation’ 
should be clear. Additionally, the ‘supra-personal’ dimension discussed by Deleuze 
negatively effects the alternative interpretation offered above: that life is to be embraced 
as preferable to the horrors of Truth. If ‘hope’ lies in this ‘supra-personal’ (here still 
interpreted as ‘metaphysically transcendent’) perspective, then the question arises if 
what is offered here can ever give solace to the human animal. This question prefigures 
a significant theme addressed at length in the next chapter of this study, one that is 
important to at least touch upon in the context of the present discussion. As Young puts 
it, if the unity is ‘metaphysically other’ to the immanent physical world, the Dionysian 
rapture can only be conceived of as a state in which “one identifies with a nonhuman 
being, the primal unity, or ‘will to live’ which celebrates, says yes to, not the 
inexhaustibility of human life but rather ‘its own inexhaustibility’” (53). In the 
Dionysian, the human “is rescued, for its own purposes- by life” (BT §7:46 emphasis 
added). This distinction appears to mark a difference between the interests of the 
embodied creature and that of the Unity and evokes with it the Schopenhauerian moral 
idea of life’s perfidious ‘seduction’ of the living. A brief assessment of this idea, and 
Nietzsche’s relation to it, will be instructive for showing just why the naturalist schema 
gestured toward in this chapter is important for understanding Nietzsche’s aesthetic 
worldview as the only possible lens through which to affirm existence.  
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 Schopenhauerian morality takes its cue from the Kantian system, and while 
Schopenhauer was deeply critical of elements in Kant’s moral theory70, he never-the-
less praised the latter’s demonstration that morality is “transcendental, or 
metaphysical”, that it constitutes “the bridge leading to […] the world of Things in 
Themselves” (OBM 11)71. This understanding, and Nietzsche’s opinion that it 
represented the essential thread uniting all moral (as opposed to purely ethical) world-
views was discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Schopenhauer’s thought was 
regarded by Nietzsche as the zenith of these worldviews- their logic taken to its fatal 
culmination- and is thus especially instructive for understanding the problem of 
metaphysics. This is because Schopenhauer, more than perhaps any other moral thinker 
(with the possible exception of some Gnostic and Buddhist sects) had emphasized that 
animal existence is not simply something inferior, which morality allows us to rise 
above. Rather, our very existence as embodied animals speaks to an irredeemable and 
inexcusable evil- one so insidious that only morality can save us from it. Life is cast as 
not only radical evil, but manipulative: a devouring slave-master whose victims actively 
fight to perpetuate their slavery. 
 Morality is important to Schopenhauer because it ‘breaks the spell’ of 
individuated immanence and reveals the unifying nature of all life: suffering. Within the 
immanent world of nature, Schopenhauer says that there is only ‘good’, defined as 
“fitness or suitability of an object to any definitive effort of the will” (WWR I §65:360). 
This is to say that something is good if it achieves the ends of some aspect of willing - if 
it has instrumental value. Taken purely from the perspective of nature, there is only 
good, since everything in it is purposive towards the ‘ends’ of nature: to endlessly play 
out the insatiable desires of the Will. Everything in nature perfectly objectivates this 
goal72, and even in ‘failure’ (death) the Will’s creations serve the purpose of ‘keeping the 
                                                 
70 Notably that “It is precisely what is moral within us that [Kant] describes as being in closest connection 
with the true essence-in-itself of things” OBM 14-18. See also Cartwright 1999 255-57; 1998 123-4, Janaway 
1994 74-5. 
71 For commentary, see Cartwright 1999 256 
72  As shown in the discussion of organs as manifestations of desire: “the parts of the body must 
correspond completely to the chief demands and desires by which the will manifests itself; they must be 
the visible expression of these desires. Teeth, gullet, and intestinal canal are objectified hunger; the 
genitals are objectified sexual impulse; grasping hands and nimble feet correspond to the more indirect 
strivings of the will which they represent” (WWR I §20 108). 
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engine running’, so to speak. Everything contributes to the higher good of the system 
of nature, and thus every part of nature contributes –in all its activities- to the eternal 
perpetuation of the Will’s desire to ‘will ever afresh’ through the simple expedience of 
existing. Within nature, nothing is not ‘good’. But the integrity of this enclosed economy 
is broken by morality, which offers a glimpse behind the wizard’s curtain.  
In claiming that something might be absolutely and unconditionally right, 
morality places upon valuation the need for a “highest good, summum bonum”: a perfect 
moral state that moral action guides us to (WWR I §65:362). This absolute cannot exist 
immanently, in a world that knows only relative, instrumental good. The human turns 
instead to the ‘metaphysical’, looking for the immutable higher purpose that unites and 
validates all individual goods. But once it does this, the ‘mask’ slips and life’s smile of 
endless self-satisfaction becomes a demonic grimace of predatory malevolence. The 
‘eternal purpose’ of the world is revealed to be only the perpetuation of willing, and thus 
the perpetuation of suffering. Against the backdrop of life’s eternal striving after its own 
perpetuation, ‘highest good’ becomes the ‘death’ of the Will and of nature itself. The 
teleological attainment of a final, perfect ‘good’ would be tantamount to “a final 
satisfaction of willing, after which no fresh willing might occur; a last motive, the 
attainment of which would give the Will imperishable satisfaction”. So not only is 
willing not able to stand as a perfect, highest good, but its continued existence actively 
prevents, actively works against, such a highest good from coming into existence. 
In the world of immanence, which knows only the endless succession of partial 
and temporary goods, summum bonnum “cannot be conceived. The will can just as little 
through some satisfaction cease to will always afresh, as time can end or begin”. Thus, 
Schopenhauer insists that “[t]here is good only locally, relative to some particular 
occurrence or state of willing”73, but that the very existence of the Will as an essential, 
unending striving precludes the possibility of attaining any final, moral ends. Cut off 
from the true Good as ‘final ends’, all life is shown as the absurd striving after nothing 
but more striving: suffering exists only so that we might continue to suffer as the “wheel 
of Ixion” inexorably turns (WWR I §38:196). In the world of nature, radically cut off from 
final ends, “the suffering [life] perpetuates cannot have any teleological justification. So 
                                                 
73 Janaway 1999 326 
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human individuals not only suffer- they suffer pointlessly” (Came 2016 10). Pointlessness 
is, however, far from the worst of it. Wholly and inescapably immersed in the ‘evil’ of 
the Will’s world, the animal creature is ‘tricked’ into believing that the Will’s deceptive, 
false ‘good’- that which serves its ‘evil’ ends- are good and desirable for the creature, 
instead of being the means by which their misery and servitude are perpetuated. 
Nietzsche’s emphasis on the sexual dimension of the Dionysian comes into play 
here, since sex is to Schopenhauer the perfect example of the way that animals are 
‘seduced’ into fighting to perpetuate life through instinctual drives and physical 
pleasure74. The animal, as nothing more than its drives, is kept enthralled to the Will’s 
strivings by chemical stimulus. Human consciousness exists in partial detachment from 
this, in so far as it is able to observe its own drives from a spectatorial remove. But in 
the cruelest of the Will’s jokes, it cannot escape those drives and has only limited control 
over their exercise. Consciousness, even more than the pre-conscious animal, is a 
prisoner of the Will; “the will to life already inhabits us prior to any understanding or 
deliberation […] the primary will to live ‘in’ me is not my will” - does not have anything 
to do with the desires or volitions of the consciousness that ‘is’ me - and thus “life is an 
unchosen goal of our striving” (Janaway 1999 326)75.  
Enslaved by the Will, cursed to have emerged from an animal mind jerked around 
on the puppet strings of desire and aversion, the human is condemned to a pointless 
existence of suffering it did not choose and cannot escape. When it believes itself an 
animal like all others, the human is not aware of this violation and is largely content to 
act out the Will’s endless dance of violence and sorrow. But in the moral capacity, the 
ability to conceive of a ‘higher good’ above the relative good reached by satisfying its 
animal urges, the human first glimpses the possibility that violence only satisfies the 
Will while giving misery to the creatures it has created to play out its desires. In realizing 
that suffering is absolutely wrong when viewed from outside of nature, we see that a life 
that endlessly perpetuates suffering in order to defer what is ‘right’ must be resisted: 
                                                 
74 Schopenhauer’s own essay “Doctrine of Affirmation and Denial of the Will to Live” (PPL II XII) famously 
demonstrates this with the Roman maxim “illico post coitum cachinnus auditur Diaboli”. ‘Directly after 
copulation the devil’s laughter is heard’ 
75 See also Georg Simmel, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer pp.30-1 
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[As this] knowledge reacts on the will, it can bring about the will’s self-elimination, in 
other words resignation. This is the ultimate goal and innermost nature of all virtue and 
holiness and is salvation from the world (WWR §27:152). 
We see here just what Nietzsche sought to achieve through his resistance to morality. 
In the wholly immanent world that Schopenhauer’s morality revealed as a ‘lie’, 
everything that serves the ends of life is ‘good’. Within the enclosed space of the 
physical, nature always serves its ends: to continue – or for Nietzsche, to ‘grow’. It is 
only the rupturing of this space and the invention of something Beyond that allows for 
people to begin positing ‘metaphysical’ perspectives against which to compare the 
world.  
It was this ‘amputation’ of the metaphysical that was the goal of Nietzsche’s 
naturalist project- to close the hole in the economy of reality (Life) by denying that 
anything about morality or reason gives any kind of insight into a world outside of that 
economy. These treasured ‘higher faculties’ are subjected to psychological examination 
and shown to be “nothing beyond entirely mundane developments and transformations 
of our original and fundamental human animality” (Schacht 192). If the aesthetic project 
remains concerned with metaphysics, with the bridging of a gap between the nature 
world and some external ‘other’, then it can have no part in that project. But if, on the 
other hand, it does as Nietzsche claims, and offers an alternative valuation that shows 
all worth to originate in Life itself, a valuation that radically denies the existence of a 
Beyond that Life is subordinate too, then those aspects of the Dionysian aesthetic 
discussed in this chapter are revealed as the founding movements in that undertaking. 
The division, ultimately, comes down to the nature of the answer that Birth offers to the 
problem of suffering: the Dionysian state in which “for a few short moments we really 
are the original essence itself, and feel its unbridled craving for existence and joy in 
existence […] and we sense the indestructability and eternality of this pleasure in 
Dionysian rapture” (BT §17:91). Are we to understand this as a unity with Life? As the 
human’s immersion in nature, the realisation that she is nothing more than a 
manifestation of that joyous, omnipotent power? Or must we understand it as the 
stripping away of Life’s deceptive specificity, a flight into a “metaphysical level […] which 
underlies the ordinary world of experience” (Ridley 2007 30)?  
 




It will be the concern of this chapter to discuss the relationship between the aesthetic 
and the metaphysical in Nietzsche’s early writing. The ultimate question that must be 
faced is whether the aesthetic worldview Nietzsche proposes is substantively different 
from the moral systems he argued against. Can we really see the aesthetic as a ‘counter 
valuation’ of Life, one that resists and overcomes morality’s attempt to subordinate Life 
to a metaphysical ‘other’? Or is this new valuation just another form of morality, one 
stripped of its ethical content in favor of Romantic aestheticism: an ‘immoral’ morality, 
rather than an ‘amoral’ counter doctrine?  
The answer to this offered in “An Attempt at Self-Criticism” is contradictory and 
problematic. AC §5 states that the original introduction of the work- a dedication to 
Wagner- establishes “art- and not morality- as the proper (eigentlich) metaphysical 
activity of mankind” (8). This would seem to indicate that art is offered as a straight 
swap, a replacement for morality as the ‘proper’ means to metaphysical insight. In 
addition, the subsequent assertion that the aesthetic worldview represented “the first 
time that a pessimism ‘beyond good and evil’ announced itself” would seem to support 
this idea: that Nietzsche simply stripped out the normative, ethical substance of 
morality while maintaining its essential structure. A new morality, with good and evil 
simply replaced. However, this ‘beyond good and evil’ is claimed to have been achieved 
by relegating “[morality] to the world of phenomenon”- i.e. by stripping it of its 
metaphysical pretentions and naturalising it. In its place, the aesthetic is offered, a 
system of valuation embodying “that perversity of mind against which Schopenhauer 
tirelessly directed the curses and thunderbolts of his greatest wrath” (8). Here we have 
the moral ‘pathway to beyond’ naturalised and desecrated (brought back to its all-too-
human, all-too-natural origin) and replaced. But with what? With what Schopenhauer 
calls, in the essay “On Human Nature”, “the real perversity of mind […] that which 
religion has personified as Anti-Christ”: the claim that “the world possesses no moral 
significance and alone a physical one” (PPL §108).  
We might explain this tension as Nietzsche attempting to forward a sort of 
‘limited metaphysic’- one that takes the physical meaning of life to be its exclusive 
metric for valuation. However even this idea remains problematic, given the discussion 
~ 67 ~ 
 
undertaken in the previous chapter; after all, any metaphysic, any idea of a view from 
‘outside’ of life opens up problems for Nietzsche - problems that will become even more 
apparent and significant as this chapter proceeds. It will be seen that even if what 
Nietzsche proposes here is nothing more than a way of ‘looking-back-in upon’ nature 
from ‘above’ as it were - with no ‘otherworldly’ co-ordinates of reference needed- the 
mere fact of positing such a metaphysical perspective ‘breaks’ the absolute frame of 
immanence required if life is claimed to be justifying itself: to be ‘affirmed’ and ‘loved’ 
for itself.  
If we now turn to Birth itself, we can see these problems starting to manifest. The 
most obvious assertion of the metaphysical nature of the books aesthetics to be found 
there is in BT §4, where Nietzsche forwards the “metaphysical assumption” (der 
metaphysischen Annahme) of a division between the “Truth” of unity and the “the 
delightful vision” (30). James Porter, in The Invention of Dionysus offers a reasonable 
(though by no means conclusive) argument that Nietzsche worded this section to avoid 
fully committing to the “constitutively iffy” philosophic fairy-tale presented therein76. 
But far more substantive- and far more pressing for the question at hand- is the 
formulation offered in the works penultimate section. 
 Towards the close of Birth, it is offered that “art is not merely an imitation of 
nature, but a metaphysical supplement to the reality of nature, set alongside it to 
overcome it” (§24:127). This formulation, more than any other, would seem to put us 
squarely back in the realm of the moral. Recall from chapter 1 that it is morality’s role 
to act as a normative ‘other’, through which we might ‘escape’ our debased animality. 
The idea that art ‘supplements’ reality in order to ‘overcome it’ seems to speak precisely 
to a Kantian understanding of morality as some miraculous intervention into the world 
from Beyond: “in accordance with the mere course of nature in the world, happiness in 
conformity with moral worth is not to be expected and is held to be impossible” (CPrR 
116). Only through morality can what is ‘best’ enter into a world radically alienated from 
it. Is this what Nietzsche means, when he calls art a ‘supplement’ that will ‘overcome’ 
nature? We should recall that in the Free Spirit works, ‘overcoming’ is predominantly 
meant, not as a ‘casting off’ or ‘escaping’ (in the sense of ‘overcoming the temptations 
                                                 
76 See Porter 47-56 
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of the flesh’ etc.), but as the process of ‘elevation’ into a higher or more refined state77. 
We see this most famously in the analogy of the ‘bridge to the superman’ in 
Zarathustra’s prologue, which re-orientates the movement from physical to 
metaphysical into a natural register: one between animal and ‘über-’ animal. Though it 
may be argued that reading Birth in this light is anachronistic, closer philological 
examination of BT §24 would seem to widen this gap and favour a reading that radically 
differs from the Idealist conception of morality as a ‘corrective’ to the world: something 
which intervenes to ‘save’ a world that cannot ever hope to ‘redeem’ itself. 
 Nietzsche’s assertion that art is “nicht nur Nachahmung der 
Naturewirklichkeit”78 is pregnant with meaning. Art is not ‘simply/only’ an imitation of 
nature, but this means that it is that- it is just more as well. We could take this as simply 
referring to the ‘representational’ nature of art- the mundane claim that art simply 
replicates reality’s objects. But the torrent of ink spilt by Nietzsche in his Schopenhauer-
inspired praise of music-as-non-representational-art79 would seem to undermine such 
a reading (which would also introduce a certain ‘platonic’ dimension that is also at odds 
with the rest of the work). These writings, combined with the use of ‘wirklichkeit’ point 
to a different understanding. Nietzsche makes a point of highlighting the significance 
of the word and its advantages over “Realität” in a passage from Tragic Age. He points 
to the relation between “wirken” and “wirklichkeit” – “the nature of reality is its acts” 
(PTA §5:53) - to promote the notion of reality as a ‘process’ rather than any discreet and 
definable ‘thing’. Read with this understanding in mind, we see that art is conceived of 
as an imitation of nature’s ‘process-which-is-its-being’ (or of its ‘be-ing as coming-to-
be’).  
It is in this light that we should view the proclamation, made in the opening 
chapters of Birth, that the Apollonian and Dionysian are “artistic powers, which burst 
forth from nature itself, without the mediation of the human artist” (§2:23). The human 
artistic process is cast as a limited manifestation of some naturally occurring process; a 
facsimile that somehow channels or arises from the way that nature creates its own 
                                                 
77 See for e.g.: D §9, GS §301, Z I Prologue, II §12.   
78 All German language text of Nietzsche’s work cited in this study is taken from the Digitale Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe (eKGWB), http://www.nietzschesource.org 2009– 
79 A theme common to the Birth of Tragedy, “The Dionysian worldview”, “The Greek Music Drama” and “On 
Music and Words”. For Schopenhauer’s theory of music, see WWR I §52 . 
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‘artworks’. If this is the case, then ‘overcoming’ fits nicely into a naturalist ‘emergence’ 
thesis. Human artistry develops from out of nature as the natural artistic process’ act of 
‘self-overcoming’: its elevation to a more refined- but not substantively different- plain. 
It is not a ‘supra-natural’ intervention from some metaphysical other, ‘correcting’ 
nature’s course towards something that Nature itself would never achieve. It is simply 
another layer, another repetition of nature’s process. Nevertheless, the claim that this 
supplement is metaphysical in origin still poses significant problems for Nietzsche’s 
affirmative claims. Not least of these problems is that if we maintain this distinction- 
between a metaphysical creative force and the creatures that are its creations- then we 
find ourselves once more butting up against the seduction thesis examined in the 
conclusion to the last chapter. How is this ‘artistic power that flows from nature’ to be 
understood as different from the enslaving, manipulating Will? 
In order to answer this, we now turn to the great ‘hope’ that the supplement of 
art is claimed to offer for the suffering creature: the notion that “as aesthetic phenomena 
[…] Life is justified to eternity” (AC §5:8). 
 
§2.1 Redemption and Theodicy.  
 
All philosophers are instinctively eager to imagine a comprehensive consciousness, a 
conscious living and willing which accompanies all that occurs, a spirit, a ‘God’. But they 
need to be told that it is in just this way that existence would become a monster, that a 
‘God’ and a general sensorium would without question be something on whose account 
existence would have to be condemned… The greatest reproach we ever cast upon 
existence was our belief in the existence of God… (WP §707) 
 
Nietzsche’s claim that Life is ‘justified’ if we consider it to be an aesthetic phenomenon 
is often traced to the symbolically pregnant image of the “Dionysian artist of worlds” 
(alluded to in BT §1 and further elaborated in BT §3 and BT §5). The image offered here 
frames all of physical reality as the ‘artwork’ of a sort of omnipotent creative force- a 
‘world-artist’- which is responsible for the teeming multitudes of forms and organisms 
that comprise our immanent reality. This is –apparently- an analogue for the 
Schopenhauerian Will, with a ‘playful’ artistic process of creation standing in for the 
macabre scheming and manipulations of the World Will. It is this ‘entity’ that we are 
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claimed to experience union with in in the Dionysian festival, as well as in our 
experience of music; an art form which “when placed alongside the world”, exemplifies 
“what is to be understood by the justification of the world as an aesthetic phenomenon” 
(BT §24:128). Music is described as a feeling of “the beating wings of longing, which 
accompanies the highest joy in clearly perceived reality”: the realisation that “even 
ugliness and disharmony is an artistic game which the will plays with itself in the eternal 
abundance of its joy”. The Dionysian experience of nature is mirrored in the rapture of 
music, a flight of enthusiasm in which share in the painful joy/joyful pain that Life feels 
as it madly ‘vomits out’ more and more of its ‘creations’, never able to make enough to 
slake its lust, “suffering from the superabundance of life” (Deleuze 15). 
The ‘divine’ rapture of the Dionysian lets us feel as the world-artist itself feels as 
it spews out its life forms in tripping, orgasmic delight. We find ‘identity’ with the 
‘creative force’ of Life, experiencing it in its full force as an unbearable “superabundance 
of life, of suffering and delight” (BT §20). It is claimed that we experience the world as 
its creator does, to be driven along by the same mad, insatiable, orgiastic need for ‘more’ 
that compels the world-artist to endlessly create the multitudes of nature. Typical 
analysis of this identification, and of the cultic, quasi-religious means by which it is 
reached, orientates the Dionysian as a sort of religious ‘transubstantiation’. The votary 
‘shrugs off’ the necessary conditions of the physically immanent universe 
(individuation) and communes with a ‘deified’ nature/’world-forming force’. In 
adopting this perspective, Young finds himself in no doubt as to the true nature of this 
‘world-forming-force’ and of its role in Nietzsche’s thought: 
The best way, however, to see that Birth is a life-denying work is to note its fundamentally 
religious character and to conjoin this observation with the well-known view of the later 
Nietzsche that religion […] is a product of those who, damaged and demeaned by life, are 
fundamentally hostile to it (Young 48). 
This understanding reflects the almost universal critical consensus regarding the nature 
of the world-artist: the idea of it as a form of god. In light of Schopenhauer’s pessimistic 
proof as to “the impossibility of reconciling the character of the world with a morally 
perfect, omnipotent creator”, Nietzsche appears to have sought “to fill the void left by 
the demise of the Christian god” with a new god (51).  
Understood this way, the aesthetic justification of Life is nothing more than a 
rearrangement of the theological/teleological world-view to make it more palatable to 
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the tastes of a Romantic pseudo-atheist; ‘because god says so’ recast to by-passes the 
incongruence inherent in the idea of a benevolent deity ruling over a horrific world.  If 
this is correct, then Young is right to dismiss Birth as a life-denying tract, concerned to 
forward a sort of immoral aesthetic religion. Moreover, Nietzsche’s own discussion of 
the role of religion in the work would seem to offer support for this idea. If we agree 
with him that it has typically been religion’s job to provide a buffer against “practical 
pessimism” (“a horrifying ethic of genocide from compassion’ that would accompany 
the realisation of life’s utter futility and meaninglessness”) it would seem that the world-
artist is created expressly to fill the now vacant throne of the moral god (BT §15:84). 
Dionysus becomes a cultic Greek stand-in for the now untenable god of goodness and 
mercy. Indeed, given the choice to frame the world-forming force in terms of an ‘ur-
artist’, it is hard to argue with the interpretation of that force as anything but an 
aesthetically oriented version of the old, discredited creator god, whose existence as 
‘Highest Truth’ validates the world in so far as it is His creation. This ‘divine justification’ 
thesis is only strengthened by the wording of what is to be taken as Birth’s programmatic 
declaration80; that “we have our highest dignity in our meanings as works of art - for it 
is only as aesthetic phenomena that existence and the world are justified to eternity” 
(BT §5:38). 
The desire to impart ‘dignity’ and ‘meaning’ upon humanity aligns strongly aligns 
the notion of aesthetic justification with the image of religion that emerges in the later 
Nietzsche’s naturalist genealogy. As Alan Watts notes, Nietzsche was quite clear that 
the religious impetus coalesces in human society for no other reason than to impart 
meaning on the meaningless:  
‘god’ is a projection by human beings which is then reflected back to provide some sense 
of purpose and wellbeing […] God was created in order to provide the answer to the 
experience of human suffering’ (Watts 50).  
A claim that the human attains its ‘highest dignity’ through relation to a deity, to a 
metaphysical force that stands as the source and meaning of the physical world is clearly 
antithetic to life-affirmation. Given this presentation, it becomes obvious why works 
like Human, All Too Human conflate aesthetics and religion and call for an end to the 
“blissful and blinding errors that stem from metaphysical and artistic ages” (§3:17). And 
                                                 
80 This sentiment re-appears several times in the work and is identified as its central thesis in AC §5:8. 
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if the ‘omnipotent artistic powers’ that ‘speak through nature’ have their origins in a 
god, then clearly we cannot see this as anything like an attempt to overcome 
metaphysics through naturalism.  
The slippage between naturalism and nature worship- between an omnipotent, 
all-encompassing nature and a ‘god-as-nature’- is something that naturalist 
philosophies must constantly be wary of. Few things have proven more damaging for 
truly naturalist presentations than the tendency to allow humanist or deist inflections 
to creep into understandings of the human-animal continuity. Ilya Prigogine and 
Isabella Stengers identify a recurrent trend in secular philosophies of nature towards 
the establishment of a “new covenant”: worldviews that sneak divinity back into nature 
so that “humanity is no longer a stranger in a strange mechanistic world. Rather, within 
the universe there is a tendency towards higher complexity and order”81. We are left 
unable to find anything in the ‘meagre, cold, and mechanistic’ materialist universe on 
which to pin our dignity or support our innate need for purposeful meaning.  Therefore, 
we instead posit a ‘superior order’ in the world- generally in scientific admiration for 
the intricacies and complexities of ‘natural law’- and align ourselves to that order82. The 
divine creeps back in as cosmic reason, and the human’s unique ability to consciously 
observe and participate in it allows, once more, for our return to a place of special 
significance in the universe. Through participation in this ‘higher’ order - a necessarily 
teleological one since it reflects the dictates of a fixed and determinate ‘Being’ inherent 
to (‘given’ in) the universe - humanity believes it will become “progressively freed both 
from material constraints, and the deceitful servitude of animalism” (Monod 180). 
The deification of nature’s ‘higher processes’ clearly reflects the Socratic moral 
worldview denounced so vociferously in Birth, with its belief that to ‘know’ the universe 
will allow humans to ‘correct’ it (BT §13-14). And even if the order offered is an 
inscrutable and ‘useless’ one that we are entirely passive before, we are still left with the 
idea that we somehow possess a special place in the universe by virtue of our ability to 
perceive its ‘higher order’. (As we shall see, this is central to another form of ‘aesthetic 
justification’ that Nietzsche seems to dismiss). Although the work clearly rails against a 
                                                 
81 Order out of Chaos, cited Drees 107. 
82 HAH II §14 addresses the “superstition” associated with mankind’s search for uniform order in the universe. 
This matter, and this aphorism, will be returned to in chapter 3. 
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scientific version of nature-deification- and against the broader idea of nature as a 
beneficent ‘mother’ to her spoilt, favoured child- the introduction of an aesthetic order 
does, perhaps, leave us in the same place. We are left with at least something of the 
question that Nietzsche ventriloquizes into the mouth of his imagined critics in the 
“Attempt”: ‘but sir, if your book is not Romantic, then what in the world is? […] Mister 
Pessimist and Deifier of art’ (§7:11). Do we not have Nietzsche’s own admission that the 
world-artist could be construed as “a god, if you like, but certainly only a completely 
thoughtless and a-moral artist-god” (AC §5:8)? 
We need not take this as Nietzsche directly calling the world-artist a God thought. 
The almost shrugging ‘wenn man will’ we get here could very much be seen as another 
example of the linguistic contortions identified by Porter: a sign of Nietzsche’s 
(apparently Kant inspired) reluctance to fully commit to any of his ‘metaphysical 
assumptions’83. And the concession can also be seen to gel perfectly cogently with the 
fact that Nietzsche appears content to refer to his ‘natural forces’ by the names of Greek 
gods, without this being taken as the slightest indication that he wishes us to take 
seriously the superstitious pantheism of ancient Hellas.84 Nevertheless, the question of 
the world-artist’s status as theistic demiurge will need to be settled more conclusively 
than this. It would seem that the pertinent test of if Nietzsche is proposing a god here 
(whether a ‘man in the sky’ type god or a ‘mother nature as divine intelligence’ model) 
would be whether or not the world-artist serves the role of a god in Nietzsche’s thought, 
and if that thought is expressly motivated by religious concerns. Watts highlights the 
importance of this distinction when he claims that despite the fact Nietzsche’s (later) 
thought clearly has no place for a traditionally conceived deity per-se, his thought 
never-the-less remains intrinsically religious.  
Discussions of ‘redemption’ and ‘justification’ in Nietzsche’s thought are held to 
reveal him as – despite fervent protestations to the contrary- “a radical religious 
reformer […] heir to part of Christianity’s theological tradition” (Watts 54). Watts thus 
interprets his thought as an attempt to save religion from the death of god; “to show not 
                                                 
83 See note p.55 
84 A willingness he shares with two of his great ancient inspirations, Heraclitus and Lucretius. See, for example, 
Heraclitus: ‘λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα’ : Logos is ‘both willing and unwilling to be spoken 
of by the name of Zeus’ (DK22B32, tr. Kahn 2001 82). 
~ 74 ~ 
 
that god exists, still perfect in the world’ but that ‘it is still possible (indeed necessary) 
to experience [life] as sacred”. This is, as we shall see across the course of the chapter, a 
common assessment of Nietzsche’s relation to theology. The deliberately ecclesiastical 
oratory of Zarathustra shows that there is clearly something to be said for Nietzsche’s 
self-aware understanding of his place in relation to the religious tradition. However, 
many of these criticisms forward a far stronger claim of continuity. Daniel Came’s 
characterisation of the early aesthetic project is an emblematic example. Like Watts, he 
‘sees no god up here’, but nonetheless frames aesthetic justification as ‘a self-conscious 
echo of the western theological attempt to justify God to man’ (Came 2006 45) - albeit 
one enacted as a ‘proto-existentialist revision’ of this attempt (2016 6). Even if the world-
artist is not a god in the traditional sense, the imperative behind its postulation marks 
it as working very much within a theistic framework. 
Ultimately, the persistence of this framework renders moot the ‘god or no god’ 
question. After all, if Nietzsche set out to transpose into the heart of being a recognisably 
human order, guaranteed by an anthropomorphised ‘creator’ figure, then he has done 
nothing more than create a Romantic, a-moral religion. He may very well approach the 
matter “in terms of […] existential need, and thereby [seek] to displace it from its 
traditional theological foundations” (Came 2016 6). Nevertheless, if this is attempted by 
means of positing a subject-like figure that exists in discrete separation from reality 
(which it creates and controls) then this figure is, by default, a deity; no matter how 
assiduously one insists that it is only an existentially motivated projection. We thus have 
two issues that need to be resolved here. First, the matter of if Nietzsche breaks apart 
his immanent naturalism through deification: the positing of “something transcendent 
to the world of flux [immanence]” (Griffin 85) which fills the role of a god (and in effect 
is one, no matter what label we choose to adopt). Secondly, we have the problem that 
the entire question of ‘justification’ would seem to indicate that Nietzsche has “a 
religious need to satisfy” (Young 116); especially considering the claim that existence is 
to be ‘justified to eternity’.  
As Jill Stauffer and Bettina Bergo point out, if Nietzsche remains tied to 
theological questions and seeks to answer them within the co-ordinates set by theology, 
then he likewise remains tied to the life-denying perspective he claims to have 
transcended. If we see the aesthetic justification as born of ‘the imperative to redeem 
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suffering - as opposed to the responsive awareness of its protean inevitability’, then we 
are forced to conclude “that Nietzsche was ultimately [a] religious thinker”.85 The very 
idea that the aesthetic justification is offered as a means of ‘redeeming’ suffering is taken 
to mark the concept as Nietzsche’s attempt to answer the perennial question posed by 
theology: it marks it as a form of theodicy. 
 
Paingod- and other Delusions. 
 
Broadly speaking, theodicy is defined as the religiously motivated attempt to defend 
claims about the goodness and desirability of the world’s order – or, more specifically, 
the god in charge of that order - from the problem of evil and suffering.86 Suffering is 
‘redeemed’ by way of a divinity that guarantees the overall goodness of existence. 
Grounds for reading the world-artist in such a light can be found in BT §4, in which 
Nietzsche forwards the “metaphysical speculation” that the world of Life exists to fulfil 
the “fervent desire for appearance” manifest by the “omnipotent artistic drives in 
nature” - thereby to provide their “redemption through appearances” (30). This section 
of Birth is steeped in Schopenhauerian imagery and gives what is arguably the most 
striking and unambiguously metaphysical formulation in entire work. Nietzsche speaks 
here of empirical reality as “that which does not truly exist, […] a continual becoming in 
time, space, and causality” and avers that this “false causal world”, “the world of torment 
is necessary in order to force the individual to produce the redeeming vision”- a vision 
required by the world-artist for its redemption (31 emphasis added).  
This presentation of the world-artist clearly falls into the category of a life-denying 
philosophy: the ‘world of suffering’ exists for the gratification of its creator, and the 
creatures within it suffer for the ends of this omnipotent ‘other’. Only a metaphysical 
insight offers solace for this suffering. Of course, this is structured as an inversion of the 
                                                 
85 Stauffer & Bergo 16. This opinion is mirrored by Llewellyn (195-8) and May (211-6). Young, Geuss, and Hill 
also touch on this claim in their assessments, but their arguments will be discussed in more detail in the pages to 
come. 
86 See Stone 325. The etymological root of the word- θεός δίκη- will be discussed further shortly. 
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traditional theodicy, with immanence serving the redemption of the other; existence 
redeems god, not the other way around. Nevertheless, the ends are ultimately the same: 
the world becomes justified, becomes ‘redeemed’ by way of its importance to a god-like 
‘other’. This understanding leads Gemes and Sykes (whose assessment of Birth is 
otherwise responsive to the scope of the division between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer 
in the work) to conclude that we must “still take Nietzsche as offering a substantive 
metaphysic” on the basis that “the success of his punitive theodicy is dependent on this 
metaphysical truth” (88). Theodicy only stands if there really is a god to stand as 
guarantor.  
BT §4 offers the most substantive declaration of the aesthetic ‘theodicy’ in Birth. 
However, it is by no means the only one. Just as in the case of the Dionysian insight, we 
find that various formulations of the aesthetic justification emerge in the work to vie for 
dominance. As with the presentations of the Dionysian, these can be divided into two 
generalised thrusts which appear contradictory, but which, when read together, 
‘modulate’ the meaning of both presentations87. Alongside the gloomy image of a 
tormented Being seeking for redemption, we have a parallel image: the “clearly 
perceived reality” that the world-artists creation is “an artistic game which [it] plays 
with itself”, born of “the overflow of an original joy” rather than a pressing need to 
‘redeem’ a horrifying existence (BT §24:128-9). The “Attempt” embodies this modulation 
effect nicely when it re-casts the world-artist’s ‘flight’ from the “eternal suffering and 
contradiction” of its nightmare reality (BT §4:30) in terms borrowed from the anti-
Schopenhaurian aspect of Dionysus. The world-artist creates to relieve itself “from the 
distress of abundance and overabundance” (AC §5:8) as suffering becomes the ecstatic 
need to be free from the “pressing contradictions” that well up in the creative force 
which drives existence. The world is ‘happily justified’ as the ‘god’ figure finding 
“pleasure and self-satisfaction in […] creating worlds”. 
However, a simple shift from the miserable to the joyous is far from enough to 
break this ‘theodicy’ away from its status as life-denial. We are still left to conclude that 
                                                 
87 ‘Modulate’ here refers to the musical phenomena whereby the superposition of one harmonic function in 
relation to another changes the colour, sound, and ‘feel’ of both functions (frequency/harmonic synthesis). 
Confusingly this needs to be differentiated from the compositional practice of the same name, which is simply the 
process of transition from one function to another.   
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the key to understanding the claim ‘the world is justified as aesthetic phenomena […] 
lies in realising that this phenomena is not for us’ (Hill 75). The world is justified ‘to 
eternity’, to the god. Not to Life itself, and certainly not to the creatures that (partially) 
comprise it. As Young puts it 
There is no suggestion here that all humans find or can find their life pleasurable or 
justified. To suggest otherwise would be to suggest that because a concentration camp 
‘justifies’ itself to its sadistic (or perhaps merely playfully mad) commandant as a 
pleasurable ‘entertainment’, so too the inmates find it justified (Young 52). 
We find ourselves once again confronting a variation of the ‘seduction’ problem. If there 
exists a substantive metaphysical division between that which is satisfied 
with/redeemed by the spectacle of suffering, and that which must endure that suffering 
to produce said spectacle, then the ‘joy’ that the Dionysian imparts is rendered 
worthless: nothing more than a seductive pleasure by which the god manipulates its 
victims into continuing to dance for it. 
Raymond Guess seeks to overcome this objection and to claim that “it shouldn’t 
be out of the question for me to be able to see the world as [the world-artist] does, and 
to share not only the [artist’s] viewpoint, but the pleasure it takes” (106). However, he 
finds himself forced to concede that the transcendent perspective of the 
creator/spectator makes this identification ontologically impossible. In order that the 
artist be able to ‘spectate’ its playful artwork, the world artist must exist separated from 
its creation, standing ‘apart’ and ‘above’ it, so to speak. Thus, to both Guess and Young, 
the fact that it necessarily exists “beyond the principle of individuation” (in the 
metaphysical Schopenhauerian sense) means that nothing ‘within’ the world of 
individuation can ever share that perspective. Both critics concede that in this schema 
the world-artist “is (in some metaphysical sense) the reality of which I […] am a mere 
appearance”, and thus that “since [the artist] is me, is the reality of which I am the mere 
appearance, its pleasure is in some sense (potentially) mine” (Geuss 106). Ultimately 
however, we must face the reality that the world-artist “is also not me”, that “‘I’, as an 
empirical person belonging to a world of individuated objects” exist only on this one 
side of a metaphysical barrier that divides me from the position which my existence 
serves to ‘redeem’. To cross this barrier means to cease to be ‘me’ -the individuated 
illusion justified by the transcendent position - and to accept that it is only in this acetic 
abnegation of my human existence (its revelation as illusion) that this existence can find 
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worth. The aesthetic theodicy’s apparent claim to offer us a true, redemptive access to 
the world-artist’s perspective is (onto) logically contradictory. The aesthetic perspective 
is thus revealed as a tool for “deceiving me about the non-identity that exists between 
me and the [artist], and the possible implications that has for my ability to see life as 
worthwhile” (Geuss 108). Redemption actualises only if we ‘lie’ to ourselves and wish 
away our individuated actuality. 
Against this claim, Bernard Reginster holds that it is indeed possible for living 
things to share in the ‘justification’ that Nietzsche offers. He argues this by showing that 
the aesthetic ‘theodicy’ relies upon a reformulation of what it means for something to 
be ‘justified’. Nietzsche’s reformation of the hedonistic underpinnings of religion has a 
knock-on effect that allows him to dramatically recast the concept of redemption: away 
from Christian groundings and towards an appraisal that sees suffering as meaningful 
in itself. The religious definition of redemption is taken to rest on a calculus of ‘burden 
to reward’, in which redemption is understood as the ‘repayment’ or ‘neutralisation’ of 
suffering in favour of hedonistic pleasure. The ‘ledger’ must be balanced; the 
overwhelmingly negative and problematic aspects of life must be outweighed – 
“compensated for” - by some “pure good” that negates the pain of suffering88 (Reginster 
232).  
Reginster’s encourages us to divorce any such ideas from Nietzsche’s use of the 
words ‘redemption’ and ‘justification’, owing to their grounding in Christian life-
denial.89 If we remain under the sway of this schema, “suffering is still seen as something 
for which we require compensation. Life, we might say, is affirmed only in spite of the 
suffering in it” (231). Life may end up coming out well, if the balance falls in our favour. 
But it is still not good in itself, and though suffering is ‘counteracted’ we would still 
ideally wish this suffering wasn’t there in the first place. Something intrinsic to Life 
remains cast as ‘evil’ and in need of expropriation, and a dream that offers this 
impossible wish is ideally preferable to the troublesome reality. Reginster proposes that 
“Nietzschean redemption, unlike Christian redemption, involves a radical re-evaluation 
                                                 
88 See also D §202 
89 This seems a somewhat weak basis of making an important claim by itself. A rebuttal to this line of reasoning 
can be found in Sadler §3 which offers an alternative interpretation of Nietzsche’s use of the language of 
‘redemption’, emphasising its continuity with received religious understandings.  
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of suffering that demonstrates its essential contribution to intrinsic goods, like 
creativity” (233). In this way, suffering is positively affirmed rather than 
counterbalanced (negated). It thus ceases to matter if we can actually identify with the 
transcendent artist-god, since the world is regarded as good in itself, with suffering 
contributing directly to this immanent good. The ‘transcendent’ perspective of the god 
simply becomes an allegorical means of recognising this fact.  
Reginster is correct when he points to this ‘radical re-evaluation’ of suffering at 
the core of Nietzsche’s thought. However, his assessment remains problematic for its 
failure to appreciate just how radical this shift is, leaving it still firmly within the 
framework of theodicy laid out in the Christian theological tradition. M. F. Stone’s 
definition of theodicy as a theological defence of theism (the broad definition we have 
been working with thus far) should be laid alongside Charles Teliaferro’s etymologically 
grounded definition: that theodicy represents the attempt to bring evil into line with 
ideas about θεός δίκη90 – ‘divine justice/order’. From the earliest models of Christianity’s 
founding theologians, theodicy has sought to “provide an overriding framework within 
which to understand at least roughly how the evil that occurs is part of some overall 
good- for example that the overcoming of evil is itself a great good” (Teliaferro 473). 
This understanding reveals the Christian through-line in Reginster’s ‘uniquely 
Nietzschean’ conception of redemption91. On the surface, it might be argued that this 
hangover from theology is perfectly acceptable and provides exactly what Nietzsche was 
seeking for: a vision of Life as positive, arrived at through acceptance – perhaps even 
praise- of its ostensibly negative (but ineluctable) aspects. It would also stand as a neat 
and simple understanding of the ‘aesthetic’ nature of the justification: the ‘ugliness’ of 
the world interpreted as a necessary precondition for some overarching beauty.  
Textual support for an interpretation like this seems to come when we look again 
at Nietzsche’s claims about music; that the experience of musical dissonance manifests 
in us the    feeling of “the beating wings of longing, which accompanies the highest joy 
in clearly perceived reality”: that “even ugliness and disharmony is an artistic game 
which the will plays with itself in the eternal abundance of its joy”. Framed according 
                                                 
90 Theós Díkē 
91 See for example Romans 5:3-4: “we rejoice in our suffering, for we know that suffering produces endurance, 
and endurance produces character”.  
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to Reginster’s interpretation, this understanding of the ‘necessity of ugliness’ emerges 
as something akin to Leibnitz’s aestheticized theodicy. Much like Nietzsche, Leibnitz 
foregrounds music as his primary point of reference and takes dissonance- the fall into 
en-harmony and musical conflict- as a metaphor for the problem of suffering. He “likens 
evil to the dissonance necessary for [the emergence of] harmony” (Beiser 33). Under 
such a principle, evil, far from being something that needs to be compensated for, is 
almost to be desired. Just as the composer deliberately disturbs the tonic balance of a 
passage to introduce dynamic tension (hanging cadence, escalation of chord dominance 
etc) “the greatest beauty arises from the unifying of the greatest possible dissonance, so 
the perfection of the universe emerges from the conflict of evil itself” (33).  
By existing as the aesthetic spectator to its own creation, the world-artist, like 
Leibnitz’s God, can appreciate the beautiful whole of the symphony, instead of being 
stuck in discomforting pre-occupation with some (deliberately) enharmonic trill. But 






“Theodicy was never a Greek concern” 
 
“But what do I care for avenging them? What do I care for a Hell?” – Ivan Karamazov. 
 
By recasting the ‘undesirable’ elements of Life as the necessary preconditions for the 
desirable ones, dissonance is ‘justified’ for its role in the production of harmony - of a 
final ‘good order’. The fact that humans cannot directly perceive this order is not a 
problem - they must simply trust in the god that stands as audience and who judges the 
performance to be ‘good’. The mere existence of this spectator’s gaze permits us to 
postulate the unity of the world into a single ‘grand performance’, and to allow the parts 
we like about the total experience to outweigh those we do not. But is this so different 
to the claim that suffering needs to be compensated for?  
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The model of theodicy forwarded by Leibnitz offers a framework in which evils are 
justified materially rather than simply metaphysically92. And while this still requires the 
god as a sort of ‘mirror’ outside the world, a perspective from which to at least imagine 
we hear the whole of the world-symphony in all its glory, it is not necessarily the god 
itself that ‘justifies’ the system per-se. Of course, this fails to meet the demands for 
unbroken immanence established thus far; but if this is simply an imagined perspective 
made to reflect on the nature of physical reality, then is this really such a problem? It is 
if it is the god that ‘judges’ the world to be ‘good’ and this idea is inherent to both 
Reginster and Leibnitz’s version of theodicy. For in both cases, the evils of the world are 
still evils, even if they are now necessary evils. The ‘divine spectator’ position 
contextualises disharmony as a necessary end towards harmony, “an essential fact of 
existence, as necessary to the perfection of the cosmos as dissonance is to beauty” 
(Beiser 33). But no matter how much evil is valued for the good ‘ends’ it produces, such 
a valuation does not allow for the affirmation of these parts of Life in themselves. To 
contextualise suffering in terms of a resulting good concedes that suffering is only 
justified “as compliment and precondition” to what is really being affirmed- the 
resulting richness of harmony. Dissonance is only valued for its negation, for its 
dissolution which allows space for ‘good’ to emerge. It is a necessary burden, to be 
endured for the sake of the true goal. 
Negation and condemnation of some part of the world lies at the heart of any 
system that “seeks to posit a supreme principle of good that cannot be obtained without 
the possibility of the relevant evil” (May 213). And no matter how assiduously we assert 
that this good cannot be achieved without the bad, it would, nevertheless, be better if 
it could: ‘what is best is already denied you’. Any trace of this must be done away with, 
if we are to understand the aesthetic justification as “a joyous fatalism […] a 
ressentiment-free affirmation of the world as it is, without negation or exception” (213). 
However, as Simon May aptly points out, this problem may be systemic to the very 
notion of justification itself: the very idea of offering a ‘justification’ of Life is grounded 
upon an intrinsically life-denying premise - the proposition that the world is in need of 
justification. This notion arises as the result of ‘suspicion’, the creeping feeling that Life 
                                                 
92 In the Nietzschean sense: justification is experienced in immanence, not just by the transcendent god.  
~ 82 ~ 
 
might not be justified, or even justifiable: ‘to justify means to distrust’ (May 222). As our 
discussion of Anaximander in chapter 1 makes clear, if life-denial is nothing else, it is 
just this suspicion and distrust of Life. Thus, any suggestion that Life requires 
justification has, at its foundations, a distain for Life that the seeker after redemption is 
looking to assuage. 
Several critics93 have approached this aspect of Nietzsche’s thought by means of a 
contrast with the writings of Emanuel Levinas and criticise Nietzsche – as Young does 
in a similar context- for his obsessive need for a “redemption of all the past” (Young 116). 
This need - a fundamentally religious yearning - is taken to lead him towards a negation 
of Life ‘as it occurs’ (as a parade of misery) in favour of a final ‘end’ that will contextualise 
(and thereby redeem) all the suffering of the world: ‘Nietzsche values the redemption 
of suffering above substituting happiness for suffering’ (Llewelyn 198). Talk of 
‘substituting happiness’ should not be understood in hedonistic terms in either 
thinkers’ case: Levinas was as fervently incredulous as Nietzsche was of ideas about a 
‘perfected life’ free from suffering. Rather, these critics contrast Nietzsche’s redemptive 
aspirations to Levinas’ sensitivity to the “protean inevitability” of suffering and his hope 
that we might find happiness within the pains of existence.  
This criticism seems unwarranted- especially considering the discussion of 
Nietzsche’s attitude towards pervasive hardship discussed in chapter 1. In this regard, 
as in so many others, Nietzsche and Levinas are, in fact, in concordance. Nevertheless, 
the problem raised by these critiques remains pertinent. If Life is in need of 
‘justification’, if what Nietzsche offers is a ‘theodicy’ in this sense, then we remain in the 
world of Life-denial. Stauffer and Bergo join May in their concession that Nietzsche 
resists Life-denial in so far as he “justifies suffering in terms of a good that he considers 
not to be motivated by the will-to-nothing” (May 221).94 However, they also concur that 
the persistence of ideas like ‘redemption’ and ‘justification’- inherent to the very idea of 
theodicy- brings with them an inescapable dimension of life-denial: “theodicy with 
neither god nor Arche remains a doctrine of justification” (Staffer & Bergo 15). 
                                                 
93 See Stauffer and Bergo (14-6), Llewelyn (198).  
94 The Aesthetic justification is ‘Nietzsche’s answer to the nihilism of ideas of soul, divinity, and ultimate 
happiness’ (Stauffer & Bergo 15).  
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An appreciation of the need for a fundamental paradigm shift is on clear display 
in the presentations of Life-affirmation to be found in the Free Spirit works. The 
opening aphorism of “St. Januarius” (GS IV) presents us with a flash outline of the ‘yea-
sayer’, the archetypal affirmer of life. She is one who has rid herself of suspicion with 
regards the difficult aspects of Life: ‘I do not want to wage war on ugliness. I do not want 
to accuse; I do not want to accuse even the accusers. Let looking away be my only 
negation’ (GS §176:157). We see here an acute sensitivity to the problem of negation 
inherent in appraisals of the world’s ‘worth’. The insidious suspicion that is the very 
septic root of denial leads to the question of how to ‘redeem’ Life, and any attempt to 
do so relies on negation of what is suspected. The very question is a symptom of Life-
denial and thus “the real challenge is to stop being obsessed with the question itself” 
(May 226). As Birth makes clear, this cannot be achieved through by a vulgar 
‘cheerfulness’ which seeks to ignore or downplay Life’s problematic elements. Nor can 
it be reached by a ‘re-casting’ of the world’s ‘evils’ as secret (instrumental) goods in the 
manner of Leibnitz when he avers that “often an evil brings forth a good, whereto one 
would not have attained the good without the evil” (Leibnitz §9). Such a recasting would 
be to ‘de-fang’ suffering, to denature reality in much the same way that the optimist 
seeks to minimise Life’s difficulties and thereby to ‘wish away’ its ambiguity. 
Watts, for his part, accuses Nietzsche of doing just this. Reiterating Ivan 
Karamazov’s agonising, pathos driven critique of theodicy, he concludes that “there is 
something disgusting in the attempt to explain away the greatest crimes in history […] 
to down play the evilness of ‘evil’ by showing its positive results” (49). However, already 
in Tragic Age we see Nietzsche exhibiting a deep suspicion of those who would wish to 
justify the problems of Life in instrumental terms - as means towards ends. This comes 
out in his critique of the Stoic School and their “dragging down” of Heraclitus’s aesthetic 
understanding of Life “to signify a vulgar consideration for the world’s useful ends, 
especially those that benefit the human race” (PTA §7:66). In ‘putting the boot’ into the 
Stoa, Nietzsche poetically accuses them – on account of their insistence upon a 
beautiful, beneficent order in the universe, guaranteed by a higher power - of 
degenerating Heraclitus’ cosmology into “a crude optimism with the continual 
invitation to Tom, Dick, and Harry to plaudite amici”. Belief in an ‘ordained order’ that 
contextualises and vindicates apparent suffering for its place in ‘God’s Plan’, is here 
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aligned - through enigmatic reference to Beethoven’s (purported) last words95 - with the 
Cycibine dream of the life-denier: “ἀπόθανειν θέλω”96. Those who see a ‘plan’ in the 
universe look forward with expectation to the completion of that plan, yearning for the 
‘happy ending’ to the comedy of suffering. 
In this sense the Stoics can be seen to prefigure the ‘last Men’ of Zarathustra, 
beings that “left the regions where living was hard”, effacing struggle and existential 
responsibility, and wrapped themselves in “agreeable dreams’ to await ‘an agreeable 
dying” (Z I 16). It is also easy to see how this early objection was to inform an 1887 
fragment97 in which Nietzsche denounced theodicy and justification. He speaks here of 
the “supreme devaluation” inherent in the idea that “the world is the work and 
expression of a God: in which case it must be supremely perfect”, and that the world’s 
evils “must proceed from God’s supreme purpose: (WP §411:221). The very question of 
justification forces the conclusion that either “evil must be only apparent”, or “our world 
is imperfect, evil and guilt are actual and determined and absolutely inherent in its 
nature; in which case it is not the real world” (222). Optimism and pessimism/asceticism 
are revealed as two ends of the same continuum - both force us to ‘reject’ the world as 
it encounters us and look for something else to explain or contextualise it. But in the 
‘yea-sayer’, we are offered a third path: one which refuses to see the world’s problematic 
aspects as ‘blameworthy’ in the first place. Close examination of the ‘aesthetic 
justification of existence’ reveal it to be grounded in just this attitude, and in this, it 
breaks the bonds of theodicy. 
 
§2.2: Aesthetic Justification: A God Before its Canvas? 
 
Matthew Rampley claims that it is to Schopenhauer we should look to understand 
Nietzsche’s approach to redemption. He credits the arch-pessimist with “assiduously 
avoiding the Christian impulse to give suffering a meaning” and claims that he instead 
                                                 
95 “Pladite amici, comedia finite est”; ‘applaud friends, for the comedy is over’. For commentary on this story, 
see Beethoven, Anguish and Triumph, Jan Swafford, §33. Handwerke also cites it as the last words of Emperor 
Augustus (HAH II 450) 
96 ‘I dream of death”- Juvenile’s Satires, employed as an epigraph for T.S Elliot’s The Wasteland. 
97 Revised 1888. 
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“prefers the deeper insight that our fear of suffering and pain is misplaced” (90). This 
assessment is clearly problematic, given the great moral significance afforded to 
suffering in Schopenhauer’s thought. It is even more so given the realisation that this 
‘displacement’ of suffering is possible for the thinker only through a denial that Life and 
the problems inherent to it are ‘Real’ in the first place. But the general thrust of the 
assessment, and Rampley’s choice to frame it in terms of Peter Sloterdijk’s concept of 
“Algodicy”, is never-the-less worth taking up. Formulated as part of his Critique of 
Cynical Reason, Algodicy is expressly framed by Sloterdjik as a “metaphysical 
interpretation of pain that gives it meaning in modernity [and] takes the place of 
theodicy as its converse […] if there is no god and no higher meaning, how can we bear 
the pain?” (1988 460).  
The persistence of the idea of ‘meaning’ imparted by ‘a metaphysical 
interpretation of pain’ would seem to mark this as very much still in a religious 
framework. Even as it later develops, Sloterdijk maintains (despite the atheistic 
suppositions embedded in the name) that the concept marks a persistence of the 
religious impulse in the post-religious world; proof that “the religious question has 
survived the end of religion” (1989 77). However, the idea that it concerns the 
persistence of these matters in a world devoid of gods and ‘higher meanings’ should 
contextualise the appellation ‘metaphysical’ here. In developing the idea in his 1989 
study of Nietzsche’s Materialism, Sloterdijk offers an astute insight into the way that 
Nietzsche sought to break the spell of religious redemption, and in doing so offers a far 
more radical re-evaluation of suffering than Reginster arrived at. According to this 
understanding, Nietzsche’s idea of justification is not concerned with defending or 
‘excusing’ existence in the face of suspicion. Rather the aesthetic justification should be 
understood in terms of an aesthetic ‘exoneration’ of Life, a project that “stands in direct 
opposition to the program of moral abrogation” (78). Nietzsche’s use of the term 
‘justification’ should not be viewed in terms of its theological meaning – “the action 
whereby [Life] is accounted or made righteous by God”,98 except as an appropriation and 
subversion of this meaning. Nor should it be understood in terms of its slippage into 
common use: as “the action […] of vindication” or as “a spoken, written, or printed 
                                                 
98 Definitions taken from OED. 
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defence”.99 Justified (gerechtfertig) read as a past-participial adjective rather than a verb: 
As aesthetic phenomena, existence is (already) justified. 
This statement marks the beginning of Nietzsche’s project of ‘restoring 
innocence’ to Life100 through the exculpation of suspicion. In proclaiming “Die Welt, in 
jedem Augenblicke die erreichte Erlösung Gottes” (AC §5) we still have the persistence 
of a god. However, the world is “in each moment the achieved redemption/release”. In 
its existence as “the eternally changing, eternally new vision of greatest suffering, 
greatest contradiction” the world is ‘redemption manifest’ and the ‘redemptive action’ 
comes in undoing our abrogation of existence on the basis of this understanding. 
Innocence is not retroactively ‘imparted’ upon Life by the Dionysian realisation. Rather 
it is the means of seeing that we had no grounding for accusing existence in the first 
place101. The metaphor that Nietzsche uses for this return of innocence to existence 
comes out in the penultimate section of Birth as the ‘clearly perceived reality’ that 
Dionysus opens the window upon. In encountering the superabundance of nature, we 
see  
the playful construction and destruction of the individual world as the overflow of an 
original joy, as Heraclitus the obscure compares the world-forming force to a child at play, 
arranging and scattering stones here and there, building and then trampling down (BT 
§24:129). 
The innocence of existence against the claims of redemptive theodicy is Nietzsche’s 
answer for finding the world to be ‘good’. In Tragic Age, Nietzsche further elaborates 
upon his vision of the world as nothing but innocence: 
In this world only play, play as artists and children engage in it, exhibits coming to be 
and passing away structuring and destroying, without moral additive, in forever equal 
innocence. And as children and artists play, so plays the ever-living fire. It constructs 
and destroys, all in innocence. Such is the game that the aeon plays with itself (PTA 
7:62) 
This understanding of the world is claimed to offer a pure, immanent, instantaneous 
justification of everything that happens in the world. It is because of this understanding 
that Nietzsche claims Heraclitus “had no reason why he had to prove (as Leibnitz did) 
                                                 
99 Definitions taken from OED. 
100 For broader examinations of the theme of ‘the innocence of becoming’, see D.L Clark “Blake, Nietzsche and 
the Disclosure of Difference”. Also Leiter 2018, Shapiro 2017.  
101 The Latin ‘exoner’ (freed from a burden) and ‘exculpa’ (freed from blame) are helpful referents here, especially 
when contrasted to ‘acquitare’, as ‘discharge of debt’. 
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that this is the best of all possible worlds. It is enough that it is the beautifully innocent 
game of the aeon” (63). 
 The figure of ‘the Aeon, boy god of the zodiac’ (PP 13:70) is chosen by Nietzsche 
to stand for the various anthropomorphised figures102 that appear in Heraclitus’ thought 
(most frequently Zeus) as personified embodiments of the ‘world-order’ he called Logos. 
This is the figure, likened to a small child playing in sand, is Nietzsche’s further 
elaboration on the ‘Dionysian artist of worlds’ initially sketched in Birth. The ‘sublime 
image’ of the world-creator as a small child raptly playing with blank matter for its 
joyous amusement is often read as the principal source of this theories’ claim about the 
‘innocence of becoming’. However, as Young and Geuss are apt to point out, this is an 
unsatisfactory explanation for Life’s hardships when taken at surface level. If we were to 
turn this image into one of a child burning ants with a magnifying glass, then we would 
easily see how close the ‘playful innocence’ of the childish mind is to ‘gleeful sadism’. 
And the idea that we are the toys of a “playfully mad” cosmic deity (Young 52) seriously 
undermines the claim that torment can be excused on the grounds of the ‘amoral 
innocence’ of the perpetrator. As Geuss phrases it; “This play follows no rational or 
moral rules; the child is merely gratifying its aesthetic predilection […] [but] dying 
painfully in a highly interesting and dramatic way- won’t be nearly so satisfactory for 
me” (106-8).  
 This presentation would seem to forward the worst aspects of theodicy, without 
any of its redeeming positives. As the later Nietzsche was to emphasise, the introduction 
of a conscious actor responsible for pain and suffering makes of life a horror and an 
absurdity. Worse, even, than claiming that all this pain serves that being’s ‘higher Truth’ 
is the assertion that we suffer for the enjoyment of this being. Moreover, if the ‘aeon’ 
stands as a god-like consciousness controlling the world, then all the other problems of 
affirmation discussed up until now come flooding back. So, has Nietzsche just replaced 
the judgemental moral god with a sadistically indifferent game-playing one? 
 Treatments of the aeon in the literature have been sparse and surface level for 
the most part, and the majority of ink spilt on the relation between Heraclitus and 
                                                 
102 See note 77 
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Nietzsche has been on the subject of the ‘agon’ in their writings103. However, it was upon 
Heraclitus’ cosmology that Nietzsche pinned the transformative hopes of (what were 
intended to be) his first two ‘great works’. The concept deserves a more thorough 
examination, if for no other reason than this. But there are to be found other, profound 
reasons for looking to Heraclitus and his aeon for an understanding of Nietzsche’s early 
project, and for productive veins of thought we might trace into the Free Spirit works. 
Heraclitus is mentioned only two other times in Birth, but a reading of Nietzsche’s wider 
meditations on the world of the Ancient Greeks shows that his shadow lies over the 
work to an extent belied by these sparse references. The portrayal of Heraclitus as the 
affirmative opposition to Anaximander’s moral/metaphysical pessimism we offered in 
chapter one is not without wider precedent, and neither is the claim that Nietzsche 
‘hitched his star’ to this figure in his early career. 
There is no shortage of evidence to show that Nietzsche the young Basel lecturer 
was profoundly taken by Heraclitus’ philosophy104. Perhaps most importantly for the 
present study we have the opinion of Greg Whitlock who, in his introduction to the 
“Pre-Platonic Lectures” lists, the core concepts of the Free Spirit works that can be 
traced back to these lectures, in which ‘Heraclitus [especially] emerges as a pre-Platonic 
Nietzsche’: ‘concepts such as the will to power, the eternal return of the same, the 
overman, gay science, self-overcoming, and so on, receive rough formulations’ (xxxvii)  
105. A great deal of these ideas were to be tied together by Nietzsche in an unpublished 
note from 1885, which sets out perhaps the most complete picture of the world as ‘will 
to power’ in his corpus: 
 ‘And do you know what I take ‘the world’ to be? Shall I hold my mirror up to it? This 
world is a monster of energy, without beginning or end, a fixed and invariable magnitude 
                                                 
103 See for eExample H, Huttler, E Friedland, Nietzsche’s Therapeutic Teaching, Bloomsbury, 82-95, Christoph 
Cox, Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Interpretation UC Press, 1982, 186-191 Timothy Wilson, “Nietzsche’s Early 
Political Thinking: ‘Homer on Competition’”, Minerva journal, Vol. 9, 2005.  
104 A letter to Erwin Rohde (June 11th, 1872), which outlines his thesis on the Pre-Socratic thinkers places 
Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides as the most important thinkers of their age, and those between whom 
a struggle for the ‘soul’ of philosophy must be seen to have started. And the fact that Heraclitus, above the others, 
‘gave flight’ to Nietzsche’s philosophy (as Dionysus appears to have) can be attributed to by the testimony of his 
student Ludwig Von Scheffler. The ecstatic tone that is claimed to have come over Nietzsche during his lecture 
on Heraclitus and the way he ended the lecture with the words (in both Greek and German) “I sought myself” 
seem to speak volumes in this respect: “the lectures voice was also overcome by a gentle trembling, expressing a 
most intimate interest in the subject matter”: (Von Schaffer, in Gillman 1987, 67) 
105 It should be noted that Whitlock goes on to say that ‘nevertheless, the young professor behind these lectures  
was still far from the thinker he would become once he had rid himself of his enchantment with Wagner and 
Schopenhauer’ (PP xxviii). 
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of energy, no more, no less, which is never expended, merely transformed, of unalterable 
size as a whole, whose budget is without expenses or losses, but likewise without gains or 
earnings […] a determinate space and not a space that could be empty anywhere, but on 
the contrary a space everywhere filled with energy, a play of energy and waves of energy, 
simultaneously the ‘one’ and the ‘many’, waxing here, waning there, an ocean of 
tempestuous and torrential energies, forever changing […] forever blessing itself as that 
which eternally recurs, a becoming that knows no satiety, disgust, or weariness- this, my 
Dionysian world of eternal self-creation, of eternal self-destruction […] this world is will 
to power- and nothing besides! And you yourself are this will to power- and nothing 
besides!’ (WP 1067). 
 In this vision, we see what Nietzsche truly valued about the Heraclitean insight. 
The idea of a ‘world of energy’, one without end or ends, a ‘Dionysian world of self-
creation’ in which there is ‘will to power - and nothing besides’ embodies perfectly the 
‘closed economy of Life’ that Nietzsche sought in his naturalist attempt to undermine 
morality and metaphysics. It is this understanding, as an echo of his vision of ‘aeon’, 
that should inform our readings of ‘his’ Heraclitus and of the aesthetic justification of 
existence.  But is this vision compatible with a world in which the universe’s ‘self-
creation’ is attributed to the work of a ‘world-artist’? Does the very idea of an artist, of 
a sovereign creative mind directing the flow of the universe, not undermine the 
naturalist formulation par excellence, Laplace’s (regrettably apocryphal) ‘Je n'avais pas 
besoin de cette hypothèse-là’? We can begin to answer this by looking at that which 
Heraclitus apparently erected his system against. 
‘Who can distinguish darkness from the soul?’ 
 
Nietzsche’s theory of the ‘Tragic age of philosophy’ emphasises the interconnection of 
its first three great figures. Heraclitus represents (at least for Nietzsche) a rebuttal 
against Anaximander’s world of guilt and injustice, while Parmenides is claimed to have 
balked at the ambiguity inherent in the theory of Logos. However, the noted Heraclitus 
scholar Charles Kahn sets up another figure as Heraclitus’ principal opponent: 
Parmenides’ precursor, the poet-mystic Xenophanes (10-13). 
 A contemporary of Anaximander, Xenophanes made a significant philosophical 
leap in the attempt to reclaim the ‘reigns of the universe’ from the hands of 
anthropomorphic god figures. His philosophic poetry sought to dispel belief in a 
physical world governed by the capricious whims of human-like deities. To this end, he 
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forwards a vision of a world unified under a single set of laws affixed to the will of a 
single, all-powerful ‘mind’. This ‘Nous’ was an ordering principle that built heavily upon 
the Milesian concept of cosmic order (Kahn 12) but sought to offer an answer to the 
persistent question of why the universe exists as it does by grounding its explanation in 
theology. What we find here is thus “essentially the conception of a cosmic god: a deity 
conceived… as the ruling principle of an orderly universe” (11). Differing from the cultic 
gods of his own people, Xenophanes’ Nous was not modelled on humanity, possessing 
recognisable motivations, discernible character, or a physical ‘form’ – “in no way alike 
to humans in mind or body”. Rather it was simply a ‘governing will’ ordering and 
controlling the universe, which “without toil [moves] all things by the thought of his 
mind”.106 This ‘one god’ that “with the whole of his being beholdeth and marketh and 
heareth”107 is the first clearly enunciated description of the all-seeing, all-powerful, all-
knowing god of the monotheistic religions. But interestingly, Nietzsche is insistent that 
Xenophanes’ god “is not some doctrine of an (im)personal god existing beyond the world, 
which would be some pure spirit: rather the entire dichotomy between spirit and 
matter, deity and world, is absent here” (PP §11:78). He sees this force as “nature worship 
of the One […] attributed to the purest predicates’ under which ‘this incredible unity 
[introduced by Thales] breaks: into what should it transform?” (78). 
 What we find in Xenophanes is a ‘nature-theism’ like the one championed by 
Alfred North Whitehead. Whitehead held the notion of a divine governing intelligence 
ordering the mechanisms of nature to be not only compatible with, but required by, the 
naturalist position, arguing that naturalism’s model of a universal nature essentially 
reflects the “generic idea of God”.108 Xenophanes’ vision was of god as a ‘mind’ that 
controls the universe as its ‘physical body’. The two are united as part of the same 
‘system’, but there remains a critical metaphysical divide between the two ‘aspects’ of 
the universe. While the physical universe is taken to be in eternal change, the One God 
“always remains in the same place”109. It exists as a point of absolute fixity and 
                                                 
106 DK21B25 tr. Whitlock 78 
107 DK21B24 tr. Whitlock 78 
108 Griffin 84. See Whitehead, A.N, Process and Reality and Science in the Modern World. See also Pratt: Modern 
understandings of theism tend more and more towards “that nature towards which naturalism also s eems to be 
tending” (168).  
109 DK21B26 tr. Whitlock 78 
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immobility, an eternal, unchanging point of reference around which the universe is 
constructed. As Aristotle observed, the nature attributed to god here- unmoving and 
active “without toil”, thus indicating “absolute repose, which amounts to the denial of 
both locomotion and disturbance […] tantamount to freedom from all kinds of 
movement including change” - is incompatible with the idea that this god is identical 
with a world of change and motion (Finkleburg 1990 109-10). The problem is resolved 
only if Xenophanes is taken to mean by his ‘unchanging god’ an “intelligible essence 
unifying the sensible manifold” (112), granting the ‘One God’ a differing ontological 
status to physical materiality. 
This shows that Xenophanes’ god, like Whitehead’s, breaks apart the monism so 
inherent to the naturalist position: there is matter, and then there is mind. Thus, we 
find here, as Nietzsche points out, “a dualism similar to Anaximander’s Unlimited: here, 
the world of becoming and passing away; there, eternally fixed divine primal matter” 
(PP 11:80). The world is wholly enthralled to and under the control of this god, and 
everything that exists does so to serve its ineffable whims. The god itself, on the other 
hand, exists apart from the world that assails the poor, stupid, uncomprehending 
human, existing as a “vision of divine rest, of the permanence of all things within a 
pantheistic archetypal peace” (PTA 10:75). This is exactly the sort of onto-theology that 
naturalism is prone to fall into. Though the god is reduced to its barest qualities as 
‘order’ and ‘master’ and is thus made identical with the laws of nature, there is 
nevertheless (as Nietzsche observed) a rupturing of the unity of existence represented 
by Thales’ monist proclamation. The naturalist dictate that “nature is the whole of 
reality” 110 may appear to be maintained in the idea of god-as-nature. However, as John 
Dewey noted in his rebuttal to Whitehead, this means (when taken seriously) that 
naturalism can permit of ‘no other realm, even a realm consisting entirely of forms or 
ideas, which transcends the natural process constituting nature’ (243). 
The separation of the world into ‘that which moves’ (mind) and ‘that which is 
moved’ (‘body’/physical matter), with the former being unchanging and of a different 
‘ontological’ status (if not strictly a different metaphysical nature) means that a division 
exists between nature-as-law and that law’s productions/manifestations. And thus, once 
                                                 
110 Griffin 85. See Dewey Naturalism and the Human Spirit 243. 
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again, the problem of seduction rears its head.  Since the Nous is regarded as invariant 
and excluded from coming-to-be111, its relation to its ‘body’ (physical matter/the natural 
world) must be regarded as reflecting the relation of the Will to Representation, in so 
far as change ‘applies not to the will, but only to its phenomena’ (WR I §25:128). Though 
there is a ‘unity’ between the two realms, the ‘pantheistic peace’ of the god means that 
it itself does not and cannot change, unlike the world of “plurality […] directly 
conditioned by space and time, into which the will itself never enters”. Change and the 
pain and uncertainty it brings are wholly excluded from the peaceful repose of the divine 
master: 
[the will] is by no means included in that plurality, that change… the struggles of the form 
of matter, all this does not concern it, but is only the matter of its objectification, and only 
through this objectification does all this have an indirect relationship to the will (WWR 
§28 158). 
Schopenhauer’s likens this relationship to the one between a magic lantern and the 
phantasmagoria it produces: multiplicity emerges as the secondary, phenomenal after-
effect of a single, unmoving flame. Just as the flame exists prior to and radically removed 
from the shadows it casts, so too does the will exist in transcendent absence from the 
world to which it has only an “indirect relationship”. 
That the world is secondary to the whims of the divine, existing only for its ends, 
is already a problem here. That Xenophanes doubles down by showing the suffering of 
humans to be for the amusement of a perfect and blissful deity that simply has no more 
concern for us than we have for ants (and rightly so in his eyes) re-enforces the problem. 
We suffer unheeded as the god continues to languish in its blissful state of peace, away 
from trouble or hardship. Tragic Age makes it clear that Nietzsche regarded just this 
fantasy of voyeuristic escape from struggle as the imperative behind Xenophanes’ 
creation: born to a tired old man, weary of a life of restless, fruitless wanderings and 
searchings (PTA §9). A god that wills us to suffer while it does not (apparently for its 
‘divine satisfaction’) is the purest crystallization of the horrific comic-tragedy of life 
engendered by the absolute division of matter and will. And Xenophanes’ own ‘theodicy’ 
is a cold, dispassionate acceptance of that reality. The world is not justified (or 
                                                 
111 As Nietzsche notes, the idea that god came to be (that there was a time when it was not, and was not self -
identical) was the highest of blasphemy in Xenophanes’ eyes. (PP §11:78). 
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justifiable) to humans because they lack the basic epistemic tools required to see the 
‘perfection’ of the world order as the god does (PP §11:80). All we can do is have faith: 
trust that the universe operates as it should, and that pain is necessary for the 
achievement of a higher order that we cannot know (and ultimately have little place in). 
We arrive here at something that mirrors the conventional critical 
understanding of the world-artist’s justification. The only difference is that unlike the 
misanthrope Xenophanes, Nietzsche is taken to claim that we can share in justification 
if we can look upon the world-order as the aeon does. However, this is taken to require 
a special perspective, one that originates from the ability to view Life from a detached 
vantage, as an ‘aesthetic spectacle’. We might point to the image of “warriors in a 
painting” (BT §5:38) for illustration of this: the madness and pain of battle becomes 
order and beauty when ‘viewed from without’; from a position of omniscient remove, 
set back from the world inside the frame. This is what tends to be understood as the 
aesthetic dimension of Nietzsche’s ‘theodicy’. We are apparently encouraged to view 
our own pain and suffering as we would the agonies of the supplice depicted in 
devotional paintings, or the beautified slaughter of, say, Ruben’s Massacre of the 
Innocents. However, as Young points out, this is problematic because one, the salvation 
is fleeting (only there when we occupy the aesthetic standpoint), and two, comes only 
when we cease to be embodied humans, i.e., the subjects of the suffering. It is only when 
“we are transported out of the role of protagonist in the tragedy of life and into that of 
its ‘soul author and spectator’ that we see the world as justified – but this does nothing 
to justify the life of an inmate to an inmate” (Young 52). 
Once again, we return to the problem that affirmation cannot function while 
there is a division between that which suffers, and that which it suffers for. Any potential 
justification on the grounds that we can ‘share’ in the divine’s pleasure at existence must 
come up against the problem that we can do so only in so far as we ‘share’ in its divinity. 
The ‘animal’ human (that which suffers) is left behind while the ‘spiritual’ human is 
shown that suffering is an illusion it can escape through renunciation. This division 
must be overcome, and it was in Heraclitus that Nietzsche appears to have found his 
answer. Kahn frames the Ephesian’s project as explicitly opposing the mystical dualism 
of Xenophanes through a system of monism unprecedented in the history of western 
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thought up until this point (Kahn 2001 131)112. If the Heraclitean insight that “all things 
are one”113, that “the ordering [is] common to all”114 is to be taken seriously, it requires 
that the logos which orders his universe (in place of the Nous) be immanent to that order. 
Heraclitus’ cosmology is thus wholly predicated upon  
a denial of any fundamental duality between a generated world order and the eternal 
source from which it arises or the ruling intelligence by which it is organised. Insofar as 
it is made, it is self-made; Insofar as it is organised, it is self-organised; in so far as it is 
generated, it is identical with its source (Kahn 2001 134). 
Nietzsche’s insistence that “Heraclitus rejected the world of Being altogether and 
maintained only the world of Becoming” means that the ordering principle of that world 
must be immanent to Becoming. No longer is the source, the reason, the ‘master’, the 
‘Truth’ of the physical world outside of this world. Instead, reality is its ordering 
principle. What does this mean for justification, and for the human’s access to it? To 
understand this, we must now look at another interlocutor that Nietzsche lays alongside 
Heraclitus: a variation on Xenophanes’ ‘world-mind’ that appears in Tragic Age: 
Anaxagoras’ Nous as ‘world-architect’. 
 
 
‘Confronted with the enormous art object of the cosmos’ 
 
Across Nietzsche’s early corpus Anaxagoras is treated to a somewhat scattered and 
unclear presentation. Notebook entries detailing various abortive plans for the Tragic 
Age project serve to cast his thought in a number of different, often contradictory lights. 
One note from 1872 for example pairs the thinker with Heraclitus as a philosopher who 
attempted to impart meaning upon the world, in opposition to Democritus’ “pessimism 
of contingency”; a mechanical/scientivistic vision of a “world lacking in all moral and 
aesthetic significance”115. Other notes from the same period place the two in related but 
                                                 
112 Kahn differs from Nietzsche in so far as he does not see Thales’s system as a true monism, But Nietzsche is 
also inconsistent on this point. Heraclitus and Parmenides are claimed as the only true monists: (PP 44, 80. See 
also Whitlock 224 n.128). 
113 DK22B50 tr. Kahn 2001 pp.44-5 
114 DK22B30 tr. Kahn 2001 
115 CW 11 23[35]: pp.129-30. 
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opposing categories, as thinkers of Art vs. Purpose116 or of ethical vs. logical 
anthropomorphism117. Indeed, in the final draft manuscript for Tragic Age we have now, 
it would seem that Nietzsche wishes to draw a close affinity between the two. Like the 
logos, Anaxagoras’ nous is portrayed as an artistic force of cosmic creation:  
[A] most tremendous mechanical and architectural genius, creating with the simplest 
means the most impressive forms and orbits, creating a moveable architectonic, as it were, 
but ever from the irrational free random choosing that lies in the artist’s depths (PTA 
§19:112) 
Nietzsche proclaims that “the Spirit [Geist] of Anaxagoras is a creative artist” and that 
by virtue of our relation to it, we are able to stand as it does, ‘confronted with the 
enormous art object of the cosmos’ (PTA §19:113). So why should it be that in the “Pre-
Platonic” lectures, Nietzsche refers to Anaxagoras as ‘the true antagonist’ to Heraclitus’ 
worldview (PP §13:101)? Is this just another ambivalent shift in Nietzsche’s evaluation of 
the pair? 
 Notebook references claim that both thinkers look upon the world as “spectators 
at a tragedy” but see in its unfolding not “a reflection of the wretchedness of existence” 
as the metaphysicians had; rather they perceive the cosmos “as artistic construct” and 
emphasise the “likeness of the laws of the world”118. However, their articulations of this 
world of law differ in small details that add up to a tremendous division between their 
worldviews. Much like Xenophanes, Anaxagoras conceived of a spiritual force of 
‘intellection’ as the guiding principle of the universe, motivating and directing the 
unfolding of matter’s formation. But unlike his forebear, whose theories require that the 
‘Mind’ of the universe be metaphysically distinct from its ‘body’, Anaxagoras was 
primarily a scientific investigator and was concerned with the ‘mechanics’ of the 
immanent physical universe. Nietzsche heaps praise upon the simple, common sense 
approach of Anaxagoras, who was willing to trust the evidence of his senses and the 
discoveries afforded “through the most immediate experience” (PTA §15:98). It is as a 
result of this method that he was led to affirm the reality of a world of change, to 
maintain that “change is motion” and that “motion is truth and not semblance… in spite 
                                                 
116 CW 11 19[116]:39 
117 CW 11 19[116]:40, see also 19[181]:57 
118 CW 11 23[35]. 
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of Parmenides” (§14:92)119. This emphasis on the reality and overriding importance of 
change to Anaxagoras’ thought clearly mirrors that element of Heraclitus’ philosophy 
that was so captivating for Nietzsche. Existence qua existence is taken to be an activity, 
and to ‘exist’ as ‘existence’ – as “life” – in so far (and only in so far) as it dynamically 
moves and changes. 
Anaxagoras’ opposition to the material scepticism of the Eleatics is seen by 
Nietzsche to extend into a metaphysical scepticism reminiscent of Kant.  Further 
demarcating his principle of ‘mind’ from the god of Xenophanes, Anaxagoras is 
presumed by Nietzsche to have asked himself how it can be that a controlling force of 
intellection exerts power over- and thereby organises- matter: “does the impetus for 
motion lie outside the many real substances? Or… does this change originate in them? 
And is this to be explained mechanically or magically?” (§14:93). The answer that 
Anaxagoras gives -that “what is absolutely alien to one another can in no wise exert 
influence upon one another, hence neither move nor be moved”120- can leave no doubt 
that his thought is concerned to present a wholly immanent vision of a mechanically 
ordered world. By denying that what is not physical can affect the physical, he does away 
with the ‘magical interventions from beyond’ sketched in Xenophanes’ theology. 
Beginning from the axiomatic principle that motion must derive from an exertion of 
force in the physical plain, Anaxagoras claimed that whatever instantiates this force 
must itself be physical. Mind must therefore be material, if it is to be regarded as the 
source and guiding principle of motion in the physical world. This means that to 
Nietzsche he was a pure materialist, whose philosophy draws no firm material definition 
between the substance of matter and of mind121. Both must be material, and there can 
exist nothing that is not material (at least in a meaningful sense). 
                                                 
119 Nietzsche also claims this revelation to be the result of the “indubitable succession of ideas in our thinking” in 
what seems an homage to Kant- though his citation of Spir’s critique of the Kantian notion of time and succession 
(§14:97) casts some doubt as to whether this is the case. Nevertheless, his discussion of  the shortcoming of the 
“inner-sense” argument that follows (pp.99-100) makes it clear that to both Nietzsche and Anaxagoras, time is 
real and the human perception of it should be regarded as more than simply the deceptive imposition of semblance 
upon a “dead motionless globe” (93). 
120 “Take two essences, each existent in itself with a totally different independent being in itself… with their 
nature as described, they can never collide, never move each other, never attract each other. There is no causality 
between them, no bridge; they do not touch one another, concern one another, disturb one another. Repulsion is 
exactly as inexplicable as magical attraction between them” (PTA §14: 93). 
121 PP §13: pp.99-100. 
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But this paradigm nevertheless brings with it the same attendant problems that 
we saw afflicting Xenophanes. Nous is envisaged as the controlling and moving element 
of the universe, the ‘engine’ that brings inert matter (Homœomeres) into motion and 
that oversees its formation into the complex arrangements of the physical world. And 
as nous is nothing more than a part of that world, we are then left with “a well-ordered 
totality creating itself, without the aid of arbitrary fictions, only by the impulse of 
ordered laws of motion” (PTA§17: 110). But in order that this should be the case, the nous 
must be omnipotent- it must, like Xenophanes’ Nous, move all by its power, without 
effort. It must be able to exert absolute control over the universe of matter, without itself 
being affected in return: 
Nous is unlimited and self-ruling and has been mixed with no thing but is alone itself by 
itself. For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with anything else, then … the things 
mixed together with it would thwart it, so that it would control none of these things in 
the way that it in fact does (Anaxagoras DK59B12 tr. Curd) 
Despite all the effort that Nietzsche puts into arguing against a metaphysical duality 
between the two, we are still left with a hierarchic relation between two fundamentally 
separate aspects of existence. This, to Nietzsche, is the essential division between 
Anaxagoras and Heraclitus’ philosophy, the reason that Anaxagoras is held up as 
Heraclitus’ ‘true’ antagonist: “no element is alive… matter is not simultaneously what 
lives” (PP §13:101). 
 In place of a metaphysically divided reality, Anaxagoras introduces into 
materialism an ontological dualism similar to the famous Cartesian one. Though 
Nietzsche still insists that “the Greek view of the world in no way distinguished body 
from spirit as matter and non-matter” we in fact find in Anaxagoras “for the first time 
the crude opposition of soul [seele] to matter: a force that knows and sets goals but also 
wills, moves, and so on” (PP §10:72). This is profoundly significant when read in the light 
of notes made early in Nietzsche’s career for his abandoned doctoral thesis on the 
concept of teleology. Philosophies of nature aspire to exorcise theology from their 
worldviews. But for Nietzsche, all prior attempts at this endeavour had failed; in their 
recourse to Reason as a universal organising principle, they had remained trapped in 
the fundamental supposition that  
There is a creating intelligence. The acceptance of such an intelligence is made after 
human analogy: why can there not be a power which unconsciously creates the designed, 
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i.e. nature […] One no longer posits cognition outside of the world. But we remain stuck 
in metaphysics and call on the thing-in-itself for assistance (KGW i.4. 550 (1868) tr. Hill). 
Nature-theology is just another form of metaphysics, merely one that finds another 
means of expressing its flight from reality:  
two metaphysical solutions are attempted: the one, still coarsely anthropological, places 
an ideal person outside the world, the other still metaphysical, flees into an intelligible 
world, in which the designedness of things is immanent (KGW i.4. 550 (1868) tr. Hill 
emphasis added). 
Considered in this light, nous manifests the baseline attribute that marks the boundary 
between nature-theology, and the sort of indecisive “cosmic spiritualism” that arises 
from simply labelling mechanical process as ‘God’: a “materialism grown sentimental” 
(Forrest & Majoran pp.68-9).  
Though expressly atheistic and materialist, Anaxagoras’ theory maintains 
something recognisable as a god, a discrete and sovereign entity that acts according to 
‘intention’. This ‘willing intention’ marks the nous as a ‘subject’, something discretely 
differentiated from the rest of reality- and ‘redemption’ comes through identity with 
that subject. In so far as we are animals, our lives “are but the direct result of blind 
mechanical movement” (PTA §19:117). It is only in our ‘escape’ from this mechanical 
nature, in our becoming like the eternal transcendent subject-spectator, that we might 
find our lives to be ‘aesthetically justified’. This is the essence of the aesthetic 
redemption that Nietzsche aligns with Anaxagoras, who answered the question as to 
why human existence has value as follows: “Because it allows me to view the heavens 
and the whole order of the cosmos” (17:113). The world is justified as an art-object, the 
object of an aesthetic gaze. The human occupies a special place in the universe owing 
to its being the “wisest of beings, harbouring a greater fullness of Nous in himself than 
all the other creatures” (§19:114), which imparts upon us the unique capacity for 
comprehension. We, alone of all the animals, have the ability to perceive the world 
(albeit in a limited way) as the nous does: as a dance of order and beauty. It is as ‘the 
paragon of animals’, the greatest and highest of nous’ creations upon which it has 
bestowed some part of its discerning, understanding ‘intellection’, that we find our 
redemption. However, this relies upon our capacity to identify with the nous’ 
perspective, through an exercise of our capacity to see as it does - something that 
Nietzsche understands to be alien to our normal, animal existence. 
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Nietzsche praises Anaxagoras for his insight that plants experience ‘states of 
will’- ‘lust’ and ‘urlust’- that inform their growth. This principle extends willing –the 
drive towards or away from states of will induced by external stimulus- to all animate 
thing: “every perception is accompanied by pain” (PP §11:104)122. But he also shows how 
Anaxagoras differentiated between a passive intellect- that which simply reacts to 
stimulus- and an ’active’ one “noticeable above all in the will”. This is the difference that 
raises humans above animals- that they possess enough nous to pass out of the purely 
passive state of willing and achieve the ‘active’ state of the cosmic nous- ‘how noble in 
reason […] in apprehension how like a god’. This gap, though small, introduces an 
insurmountable gulf between the embodied, physical animal and the ‘higher’ 
comprehending being that stands as cosmic spectator. The ability to perceive life as 
justified, therefore, relies on our ability to separate ourselves from the ‘animal 
interestedness’ of our physical lives, and to exist as the ‘Geist’ does: unaffected by the 
striving and privation that comprise the mechanical, physical world. It relies, in short, 
on the attainment of a disinterested aesthetic state, one in which the demands of 
‘passive’ animality are transcended123. Anaxagoras’ aesthetic redemption thus reveals its 
roots in Schopenhauer’s principle of the ‘aesthetic state’ of ‘disinterested 
contemplation’: the ‘pure, will-less state’ of escape from impassioned, embodied care124.  
 
‘Oh these Greeks, we sighed, they overturn our aesthetics!’ 
 
Existence as a human is glorious for Anaxagoras because comprehension allows us front 
row seats to the spectacle of the universe. However, the human has another existence: 
that of ‘art object’ and ‘passive tool’. We find an interesting formulation of the 
divine/embodied divide that Nietzsche identified in Anaxagoras’ thought coming 
through in discussions of the organic brain. In a proclamation that becomes profoundly 
                                                 
122 This principle will become important for Nietzsche theory of the ‘physics of forces’, discussed at length in 
chapter 3. 
123 This is not a fully ‘ascetic’ translation: after all, passive and active willing are regarded as united: “intellect is 
only the finest and purest of all things” and “representation and drive are united in the one concept intellect: both 
are effects of the life force” (PP §11:100). To ‘comprehend’ is still to perceive and thus to will. But we nevertheless 
have here something of the problem that Nietzsche ascribed to theories of art tha t delineate the specifically 
aesthetic state from one characterised by embodied passion. 
124 See WR I §37. For extensive commentary, see Vasalou (esp. §1), Vandenarbeele 2015 §1-4, Foster 1996.  
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significant when read in the context of Nietzsche’s philosophy of the body, we find that 
Anaxagoras drew a distinction between the brain and the mind: 
It seems curiously eccentric […] to separate the ‘spirit’, the brain-product, from its causa 
and to imagine its continued existence after such a separation. But that is what 
Anaxagoras did; he forgot the brain, its astonishingly elaborate refinement, the delicacy 
and convolutedness of its labyrinths, and instead decreed ‘the spirit as such’ (PTA §15:100-
101) 
Spirit has no reciprocal relationship with the physiological activities of the body, but 
rather precedes them, animating body and organs into life as its puppet125. This state of 
affairs is necessary if the spirit is to maintain its eternally ‘self-same-identity’, 
unchanged and unaffected by the physical world. In exerting its ‘will’ over matter, it 
must not be affected in turn. Therefore, the labyrinthine complexities of the brain are 
relegated to the world of ‘mere mechanical motion’ and can exert no influence upon the 
‘spirit as such’. This division, reflecting the one between free, active nous and lowly, 
determined, passive matter (homaeomens) runs to the heart of this presentation of the 
aesthetic worldview. In so far as we are ‘spirit’, we are ‘free’ and justified. In so far as we 
are animal, we are only the means of that justification; and, crucially, ‘never the twain 
shall meet’: for what moves is not what is moved. 
 Of course, the physical animal does nonetheless remain ‘justified’ in so far as it 
is such an art object; and as the greatest of artistic creations, the apex of nous’ artistry, 
the human is the ‘most worthy’ thing in the material world. The nous, when it dwells 
within matter as living things, “always builds for itself out of the available material, tools 
suitable to the degree to which it appears” (§19:114) meaning that the more ‘spirit’ an 
animal possesses, the more ’beauty’ it possesses. The human stands as “the very image 
of the Anaxagorean cosmos, the image of nous itself that has built for itself a most 
beautiful and worthy mansion”. Worthiness is manifest most fully in the human hand: 
the cleverness and dexterousness of its functioning is directly manifest in the measure 
of its proportions, and the organ is metonymic of the whole: ‘in form and moving how 
express and admirable’126. The relation of function and beauty is interesting to note here, 
as we see that the human is most beautiful because she is “the best tool” (PP 11:99). In 
                                                 
125 Or, as Nietzsche puts it, nous’ “home” (PTA §19). 
126 For Aristotle’s discussion of the hand and its significance for Anaxagoras, see PP §13:99 -100. See also 
Aristotle, Of Parts and Animals, Book 1 
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her, the nous has created something that concentrates its creative capacities to such a 
degree that it has become not just a work of art, but also a work towards art, “an 
instrument to further instruments”127. Not only does it spectate the world as the nous 
does: it creates as it does too, and this affords it some claim to dignity that is directly 
linked to its animal existence as physical matter.  
 Nietzsche aligns this value strongly with the Athenian hegemony that nurtured 
Praxiteles and Myron and gave birth to the Parthenon - a work that stood as proof to 
the Athenian physis that “coming-to-be is not a moral but an aesthetic phenomenon” 
(PTA 19:113-6). In particular, “Pericles represented the visible human realisation of the 
constructive, moving, distinguishing, ordering, reviewing, planning, artistically 
creative, self-determining power of the spirit” (PTA §19:114). However, critically it 
should be noted that ‘Pericles the man’ is nothing other than a ‘visual’ manifestation of 
this imperative. We see this come through in Nietzsche’s imagined description of the 
Funeral Oration. The man himself “stood before his people […] in the beautiful rigidity 
and motionlessness of a marble Olympian […] wrapped in his mantle, its draperies 
unmoved, his continence without change” (§19:114). The calmness and serenity of this 
statue-like figure “his strong voice powerfully even” should remind us of Xenophanes’s 
immobile, sovereign, commanding god, especially in the contrast between this 
presentation and that of the “thundering, flashing, destroying, redeeming” power of the 
words that speak out from this ‘possessed’ edifice of immobile matter. The difference 
between this power and the passive, noble ‘figurine’ it emanates from highlights what 
Staten claims about the aesthetic justification: that the human fulfils her “ontological 
vocation as vessel of a higher purpose” (110). In this, we see that the analogy to Hamlet’s 
soliloquy we have teased out so far is more than just superficially suggestive. The human 
is ‘in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel’- but we 
are to understand this in terms of what the apocrypha tells us of angels: that they are 
ornamental automata, existing only to praise the deity, carry out its will, and prettify its 
paradise. 
 As Nietzsche states in “The Hellenic Will”, the human in her embodied, material 
‘aspect’ is “nothing but a tool of the will… But there is something in [her] for which the 
                                                 
127 PP §13: pp.100-1, N.28. See also above note.  
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dance of the stars and the states is performed as a showpiece”128. As physical ‘actor’ she 
manifests as nothing but a passive object of the nous’ creative drive. Nevertheless, 
somewhere ‘within’ her dwells a creative and speculative divinity that recognises itself 
as the “aim and final purpose” of existence: a creature that can stand as an appropriate 
and worthy spectator to the cosmic play (Staten 110). The spectatorial stance, with its 
inherent difference between ‘observer’ and ‘observed’, implies a gap that cannot be 
closed. Many critics have been willing to simply accept this problematic as beyond the 
ken of Nietzsche’s concerns. We may well be tempted to join them, and to read an 
embrace of our vocation - as passive means to a divine end - as the meaning of Birth’s 
claim that we find out dignity as ‘works of art’: as well as the claim that when we create 
artistically, we do so as “the only subject which truly exists” (BT 5:38). By this 
understanding, all artists are just a ‘medium’ (in the spiritualist sense) through which 
the ‘world-artist’ enacts its creative ‘vision’.  
The problem with this comes when we try to link the notion back to the idea of 
an imminent, human justification for life. It establishes a difference between the ‘purely 
human’ state (the creature-as-work/tool) and a divine ‘aesthetic’ state, one in which the 
human is able to view itself ‘from an aesthetic remove’ and appreciate the tribulations 
of the suffering animal as an impassive spectacle of beauty. This is all very well when we 
are able to ‘distance’ ourselves from these tribulations. However, as Nietzsche’s history 
of the encounter between Apollo and Dionysus shows, no aesthetic ‘fantasy’ of beauty 
and grace, no matter how elaborate and powerful, can withstand the howling gale of 
change that blows from the void of becoming. The ‘shrill laugher’ of the forest god would 
have shattered the “flattering mirror” of the Olympians had it not been able to resonate 
with that cry, turning it into a joyous, ecstatic laughter instead. 
 Anaxagoras’ ‘Praxieteilean’ vision of human grace and dignity can inspire love-
of-life when suffering in not too great. However, once the agonies of animal life become 
too strong, we are inevitably dragged back from the beautiful dream by the sheer weight 
of torment that the world can heap upon the living animal. To speak of ‘grace’ and 
‘dignity’ of the human condition is all very well when the sun is shining. But such a 
                                                 
128 “schliesslich sind auch sie nichts als werkzeug des willes und haben das wesen des willens an sich zu erleiden: 
aber etwas ist in ihnen für das der reigentanz der gesterne und der staaten als ein schauspeil auf geführt wird” 
(KGW 3:285-6. My Translation, emphasis added).  
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vision, like that of the life of ambrosia atop the magic mountain, becomes pale and 
insubstantial to the beaten, shivering, starving creature that needs amour fati more than 
anyone. Pain breaks apart the illusion of human dignity, and with this melancholia, 
justification through beauty vanishes: Anaxagoras’ ‘brave o’er hanging firmament’ 
degenerates rapidly from a ‘majestical ceiling, fretted with golden fire’ to a ‘foul and 
pestilent congregation of vapours’. To most critics, as was said, this is not seen as a 
problem and is in fact taken as the grounding for what Salim Kemal calls “Nietzsche’s 
politics of aesthetic genius” (257). Kemal joins others like Staten in claiming that it was 
Nietzsche’s political purpose to re-introduce the ‘republic of geniuses’ through his 
cultural project, and that works like “The Hellenic Will” and “The Greek City State” 
stand as testimony to this. Yes, reality can break down the conviction of the strongest 
among us. That is why we require slavery (it is argued): to ensure that those most 
capable of producing and disseminating works of beauty to inspire ‘love-of-life’ are kept 
in the ‘aesthetic’ state of ease and joy. 
 This reading would seem to miss something critical about the idea of the human 
artist as ‘world-genius’: something which attests to the unique vision of the aesthetic 
Nietzsche saw in Ancient Greek art. Indeed, in his framing of the problem posed by lyric 
poetry to modern aesthetics, we might be tempted to see Nietzsche offering a direct 
rebuttal to those who interpret his theory of aesthetic justification in terms of a 
Schopenhauerian redemption through aesthetic withdrawal. Nietzsche castigates 
modern aesthetics for a myopic belief that art and the aesthetic sphere is concerned 
only with dispassionate speculation (BT §5:34). Under such a dictum, he claims that we 
are unable to recognise the lyric poetry of Archilochus of Paros as art, properly speaking. 
The mercenary poet’s works, which passionately manifest “the screams of his hatred and 
scorn […] the drunken outbursts of his desires”, are held as wholly alien to the aesthetic 
landscape of contemporary Europe: 
we know the subjective artist only as a bad artist and demand above all in art the defeat 
of the subjective, redemption from the ‘I’ and the silencing of each individual will and 
craving, indeed we cannot conceive of the slightest possibility of truly artistic creation 
without objectivity, without pure disinterested contemplation (BT §5:34). 
Schopenhauer’s reading of song and poetry (WWR I §51) offers an advance over this 
theory, in that it can accommodate Archilochus’ works under the category of fine art. 
However, it does so by drawing a division between the passionate creature and the 
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artist. The lyric emerges from a state of ‘vacillation’ between interest and disinterest: a 
flickering back and forth between a state of embodied passion (which cannot be 
aesthetic) and a state of disinterested contemplation of these passions (which is). The 
one state provides the ‘content’ for poetry in its flights of lust and anger, while the other 
passively observes these paroxysms and gives them form as art. 
Just as with the vision of justification through aesthetic spectacle offered above, 
we see that the state of ‘embodied willing’ will forever attempt to drag us away from the 
‘healing vision’ that makes of our feelings a distant and disinterested spectacle: 
In this [the aesthetic] state, pure knowledge, as it were, approaches us in order to redeem 
us from willing and its pressure: we follow, but only momentarily: willing, the memory of 
our personal goals, tears us away again and again from calm contemplation; but equally 
the next beautiful surroundings […] entice us away again from willing (BT §5:37). 
The upshot is a vision of the lyric as “an incompletely achieved art, an art which, as it 
were, reaches its goal only seldom and sporadically”, emerging from an alternation 
between “the un-aesthetic and the aesthetic state”- between the desires that give 
content to the work, and the disinterested artistic state that imparts upon it form (BT 
§5:37). This can be seen to mirror the ‘incompletely achieved redemption’ that arises if 
we view the aesthetic justification in terms of this ‘modern’ aesthetic outlook. However, 
for Nietzsche this theory only arises because modern civilisation has developed a false 
and counterfeit understanding of the work of art based in a concretisation of the relation 
between subject and object, and between intellection and materiality. The truth of art, 
revealed in the lyric’s evolution over the epic, is that “the whole opposition between 
subjective and objective […] is completely irrelevant to aesthetics”. In the properly 
aesthetic state, the demarcation between spectator, artist, and artwork collapses: or 
rather we are “simultaneously subject and object, simultaneously poet, actor, and 
spectator” (BT §5:38).  
To view the world aesthetically is not to withdraw and view one’s embodied 
physicality as a distant and unreal object of dispassionate speculation. It is rather the 
ability to understand that the ‘spectator’ to the world tragedy is herself a part of the 
play: that she is the artist, the audience, and the work all at once. 
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§2.3: ‘Fire Everliving’: Heraclitus’ Aesthetic Cosmodicy. 
 
Where for Anaxagoras the human lives a dual existence as artwork and art-appreciator 
- combined but never entirely mixed - the Dionysian aesthetic that Nietzsche sees in 
lyric and tragic art serves to bridge this divide. The ‘aesthetic wall’ that separates the 
spectator from the spectacle and marks the latter as an ‘unreal’ and ‘safe’ object of 
disinterested contemplation, is removed- or at the least profoundly transmuted. We see 
Nietzsche’s vision of this unique ‘totalisation’129 of the artwork most clearly in his 
presentation of the tragic satyr-play, in which “the distinctions between characters, 
chorus, and audience are problematized or weakened” (Mulhall 110). 
 The chorus’ role as a sort of ‘frame’ for the play, a “living wall which tragedy built 
around itself” might seem at first to undercut this interpretation. The claim is presented 
as a rebuttal to the ‘ideal spectator’ theory forwarded by Schlegel, a dismissal tied up 
with Nietzsche’s rejection of the “people’s chorus” –the chorus as the “immutable moral 
law” of the democratic mass (BT §5:pp.42-4). We might then take this, in conjunction 
with the ire expresses towards Euripides for his having “brought the spectator onto the 
stage” (§11:63) to indicate a ‘barricading’ of the difference between artwork and 
spectator. This is Sloterdijk’s reading, one which emphasises the importance of the 
chorus as an ever-present “Apollonian catch mechanism”, preventing the demonic 
powers of the god from overflowing the stage by re-enforcing its status as art, and thus 
as ‘unreality’ (Sloterdijk 1989 24-5). Upon closer examination however, we find that 
while the chorus does indeed ‘frame’ the tragic stage, it does so as a conduit rather than 
as a delineating boundary. 
 The framing of the stage, its re-enforcement as a construct and work of art may 
well serve to “[ensure] that no orgy will result from the orgiastic song” (Sloterdijk 1989 
24), but it does not serve to render the spectacle of the Tragic ‘artificial’ and thus ‘’tame’ 
or otherwise ‘unreal’. Rather, as Stephen Mulhall notes, the position of the chorus “at 
the innermost of the concentric circles of terraces at which the spectators sat” meant 
that “their singing and dancing […] was essentially liminal with respect to both drama 
and spectators, internally related to both and so not exclusively identifiable with either” 
                                                 
129 What in Zarathustra, he was to call “homological art”: See Pothen §3 
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(109). They were, in effect, audience members “capable of interacting with the 
characters in the drama in ways not available to mere spectators”, and the audiences’ 
identification with them (the chorus) served to overcome the spectatorial distance 
between observer and artwork. For Nietzsche, “a public of spectators as we know it was 
unknown to the Greeks”; sat in the stalls with the chorus, each individual was able to 
“imagine oneself as a member of the chorus” (BT §8:48). The fact that “there was at 
bottom no opposition between public and chorus” meant that the ‘enchanted world’ of 
the drama spilled out to fill the theatre of Dionysus, which was transformed into the 
mountain pass in which the Roaring One appeared to the Bacchae. Through 
identification with the Satyr chorus, the audience “imagine themselves as recreated 
geniuses of nature, as satyrs”, and “as satyr [she] in turn beholds the god”. They are 
enfolded in the art-world of the stage and undergo the same transformation that that 
ensures we “do not see the awkwardly masked man” but instead “the arrival onstage of 
the god” (§8: pp.48-52). 
The ‘magic spell’ of the stage seeps out into the stalls via its conduit, the chorus: 
half spectator, half artwork. In merging with this intermediary, the audience becomes 
part of the artwork- a satyr who is “the sole beholder of the stage’s vision world” (BT 
§8:48). This vision, of a work of art that observes itself, that encompasses both spectacle 
and spectator, is the key to understanding Nietzsche’s aesthetic worldview. When he 
asks of Schlegel what sort of art form is built upon the “spectator in himself”, he points 
to the reciprocity of this process: to think “the spectator without a play is a nonsensical 
concept” (§7:44). Aesthetic distance collapses; the observer is revealed as part of the 
artwork. It is in this light we should understand the aesthetic justification. It is not the 
joy of some privileged third-party spectator that is taken to justify existence: rather it is 
revealed that the audience is a part of the work, and that this work acts as its own 
justifying spectator. Nietzsche’s understanding of the aesthetic perspective is one in 
which the human, as both observer and observed simultaneously, “resembles the 
uncanny image of the fairy-tale, which can turn its eyes inside out and contemplate 
itself” (§5:38). 
 The vision of the aesthete god, standing in appreciative removal from its 
beautiful, tormented creation is radically undermined by this reformation of what the 
aesthetic actually means. Rüdiger Grimm highlights an 1886 notebook fragment in 
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which Nietzsche delineates between an “aesthetisch” and an “artistisch” perspective and 
criticises the latter as the inclination to “…sich vor das leben hinsetzen”: passively to ‘sit 
before life’130. This difference is significant, as it speaks to Nietzsche’s growing distrust 
for artists in the period after 1876, while showing his willingness to preserve this active 
and immersive new definition of ‘aesthetic’. The distinction is, however, instructive for 
us in other ways. It should remind us that we have only shown how Nietzsche envisaged 
the unity of spectator and artwork, while apparently leaving the distinction between 
that work and its creator unopposed. We are now forced to reckon with the other half 
of Nietzsche’s aesthetic worldview: the claim that as “knowing beings” that we are not 
“one and identical with that essence, which as sole creator and spectator of that comedy 
of art prepares for itself an eternal pleasure” (§5:38).  
 It would seem that having claimed for ourselves the role of spectator and 
artwork, we are still left to conclude that there is a substantive metaphysical divide 
between our empirical existence as that ‘artwork’, and the ‘great creative subject’ that is 
its originator. However, it is here that the importance of Heraclitus’ version of the 
world-artist and the “game that aeon plays with itself” comes to the fore. The 
fundamental Heraclitean dictum ἓν πάντα εἶναι – ‘all things are one’ – is manifest in the 
notion that the child is materially identical with the matter of its creations: 
“transforming itself into water and earth” (PTA §7:62). However, this identification is 
taken further. In what is perhaps the most important statement that Nietzsche attaches 
to the aesthetic justification, we are told that  
only aesthetic man can look thus at the world [i.e. as Heraclitus did], a man who has 
experience in artists and the birth of art objects how the struggle of the many can yet 
carry rules and laws inherent to itself, how the artist stands contemplatively above and at 
the same time actively within his work, how necessity and random play, oppositional 
harmony and tension, must pair to create a work of art (PTA §6:62). 
The idea that the world-artist is both ‘contemplatively above’ and ‘actively within’ its 
creation points us back to the overcoming of the subject-object distinction in aesthetics. 
But here, we see Nietzsche gesturing towards what is perhaps the most important 
insight to emerge from his aesthetic thought: the disintegration of determinate identity. 
                                                 
130 KGW VIII, 1. 264, cited Grimm 148 
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 The ‘game’ of the aeon can only be fully understood in the contrast that 
Nietzsche draws between it and the nous of Anaxagoras. We have already addressed the 
difference between mind and matter in that philosophy, and the problems that arise 
from differentiating between a discriminating, self-identical intellect and the world is 
‘governs’. But Nietzsche further delineates the two thinkers with a subtle but profound 
difference that further helps to outline the meaning of the aesthetic in Nietzsche’s 
thought: 
We find here a purely aesthetic view of the world […] for the cosmic child behaves with 
no regard to purposes but rather only according to an immanent justice: it can act only 
wilfully and lawfully, but does not will these ways. That constitutes the abyss between 
Heraclitus and Anaxagoras (PP §10:70). 
Nietzsche’s insistence that the aeon ‘does not will’ - that it acts without cognisance and 
without intention - will prove critically important for Nietzsche’s formulation of the 
aesthetic. However, in the context of the present discussion, we see what Nietzsche 
frames the aeon as a radical breakdown of the idea of a self-same creating ‘god’. 
Heraclitus’ world-order is conceived of as nothing more than “the continuous working 
out of a unified, lawful, reasonable justice”- a justice wholly immanent to the process 
itself (PTA §7:64). It does not derive from any sort of ‘divine intelligence’ as with the 
“superficial” Stoics (PP §10:70 n.72). ‘Justice’ is instead a game that plays itself and the 
‘player’ of that game- the aeon – is conceived of as nothing more than the game playing 
itself out. The whole universe as “joy and joylessness, wisdom and un-wisdom, great and 
small [..] all but the same, circling around, up and down, and interchanging in the game 
of eternity […] in discord, in concord” – this is the Dionysian realisation offered by 
Lucian’s ‘Heraclitean’131. 
 Eternally becoming, eternally just, eternally justified by its own nature; as the 
necessary ‘coming to be’ of justice and nothing else; “only the Greeks were in the 
circumstances to discover such sublime thoughts as cosmodicy” (PTA §7:64). This term, 
borrowed from Erwin Rohde, was selected by Nietzsche to stand in for ‘theodicy’. 
Replacing ‘theos’ with ‘cosmos’, the universe itself is taken to be both the sole source, 
and the sole justification of Life132.  
                                                 
131 Lucian Philosophies for Sale (XIV), cited PP §10:65. 
132 For commentary, see Gillham pp.146-48. 
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‘Before his fire-gaze, not a drop of injustice remains’ 
 
No one else has watched so attentively the everlasting wavebeat and rhythm of things. 
And what did I see? [..] the whole world the spectacle of sovereign justice and of the 
demonically ever-present natural forces that serve it. Not the punishment of what has 
come-to-be did I see, but the justification of all that which is coming-into-being […] where 
injustice rules there is caprice, disorder, lawfulness, contradiction. But where law and 
Zeus’ daughter Dike rule alone, as they do in this world, how could there be the sphere of 
guilt, of penance, of judgement? How could this world be the execution-arena of all that 
is condemned? (PTA §5:51). 
 
References to the ‘justice’ of the world are replete in Heraclitus’ thought, which 
“generalises the notion of justice to apply to every manifestation of cosmic order, 
including the rule of the jungle” (Kahn 2001 15). Kahn, like Nietzsche, traces this as 
Heraclitus’ inheritance from his Milesian predecessors and sees in this inheritance the 
residual of an ethic of vengeance: “for the killer will be killed in his turn […] conflict is 
justice” (Kahn 2001 18). But should we take this inheritance as the defining imperative 
of Heraclitus’ universe? His world is in line with generic Ionian cosmology in so far as it 
interprets “physical change as a conflict of elemental powers within a periodic order of 
reciprocity and symmetry recognised as just”, but it makes a number of critical 
advancements over the Milesian school in its understanding of what this reciprocity 
actually means. To speak in ‘sibylline tongue’ as Heraclitus might, the difference is that 
between a pendulum and a coin. 
Kahn notes that the Milesian concept of cosmic justice derives from a principle 
of symmetry elaborated from the ‘Theogony’ of arche: ‘what came first of all’”(2001 
pp.18-19). The ‘genesis’ of existence in an initial act of creation is taken to open a logical 
‘bracket’ that must end in the ‘Omega’: the return of everything to nothingness. The 
pendulum’s arc begins, and the laws of its motion mean that it will return to that 
beginning. But to Heraclitus, the movement between one state and another it not this 
sort of ‘vacillation’, the inevitable progression from ‘birth’ to ‘death’, and from ‘crime’ to 
‘retribution’. Rather “all things are requital (anamoibe) […] as gold for goods and goods 
for gold” (DK.21.B.90). Kahn avers that the introduction of this language of ‘equality of 
exchange’ fundamentally shifts the conception of justice we find here: Instead of 
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‘punishment’ inevitably following on from ‘crime’, we have an economy in which 
“nothing is taken without repayment” (114).  
Heraclitus’ explains his concept of reciprocity in the proclamation that “the name 
of the bow is life; its work is death” (DK.21.B.48). This pun on the difference between 
βιός (bow) and βίος (life)133 plays on the fact that the bow gives life (in the shape of food) 
by enacting death (hunting). Critically though, we should understand this exchange as 
unified in a single moment that highlights the inseparability of life and death. As Kahn 
puts it, “the life-signifying name of the instrument of death” serves to dispel “the error 
of taking the opposition of life and death as irreducible” (2001 201). This idea, that life 
and death are two separate and opposing things, arises only when we “do not 
comprehend how a thing agrees at variance with itself; it is an atonement turning back 
on itself, like that of the bow and the lyre” (DK.21.B.51). This is Heraclitus’ conception 
of justice. Against his Milesian predecessors, ‘coming into being’ does not introduce a 
‘debt’ into the ledger of existence for which ‘passing away’ is the repayment. Rather both 
are the same thing viewed from different perspectives. The ‘impoverishment’ of one 
party is always and necessarily the enrichment of another, for nothing is ‘destroyed’ or 
‘lost’ in any such exchange- merely moved or transformed: “living the other’s dead, dead 
in the other’s life” (DK.21.B.16), “The same… living and dead […] for these transposed are 
those, and those transposed again are these” (DK.21.B.67). 
It is by this light that we should view both Nietzsche’s assertion as to the 
inseparability of pleasure and pain, and his claim that the ‘game’ of the Aeon constitutes 
“coming to be and passing away, ordering and destroying […] in forever equal 
innocence” (PTA 7:62). In the phenomenon of ‘birth/creation’ aeon “builds towers of 
sand like a child at the seashore”, while in that of ‘death/destruction’ it “tramples them 
down again”. However, both are just part of the same game- indeed the same movement. 
Each act of destruction is an act of creation, each creation a destruction of what came 
before. Heraclitus denies that the universe could have a beginning or an end, or that the 
‘energy’ that is Life can ever exhaust itself - “The kosmos, one and the same for all, no 
god nor man has made, but is and was and ever will be: fire everliving- kindled in 
                                                 
133 A pun furthered by the fact that written archaic Greek had no means of differentiating ό from ο (See Kahn 
2001 pp.65, 201) 
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measure and in measure going out” (DK.21.B.31A). All that appears as death, decay, loss, 
negation, is simply the payment of measure (metas) into more measure- into something 
else. Nothing is lost, nothing is negated, and only the formations or arrangements of 
things are ‘destroyed’- but only in so far as they become a different arrangement.  
The genius of this ideal for Nietzsche was that the ‘going out’ of the fire is shown 
to be one with its kindling: that the fire’s ‘dying back’ is not a negation or annihilation 
of fire. Rather “everything which coexists in space and time has but a relative existence”: 
it only “exists through and for another like it, which is to say through and for an equally 
relative one” (PTA §5:52)134. To stay with the fire analogy, this means that as a pyre grows 
cold and dark, it is not ‘ceasing to be’. The heat and light that characterised the flame 
have simply shifted to become cold darkness. This is not to be considered a negation, 
for darkness is not a negation of light, just as cold is not a negation of warmth. They are 
both simply differing relative stations on the same continuity. Heraclitus’ world is thus 
one in which fixed, bounded, and essential properties do not exist. The implications of 
this for the concept of justice are profound, and can best be understood in terms of the 
‘cosmic harmony’ that Nietzsche sees arising from this paradigm.  
Dostoyevsky nicely encapsulates the pitfalls of theodicies of harmony- briefly 
touched upon in §1.2 – in a famous chapter of The Brothers Karamazov: “if the sufferings 
of children go to swell the sum […] necessary to pay for Truth, then I protest that truth 
is not worth the price” (Dostoyevsky 474). Leibnitz’s claim that evil is not just there to 
be overcome, but is to be valued in itself falls flat before Dostoyevsky’s nihilism of 
pathos. Against the idea that “shadows enhance colours; and even dissonance in the 
right place gives harmony” (Leibnitz 130), we are treated to the description of a child, 
torn to pieces by dogs for the amusement of sadistic bandits and asked what consolation 
or justification can be found in the idea that “my sufferings may manure the soil of […] 
harmony for somebody else” (Dostoyevsky 472). All these problems can be seen to arise, 
as previously stated, from the fact that dissonance exists only to for the sake of harmony. 
Dissonance (‘evil’) is ‘desired’ only for its relation to another, and is at best tolerated for 
                                                 
134 This understanding is claimed by Nietzsche to have arisen from Heraclitus’ intuitive understanding of space 
and time: “the present is but the dimensionless and duration-less boarder between [past and future]”, while the 
past and future -“as perishable as any dream”- exist only in relation to this present (PTA §5:53). None of these 
have discrete existence in and of themselves, but they are equally not ‘figments of our feeble human minds’, as 
Parmenides believed (52). 
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its contribution to the emergence of its opposite: for its eventual negation. It is never 
willed in itself. However, the Heraclitean notion of Harmony that comes through in 
Nietzsche’s aesthetics of music paint a very different picture of the role of dissonance in 
the ‘world-symphony’. 
Daniel Came (2016) forcibly argues against reading Nietzsche’s discussions of 
harmony with any idea that it represents an ‘ends-orientated’ model of justification: 
dissonance praised as a means towards resolution. Citing the philosopher’s explicit 
emphasis upon the “pleasurable sensation of dissonance […] which can receive no 
resolution”, he astutely points to the ‘Tristan Chord’, which he cites as establishing a 14-
minute-long passage of unresolved dissonance in the prelude of Tristan and Isolde 
(pp.32-4). He thereby draws analogy between Nietzsche’s conception of the role of 
dissonance in the world, and Wagner’s principle of endless melody, holding that 
“Nietzsche conceived of the dissonance of tragedy in this Wagnerian model” (33).  
This understanding gestures in the right direction, and evokes parallels between 
the tripping, endlessly unresolved dissonance of the chord and the tripping, protean 
descriptions of the Dionysian procession alluded to in chapter one. The Dionysian-
Heraclitean world, ‘that fearful, swirling, compulsive process of annihilation’, is 
mirrored in the chord’s duelling dissonances: resolutions may come, but always there is 
a suspension still open. Again and again, Wagner “resolves one of these dissonances but 
not the other, thus providing resolution-but-not-resolution” (Magee 208). Individual 
moments of dominance and dissonance arise and are resolved, but there is no true 
resolution or negation, no final harmonic sublation. For all these individual dissonances 
exist as the result of the one initial dissonance that is its ground. The dynamic tension 
that is the very existence of the chord is predicated on the continual impossibility of 
finally negating this foundational dissonance:  
if the  sea  stir  up  its  water  of  itself,  if  it  beget  the  ground  of  its  commotion  from  
the  depths  of  its  own  element:  then  is  this  agitation  an  endless  one  and  never  
pacified;  forever returning  on  itself  unstilled,  and  ever  roused  afresh  by  its  eternal  
longing (Wagner  1993  §4:113)   
Unfortunately, Came’s presentation is neither as accurate nor as penetrating as 
it could be. It is not just nit-picking that beholds us to note that the suspended 
dissonance began in the opening of the opera does not in fact find complete resolution 
until Act III Scene 3 and the ‘leibes-tod’. That this resolution coincides with Isolde’s 
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dying words as she ‘drowns in the universal stream of the world-breath’ and surrenders 
herself to dissolution135 is telling of an important detail in Wagner’s understanding of 
dissonance: that it is an ‘evil’ that love must overcome.  The Tristan chord is an 
expression of frustrated longing, which ‘seeks’ chromatically upwards in its first 14 bars. 
This ‘sublime seeking’ towards the heavens for release speaks to the chord’s original 
name; The Nirwana chord. It is an eternally frustrated dream of paradisiacal release: 
 I often gaze around, yearning for a glimpse of the land of Nirvana. But Nirvana quickly 
turns into ‘Tristan’; you know the Buddhist theory of the origin of the world.  A breath 
clouds the expanse of heaven: [Wagner here reproduces the chromatic lead-out from the 
chord’s enharmonic G#] it swells and grows denser, and finally the whole world stands 
before me again in its impenetrable solidarity.   
(Wagner 1987, letter to M. Wesendonk, March 1860).   
In the opera, love (as ‘love-death’) serves as a redemptive ‘presence from beyond’ that 
mirrors the god of traditional theodicy. It is a filler for the chord’s ‘abyssal remainder’, 
a justifying ‘Truth’ that allows the world a redemptive ‘completion-in-final-harmony’ 
that it itself can never find: 
[if this] measure-giving object step towards [the world] from the sure and sharply outlined 
world of manifestment….the flame at last, when its wild glow has smouldered down, will 
shine with mild serenity of light…[leaving] Man, rejoicing in the sweet harmony of his 
whole being (Wagner 1993 §4:113) 
Dissonance only stands until ‘Truth’ arrives to free it of its burden. 
 
Sentenced to carry the consequences of evil forever and anew?’ 
 
The discussion of the unending suspension of resolution in Heraclitus and 
Schopenhauer to be found in Tragic Age shows his conception of it to be at radical odds 
to Wagner’s. After drawing a parallel between the two thinker’s models of material 
nature as an endless succession of “mechanical, physical, chemical and organic 
phenomena” that exist to “greedily push to the fore, snatching matter from one another” 
(WWR I §27, cited PTA §5:56), Nietzsche then goes on to expressly proclaim what it has 
been the concern of this study thus far to demonstrate. He states that while the two 
                                                 
135 “in the heaving swell, in the resounding echoes, in the universal stream of the world-breath- to drown, to 
founder – unconscious- utmost rapture” Wagner, Tristan and Isolde III 3 
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thinkers began from an identical conception of reality, Schopenhauer’s evaluation of 
this world  
is quite different from that which Heraclitus offers, because strife for Schopenhauer is a 
self-dissociation of the Will […] which is seen as a self-consuming, menacing and gloomy 
drive, a thoroughly frightful and by no means blessed phenomenon (PTA §5:56). 
The restlessness of Schopenhauer’s Will derives from a ‘defect’ or ‘rupture’ in its Being 
that it can never overcome: a ‘lack’ that can never be filled. Because it is broken, the Will 
can never find peace. Heraclitus however, did not see harmony as ‘peaceful resolution’, 
and this alternative understanding provides the basis for a very different theory of music 
for Nietzsche. 
 An instructive way to look at this is through the profoundly significant discussion 
of ὕβρις (hybris) that Nietzsche treats us to. The notion that “satiety gives way to hybris” 
is taken (by Jacob Bernays and others) to mean that fire’s “outpouring into the forms of 
plurality” represents its ‘fall’ into ‘otherness’ (PTA §6:61). Overcome by some internal 
defect, pure fire ‘degenerates’ into impure forms136. Matter’s return to its ‘pure’ and ‘true’ 
state as fire is thus a “purification, or catharsis” of this corruption (PP §13:67-9). We 
might relate this concept to Andrew Bowie’s presentation of the becoming-into-its-
being of Being in Hegel’s logic. Utilising musical metaphors to explain the dialectic, we 
are told that dissonance for Hegel constitutes the ‘fall’ of identity to an internal tension 
that must be resolved. In the act of resolving - the ‘catharsis’ that returns the dominant 
to its tonic (or idea to its self-identity) - we arrive at the goal: “Only this movement, as 
the return of identity to itself, is the Truth”137. The ‘musical theodicy’ is expressed in the 
‘becoming itself’ of the idea, and dissonance is a means to that goal- to ‘achieved 
consonance’. This is because the idea-tone’s ‘identity’, its ‘truth’, is regarded as lying in 
consonance: dissonance is merely the means to reach this. 
 This presentation speaks to an important connection between harmony and 
morality. Stripped back to its purest form, morality is understood by Nietzsche as the 
gesturing towards an end point, towards the final consummation of the movements of 
existence. It is the promise of identity - the hope that one-day, the self-dislocation of 
                                                 
136 By this understanding, the ‘wisdom’ of fire is “weakened by fluids”, and that references to ‘moisture’ as “the 
watery element” most opposed to fire is symbolic of “psychic dissolution or partial ‘death’” (Kahn 2001 244. Cf. 
CVI) 
137 Hegel, Science of Logic, Cited Bowie 297.  
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existence that gives rise to pain and hardship will be effaced, and all will become as it 
‘should be’. Morality’s gesture towards ‘Being’, towards an eternal, unchangeable ‘in-
itself’ speaks to this idea, and the justification of suffering based on its utility towards 
this goal makes of life the grudgingly paid cost of its own undoing. Life and ‘history’ 
becomes nothing but Truth’s “eternal deferral of itself” (Nabais 67). Nietzsche holds that 
if we view Heraclitus in this light – if we allow moral questions of ‘ought’ and of the 
‘rightful state of the universe’ to enter into this philosophy – his “countenance […] is 
transformed before our eyes. The proud light in his eyes is extinguished, wrinkles of 
painful renunciation, of impotence become apparent […] is not the entire world process 
now a punishment for hybris?” (PTA §6:61). For Nietzsche/Heraclitus however, 
dissonance is not the ‘untruth’ of en-harmony that must undergo aufheben. Rather the 
whole idea that one side of the construction/destruction dichotomy is preferable to the 
other is “completely un-Heraclitan […] a consequence that he himself did not draw” 
(69).  
 Much as in the discussion of pain and pleasure in the first chapter, we find that 
“Becoming and Passing away constitute the primary property of the [aeon]” (PP §13:63). 
Just as pain and pleasure are just ‘sensation’ viewed from different perspectives of will, 
creation and destruction are just differing manifestations of ‘change’- the aeon’s only 
property. We should not take this to mean that the two are the same thing, that the 
“con-tuitive” perspective (which sees the inter-relatedness of things) collapses their 
difference into a ‘pantheistic peace’138. The movements of Heraclitean ‘harmony’, the 
endless interplay of united opposites, are to be understood rather as a continuously 
enacted ‘reconciliation’ of these opposites. This is not a reconciliation in the usual sense 
of something that is ‘achieved’ at the end of a process. It is more the continuous 
enactment of the fact that they are (inalienably) reconciled, in their continued existence 
as pure act. Kahn identifies this lesson in the allegory of the bow and the lyre. The 
translation of this fragment offered above uses the suggestive word ‘atonement’, but the 
archaic Greek ἁρμονίη, (harmonie) is noted to more properly refer to the harmonious 
                                                 
138 In this regard, Nabais is right to claim that “Nietzsche’s philosophy is inimical to all forms of monism or 
pantheism” (65).  However, as we shall see in the following chapter, the conflation of monism with pantheism 
here is not warranted.  
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agreement of antagonisms – “Reconciliation- the child of Aries and Aphrodite” (Kahn 
2001 196). 
 Kahn’s learned etymology of ἁρμονίη locates its origin in the word used by 
shipwrights for the art of ‘joinery’. While this may imply the act of fixing together two 
pieces of wood to make something that cancels their difference (a boat), Kahn is equally 
clear that “from the beginning, the word is also used figuratively, for agreements or 
compacts between hostile men” (2001 195). This is not ‘peace’, not the effacement of 
νέμειν (‘Nemesis’, whose other name is ‘she who cannot be escaped’ (Ἀδρήστεια139)). 
Rather, Harmony is the sister of “Strife” and “Conflict” and a “principle of proportion 
and agreement which creates a harmonious unity out of potentially hostile powers”. The 
word ‘potentially’ here does not mean that the hostility is lessened or overcome. Rather 
it is the dynamic potentiality of the bow or the lyre, which produce their effects only 
because the tension of their opposing ends are not effaced but are rather harmoniously 
measured against each other140. The ‘harmony’ of the lyre is not one in which the 
tensions inherent in its construction have been ‘cancelled out’ by their unification into 
one thing. Instead it is an agreement (ὁμολογέει ‘homologee’) born of “a thing at variance 
with itself” (διαϕερόμενον ἑωυτῶι) (Kahn 2001 197). 
Raymond Williams instructively analyses this notion in contrast to the 
Pythagorean understanding of harmony and reconciliation. For Pythagoras “after 
reconciliation the opposites are no longer hostile or in tension. Reconciliation and the 
resulting union suppresses their differences” (338).  Heraclitus, on the other hand, 
“believes that a vital unity or harmony does not destroy or suppress the opposites, but 
rather maintains them in tension”. Indeed, such a system cannot permit of suppression, 
an “equilibrium of opposites in peace”: “if this equilibrium/ tension were eliminated, the 
whole (the cosmos) would disintegrate” (339). Just as the bow and the lyre exist only as 
                                                 
139 Adrastea, the other daughter of Ares and Aphrodite. Sometimes presented as the handmaiden of Nemesis, 
sometimes her non-chthonic counterpart (see Graves pp.27-8, 77). And sometimes, as the blind, scales bearing 
goddess of equilibrium, also as the Olympian manifestation of Δίκη  
140 The dynamism created in Praxiteles’ sculptures by the tension between rest and motion captures this effect of 
antagonistic ‘potentia’ perfectly. Sloterdijk’s description of Dionysus and Apollo as “frozen in a vision of 
struggling movement” like “a sculpture carved in stone of two superhuman wrestlers whose potential for violence 
is immediately apparent […] without their ever having to move” (1989 25) also encapsulates this. It shows that 
the ‘reconciliation’ is still imbued with violence and ceaseless motion, without devolving to a flickering 
vacillation. 
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objectivations of their dynamic internal contradiction (everything that is ‘is and is-not’), 
the kosmos only exists as Wirklicheit:  
“only by way of its acts does reality fill space and time […] reality consists of nothing more 
than this […] its whole being and nature exists only in the orderly changes which one of 
its parts produces in another” (PTA §5: pp.53-4)141 
To wish that the lyre were not under continual tension is senseless. To wish that the 
world would come to rest in a peaceful self-reconciliation is equally absurd: for the 
world is nothing but this tension. Without a stable, self-same ‘identity’ that it could ever 
finally settle into, it is nonsensical to speak of the world not being what it should be, as 
the metaphysician and the moralist do. Moreover, it is even more non-sensual to speak 





Conclusion: Nature and the Myth of Identity. 
 
[if] there is no such dualism between a world of the unlimited [Being as it ought to Be] 
and one of qualities [then] all arising and passing away [are] tools of justice […] The φθορά 
is in no way a punishment. Thus Heraclitus presents a cosmodicy against his great 
predecessor, the teacher of injustice in the world (PP §13:63) 
 
The difference between a Hellenism and a Pessimism is announced in the forgoing 
distinction. The need for “Truth” - for the final resolution of the world into what ‘ought 
to be’, and existence’s perpetual frustration of this saudade - makes of life a torment. 
However, in exorcising ‘ought’ from our vocabulary, we reaslise that there is nothing to 
condemn life for, except the persistence of that feeling within us. By understanding this, 
we realise what is meant by the answer that Heraclitus is presented as offering “if we 
press upon [him] the question of why fire is not always fire”: that “it is a game. Don’t 
take it so pathetically and –above all- don’t make a morality of it!” (PTA §7:64). What 
may initially seem like a callous dismissal is contextualised when we recall that 
                                                 
141 Citing WWR I §4. See also WWR I §27 
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“pathetisch” has other meanings besides the direct translation of ‘pathetic’ (in all its 
condescending implications). If we understand the word to mean something like 
‘histrionic’ or ‘overwrought’, then the warning ‘do not make a morality of it’ comes into 
sharper focus. In the Preface to Human All Too Human II, Nietzsche speaks of being 
overcome by “the sorrow of a relentless suspicion” – “I, after this disillusionment, was 
condemned to mistrust more deeply, despise more deeply” (6). Just as with the 
presentation of Anaximander, Nietzsche states that he found himself taking his personal 
experience of life and projecting the “anger, against myself, and for everything that 
caused me pain and was difficult” (7) into the heart of existence142. The tendency to take 
one’s personal feelings as a condemnation against life itself returns in Zarathustra’s 
theory of redemption, and the anguished cry of the life-denier: “Cloud upon cloud rolls 
in over the spirit, until at last, madness preaches: ‘Everything perishes, therefore 
everything deserves to perish” (Z II §20:116).  
 The answer to this riddle is the realisation that there is no ‘morality’ dictating 
the world’s actions: that nothing ‘stands behind’ the world and judges if a thing 
‘deserves’ to be happy or to suffer. It is only against the backdrop of our idealisation of 
the world that we judge its actuality to be lacking and defective. That ideal, for 
Nietzsche, is only born of our pain and our distrust: 
Heraclitus only describes the world as it is […] Gloomy, melancholy, tearful, sinister, 
bilious, pessimistic, generally hateful; only those can find him thus who have good cause 
to be dissatisfied with his natural history of mankind (PTA 7:64). 
Nietzsche’s ‘cosmodicy’ is thus to forget these ‘ought’s’ and the belief that Life must be 
‘fair’, that it must be driven along by ‘reasons’ and that suffering or fortune must derive 
from punishment or reward- from ‘motivations’. In order to do this, we must resist the 
urge to see Life as serving anything other than its own ends. We must view it 
‘aesthetically’. This conjunction has two interwoven meanings. Firstly, it speaks to the 
origin of the term as a ‘science of sensuous experience’143. We should remain 
‘superficial’:  
“Oh those Greeks! They knew how to live: for that purpose, it is necessary to keep bravely 
to the surface, the fold and the skin; to worship appearance, to believe in forms, tones, 
and words […] Those Greeks were superficial- from profundity! […] and are we not [we free 
                                                 
142 This tendency will be examined further in §4.2 
143 see §1.3, p.43 
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spirits] precisely in this respect- Greeks? Worshipers of forms, of tones, and of words? 
And precisely on that account- artists?” (GS xi-ii). 
The injunction to ‘not be so pathetic’ is an encouragement to the “ordinary, cheerful, 
confiding, superficial natures against the rule of the graver, profounder, more 
contemplative” (GS §350). If we stick only to this sensate, surface layer, innocence 
returns to the world as we banish ‘reward and punishment [from] the nature of 
things’144.  
 Left as it is however, this interpretation of the aesthetic as simply ‘surface’ and 
‘sense’ is incomplete. We have succeeded in removing the god of ‘reasons’ that stands 
behind the world, but nothing has replaced it. What is left now to stop the world from 
falling back into the status of blind, indifferent chance, as “a fragment, a riddle, a cruel 
coincidence” (Z II §20:117)? In removing God and the transcendent moral order, have 
we not given ourselves up to the ‘pessimism of contingency’? Moreover, where does 
Knowledge come into a world without any sort of knowable order? The answer to this 
can be found in seeing that Nietzsche’s aesthetic worldview extends beyond the call to 















                                                 
144 paraphrase of GS §294 
















CChapter 3: The Aesthetic ‘Self-ness’ and its Worlds 
 
Critics who read a firm line of demarcation between the early aesthetic writings and the 
Free Spirit works, typically point to the apparent shift in the status of knowledge 
between the Unfashionable Observations and Human, All Too Human. Julian Young’s 
study is typical of this approach and of the claim that “[Human] adopts and inhabits […] 
the stance of ‘theoretical’, ‘Socratic’, or ‘Scientific’ man” (Young 59). This critical vain 
reads the work as “an affirmation of scientific realism” grounded in the belief that “the 
world is the way a completed natural science claims it to be” (Young 60), and the book’s 
praise for the scientific method would seem to support such a claim. Presenting as its 
goal the pursuit of a “genuine science, as the imitation of nature in concepts” (HAH I 
§38:47) It is hard not to see Human as anything but a radical about-face when laid 
against Nietzsche’s previous works. This is especially true of the unpublished essay “On 
Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense”- a work which radically denies the validity of 
concept-based knowledge. Young entirely omits “On Truth” from his study – a 
significant oversight in a work that seeks to understand Nietzsche’s reading of art – and 
instead reads Human as a continuation of the metaphysical schema he diagnosed in 
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Birth. The difference now is that this metaphysical world is rendered intelligible by 
science. In contrast to the ‘mystical’ metaphysics of Birth, Human is claimed to forward 
a metaphysic in which “the ‘real’ world as it is in itself […] is the world described by 
science”, one that “can be known about, quite directly, by humans” (Ridley 2007 37).  
 That Young sees both Human and Birth as concerned to promote the same 
metaphysics, in different forms, is telling of the problem that arises in reading the 
former – in its enthusiasm for science - as a work of Socratic optimism. This problem 
shows through in the confusing definition that Young offers of Human’s worldview, in 
which he concedes that Nietzsche denies the existence of “things-in-themselves” but 
nonetheless maintains that science can allow us to know and grasp an objective 
metaphysical reality (Young 60)145. Against the argument forwarded in the previous 
chapters - that there exists only the physical world of flux with nothing ‘metaphysical’ 
preceding or conditioning it - it is argued that the goal of Nietzsche’s scientific turn was 
an attempt to fulfil the dream of the Socratic man. Nietzsche’s new science seeks to 
discover the laws that govern reality, thereby rendering it objectively knowable (Young 
60), predictable (pp.62-4), and correctable (pp.64-6). By this ‘optimistic’ hope, Human 
apparently promises safety and freedom through knowledge, and the deliverance of 
humanity from the “arbitrariness” of the “Dionysian god-child” (62). The movement 
away from “On Truth” and its scepticism is completed and the conceptual 
“columbarium’s” - that the essays called “the gravesites of perceptions” (TL 151) - are 
transformed into the hope of humanity. 
 The problem with this estimation is that (as Young himself concedes) Human 
maintains precisely the Heraclitean worldview that had underwritten both Birth and 
“On Truth”. This world is, as has been argued, radically alien to the demands of Socratic 
reason146 which is built on “the assumption that the object of enquiry is self-identical 
and unchanging with time, that correctly predicated properties are valid at all times, 
and that there is a determinable essence to such objects” (Rampley 25). In an attempt 
to square this circle, Young claims that Heraclitus’s thought simply denies the existence 
                                                 
145 Ridley’s 2007 study offers compelling textual arguments that undermine this idea of a ‘metaphysic of science’ 
and show the work to be grounded in the same sceptical stance found in “On Truth”- a refusal to say anything at 
all about the nature of reality ‘in itself’ (Ridley 2007 34-41 See also HAH 1 §10, 16-18, and TL 145). 
146 This amenity is shown by the thinker’s denunciation of the ‘Men of flux’ in Theatetus and the discussion of 
rhetoric and sophistry in the Gorgias.  
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of discrete objects, while still maintaining that flux is governed and determined by 
material laws. Thus, it is possible that “the world can be both flux, in the sense of there 
being no material objects that persist through time and change, and be predictable” 
(63). He points to Nietzsche’s reading of Ruđer Boscovich as grounding this 
“hypothetical”147 claim, offering §107 of Human as exemplar. This aphorism subjects the 
apparently chaotic “bending’s, twisting’s, and breakings” of a waterfall in flow to a 
version of Laplace’s, (or rather ‘Boscovich’s) Demon’148. “If at some moment the wheel 
of the world were to stand still, and an omniscient, calculating understanding were to 
make use of this pause” it might “describe every track on which that wheel had yet to 
roll” (§107:82).  This section is held up as the first instance of a “new knowledge” of 
“necessity” which science is able to oppose to the arbitrary and capricious metaphysic 
of the world-artist. 
This interpretation is, however, unsatisfactory. As was discussed extensively in 
§2.2, Nietzsche took great pains to emphasise that there is nothing capricious or 
arbitrary about the aeon: “Caprice” and “disorder” are taken to be the marks of a world 
“where injustice rules” (PTA §5:51). Rather, Heraclitus’ philosophy taught “lawfulness in 
becoming and play in necessity” (§8:68), a combination that Tragic Age presents as 
united “only […] in artists and the birth of art objects” (§7:63). This melding not only 
shows that Nietzsche’s interest in “necessity” predates his ‘Socratic turn’, but also serves 
to highlight an important element of Nietzsche’s concept of necessity that is lost in 
Young’s reading. This misconception leads him to posit another stark about-face in 
Nietzsche’s work, dividing the Free Spirit project into two distinct phases149: a 
disjunction between the view of “necessity” offered in Human and that forwarded in the 
Gay Science aphorism entitled “Let us beware”: 
                                                 
147 Ridley (2007) correctly notes that Young offers no textual evidence for this assertion (37-8). Nevertheless, a 
link to Boscovich and evidence of his influence can be asserted. Studies by Greg Whitlock, (1996, 1999), Peter 
Poellner (1999) and Keith Ansell-Pearson (2000) have all offered significant elaborations upon Karl Schlechta’s 
1962 work, which traced Boscovich’s influence in notes at least as early as 1873. 
148 As Boris Koznak notes, Boscovich presented Laplace’s famous determinist thought experiment 50 years prior 
to the Frenchman’s 1814 essay “A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities”. Boscovich’s theory was not only 
chronologically pre-eminent but was also more substantively grounded in mathematics than Laplace’s 
metaphysical/rationalist presentation. See “Who Let the Demon Out; Laplace and Boscovich on Determinism”  
149 Or perhaps just a shattered and fragmented abortion, given that he sees the perspective of Human I abandoned 
in Volume II (Young pp. 73-89) before returning (in a sense that is not really developed to all) in Dawn (pp. 88-
91) and yo-yoing away again for Gay Science (pp. 92-100). This highly fragmented timeline would seem to 
indicate that something about the lens through which Young is viewing Nietzsche’s development is not 
appropriate for that task.  
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“The total character of the world, by contrast, is for all eternity chaos, not in the sense of 
a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, organization, form, beauty, wisdom, and 
whatever else our aesthetic anthropomorphisms [Menschlichkeiten] are called. […] nor 
does it observe any laws. Let us beware of saying that there are laws in nature. There are 
only necessities: there is no one who commands, no one who obeys, no one who 
transgresses. Once you know that there are no purposes, you also know that there is no 
accident; for only against a world of purposes does the word 'accident' have a meaning” 
(GS§109 pp.109-10) 
Young interprets this as Nietzsche’s return to a mistrust of science and the optimistic 
hope for a metaphysically grounded conception of knowledge. But is this the case? Or 
has Young simply misunderstood the view of science forwarded in Human? 
 GS§109 offers what Nietzsche, at the concluding end of his Free Spirit arc, 
regarded as the criteria for a wholly ‘god-less’, naturalist world. Its denunciation of order 
and of law in the world is undertaken in the name of approaching a “completely de-
deified nature”, a time when “all these shadows of god will no longer darken us” and we 
can “begin to naturalize humanity with a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed 
nature”. The question thus becomes whether the world-artist thesis is compatible with 
this presentation, or if this ‘de-deified nature’ is entirely different from the world 
forwarded in the early aesthetic writings. The explicit rejection of ‘aesthetic 
anthropomorphism/humanisms’ we find here would seem to indicate that it is not 
compatible. The rejection of ‘law’ and of a ‘commanding’ creator also seem to argue 
against such a continuity, while the assertion that the world is nothing but chaos 
without order would seem to point to a glaring internal inconsistency in the world-artist 
thesis itself: if there is nothing but ‘Dionysian chaos’, how is it meaningful to speak of a 
world-artist/artwork? This question can be seen to interweave with the problem we 
were left with at the end of the previous chapter: if the world has no transcendent order, 
what saves it from falling into randomness as dispersion?  
 Through the course of this chapter, we shall examine the answer that Nietzsche 
gave to this question in the form of his nuanced conception of “necessity”. In doing so, 
it will become clear that the formulations he attached to the aeon – as embodying both 
“necessity” and “random play” – remain critical for understanding this, and that while 
scientific ‘discipline’ became significant in the Free Spirit works, Nietzsche’s view of the 
world continued to rest on ideas developed in his aesthetic writings.  
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§3.1: Forms of Freedom and Necessity 
 
In Nuno Nabais’ estimation, “Nietzsche’s philosophy represents the last metaphysics of 
necessity of the modern period” (65). Contrary to Young, Nabais emphasizes this as the 
core of the ‘aesthetic justification’ thesis, which is claimed to rest upon the notion that 
“only in the absolute rejection of contingency will human existence be revealed […] 
without reference to transcendent values”. Only a metaphysical guarantee that the 
world cannot permit of contingency would render the world’s events justified by the 
sheer ‘facticity’ of their existence150. But Nabais’ choice to label this as a ‘metaphysic’ 
points to a problem that, while it does not seem to bother Nabais, did appear to bother 
Nietzsche. The discussion of natural law in Anaxagoras lays this problem out: 
“if the nous had to fulfil by means of its motion a purpose necessary to its nature, then its 
starting movement is no longer a matter of free choice. In so far as nous is eternal, it would 
have to be determined by its purpose eternally […] Anaxagoras always had to emphasise 
most strongly and with greatest conviction that spirit has free, arbitrary choice” (PTA 
§19:116) 
This is to say that if the world is governed by strict and immutable laws of the sort 
posited by natural science, then we have arguably only ‘displaced’ legislation by locating 
‘eternal law’ in the world-artist’s metaphysical ‘nature’. This is what was at the core of 
Nietzsche’s rejection of Spinoza and his ‘logical pantheism’: if the world adheres to an 
inherent, immutable course of Reason, then that Reason effectively becomes the ‘true 
identity’ or ‘essence’ of reality (WP §55). And the world of change becomes nothing but 
the ‘playing out’ of that essence; a ‘coming-into-being’ of Truth/identity. 
 The inability to permit of any form of contingency means that everything in the 
universe exhibits a form of predestination. If the world is the ‘coming to be’ of a perfect 
order, then life is nothing but the ‘unfinished opus’ of the great artist, whose goal is the 
final completion of that work: 
When someday, at an infinitely remote time, it is accomplished, when all the likes are 
gathered together, and the primal essences lie side by side, undivided and in beautiful 
order, when each tiny particle has found its companions and its home, when the great 
peace enters the world after the great divisions and splits of the substances and no more 
split or divided material is left-then nous shall return to its self-movement, no longer 
roaming the world, itself divided, at times into greater, at times into smaller masses, as 
                                                 
150 Nabais argues this by drawing a strong correlation between Nietzsche and Spinoza (pp. 65-7), a connection 
that Moles does a good deal to qualify in a way that undermines Nabais’ metaphysics of necessity (see Moles pp. 
213-22) 
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vegetative or animal spirit, indwelling in alien materials. Meanwhile the task is not yet at 
an end, but the kind of motion that the nous has figured out, in order to accomplish its 
end, demonstrates marvellous efficiency, for by it the task is nearer completion with each 
passing moment (PTA§17:107) 
The nous is not ‘determined’ or ‘bound’ to this goal, but the universe and the world of 
material change is, owing to the existence of an immutable logic that will, given enough 
time, reach perfection. In Nietzsche’s estimation, such a determinism gives rise to a 
world in which “becoming and passing away do not exist, but rather everything is the 
same for all time” (PP §13:96). The only way he was able to ‘save’ this world from 
becoming like the frozen globe of Parmenides was to posit a fragment of absolute free 
contingency – nous – and place it ‘outside’ the remit of causality. 
 This problem – and its metaphysical solution - Nietzsche wished to avoid by 
denying that the aeon is determined by any eternally fixed rationality. If the game of 
aeon “were but the coming-to-be-visible of the struggle between eternal qualities” – the 
playing out of essences interacting with one-another in accordance with determined, 
essential laws - then becoming would be reduced to a phenomenal phantasmagoria (as 
with Schopenhauer’s ‘magic lantern’): Life as “but the dust cloud of the Olympic battle 
and the flash of divine spears- a coming-into-being, in other words” (PTA§ 6:51). The 
claim that Nietzsche promotes a ‘metaphysic of necessity’ thus skirts dangerously close 
to the “detour […] back into a dual world order” that Tragic Age identifies as potentially 
arising from the idea of the aeon as a ‘god’. But this world without becoming, in which 
time is nothing but the slow playing out of eternally pre-determined battles is precisely 
the world that proponents of the ‘scientivist turn’ appear to promote in their readings 
of “necessity”.  
 If we turn back to Young, we see something like a ‘metaphysic of necessity’ being 
proposed in his reading of Boscovich. It is claimed that he found in the mathematician’s 
worldview a way to arrive at a mathematically determinable understanding of the world, 
in which every future event could be mapped. In Young’s defence, it is hard to read §107 
of Human and arrive at any other conclusion. We are in fact expressly told that that the 
universe’s “every movement [would be] mathematically calculable” (82), if we were able 
to freeze time and expand our reasoning powers to a sufficient degree. This leads Young 
to claim that Nietzsche, like Boscovich before him, sought to use science to render the 
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world of flux knowable and predictable (and hence to subject it to immutable, eternal 
laws that would, by Nietzsche’s definition, constitute a metaphysic).  
Historically speaking, the idea that in “knowing the present state of the universe, 
[we could] predict and retrodict its state with certainty at any given past or future 
instant of time” served to underwrite  
“one of the fundamental principles of scientific understanding that would persist across 
all scientific disciplines and popular culture all the way from Laplace up to the present 
day: that nature is, in principle, knowable and that science can offer a detailed, precise 
and reliable way to that knowledge” (Koznjak pp. 41-2).  
This was undoubtedly Boscovich’s assessment: that the world could be rendered 
mathematically predictable (Koznjak 40, 44), neatly explained in all its intricacies by a 
“formal […] quite practical algorithm” (47). Moreover, there is little doubt that the 
theory of forces upon which this claim was based was tremendously important for 
Nietzsche, as we shall see. But the mechanistic implications of this theory are very 
clearly at odds with the early writings and their dismissal of the Alexandrian optimist’s 
“Deus Ex Machina”; the “god of machines and melting pots” (BT §17:95). It is also very 
much at odds with The Gay Science’s rejection of “Mr Mechanic, who nowadays likes to 
pass as a philosopher and insists that mechanics is the doctrine of the first and final 
laws on which existence may be built, as on a ground floor” (GS §373:239). So is this in 
fact a vacillation on Nietzsche’s part? Did it take until the ‘period straddling’ fifth book 
of Science for him to realise that mathematical determinism would constitute precisely 
the sort of ‘law of first and last things’ that Human’s first chapter set out to reject? 
 The answer is that by volume II of Human, we see Nietzsche expressly 
denouncing mechanical determinacy as a “superstition”, a “last refuge of mythological 
thinking” alongside all other claims that “nature conforms to certain laws” (§9 pp. 15-
6). As with the presentation of Anaxagoras’ ‘aesthetic justification’ discussed in the 
previous chapter, mechanical determination sees us “enraptured by the idea of a 
creative mechanic who has made the most artistic of watches, with living beings 
decorating it”. But we need not even look as far afield as this for evidence against 
Young’s presentation. §19 of volume I sees Nietzsche begins his first Free Spirit work 
with an apparent re-iteration of “On Truth’s” epistemic scepticism, aimed specifically at 
mathematics’ claim to offer ‘knowledge’ of the world:  
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The invention (Erfindung) of the laws of numbers was made on the basis of an error […] 
that several things might be identical (but actually there are no identical things) or that 
there are at least things (but there is no ‘thing’) [...] error already holds sway, already we 
invent beings, unities, that do not exist […] the laws of numbers are completely 
inapplicable in a world that is not our representation: these have validity only in the 
human world (HAH I §19:30). 
Once again, we see Nietzsche maintaining that our symbols of the world can never give 
us a ‘True’ picture of it, because they are based on a supposition that simply is not true: 
that the world inherently possesses a persistent identity that these symbols could 
adhere to. 
 We find the same view expressed in HAH I §11 and its claim that logic and 
mathematics151 “rests upon presuppositions to which nothing in the real world 
corresponds; for example, upon the presupposition of the likeness of things, of the 
identity of the same thing at different points of time” (22). In Nietzsche’s eyes, however, 
we have now shown this to not be the case, and have come to realise that the world 
ostensibly ‘described’ by our languages are in fact the ‘product’ of them. With this 
realisation in mind, we can work towards a “new Knowledge”, one no longer built upon 
fixity and immutable determination.  
 Given that discrete, self-same identity is rejected, it becomes clear that a 
mathematical determinism, of the sort that Boscovich proposed, is inconsistent with 
Nietzschean necessity. To claim that the universe can be ‘boiled down’ to a set of 
elementary rules, which can be used to predict with absolute certainty everything that 
will happen in the casual unfolding of said laws, is to claim that these rules precede and 
condition the world: that they are essential and self-same throughout time. We thus see 
that necessity must be ‘total’ enough to exclude any random or arbitrary occurrence, 
while not so fixed and ‘absolutising’ as to reduce becoming to the ‘playing out’ of Being.  
It was precisely this problem that Nietzsche explored in his high-school essays 
on “fatum”152: if nature is automata (is fully causally determined) then all its actions are 
inherent in their beginnings; fate becomes telos. Both Michele Haar153 and Robert 
                                                 
151 “mathematics, which certainly would not have come into being if one had known that there was in nature no 
exactly straight line, no real circle, no absolute magnitude” (HAH I §11:22). 
152 “Fate and History” and “Freedom of Will and Fate” (1862), reproduced in The Nietzsche Reader, ed. K. Ansell-
Pearson, D. Large, Blackwell-Wiley, Hoboken NJ, 2006,  
153 Nietzsche and Metaphysics, Suny Press, 1996 120-143 
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Williams154 pay a great deal of attention to this problem in their studies of Nietzschean 
necessity and justification, emphasising his rejection of “the concept of totality; it is a 
god-term” (Williams 329). In order to avoid this fall into finality, the universe must 







“This blessed certainty I found in all things: that they would rather - dance” 
“Oh heaven above me, so pure, so high! That is what your pureness means to me,  
that there is no eternal reason-spider and no spiderweb- 
-that for me you are a dance floor for godlike accidents, that you are a god’s table for 
godlike dice and dice-throwers” (“Before Sunrise”, Z III §3:138)  
 
Nabais (65) admits that Nietzsche’s works are “loaded with symbols of contingency”, 
like the dance or the dice-throw, but these are rejected as poetic embellishments that 
weaken his philosophical position. Set against this we have Deleuze’s famous discussion 
of “The Dice-Throw” (Nietzsche and Philosophy, §11 pp. 23-6) which underlines the 
importance of contingency to Nietzsche’s non-teleological world: “To abolish chance by 
holding it in the grip of causality and finality […] the operations of a bad player” (25). 
Necessity and chance are combined in the throw of the dice, where anything that could 
happen might happen - until the bones land and ‘iacta alea est’155. After this moment, 
the outcome is fate: it had to happen. But it only had to happen once it had happened. 
No plan, law, or certainty set this beforehand, and in the moment of chance, the dice 
could have fallen in any way that they would allow156. ‘In absolute chance, there is 
                                                 
154 Tragedy, Recognition, and the Death of God: Studies in Hegel and Nietzsche. 322-348. Esp. 333-340 
155 ‘The die has been cast’ 
156 This is of course the great paradox of the eternal return and Zarathustra’s ‘redemption’: to affirm the absolute 
necessity of everything that chance delivers, without turning life into an immutable ‘divine plan’- as the Stoics 
did with their version of necessity 
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absolute necessity’: the properly Heraclitean ‘harmony’ whereby determinacy does not 
subsume and destroy contingency. This is why Nietzsche rejects a world of order 
governed by natural laws. But any theory of chance offered must also respect this 
boundary, and Nietzsche must ensure that chance does not overwhelm and negate 
necessity.  
 In order for ‘justification on the grounds of necessity’ to stand, Nietzsche cannot 
allow his vision of chance to involve arbitrary and capricious randomness. Herman 
Siemens offers a productive framework for understanding this task in his 
characterisation of Nietzsche’s naturalism as an attempt to “rethink ‘necessity’ in a non-
anthropomorphic, non-moral way that offers an alternative, non-legalistic explanation 
or interpretation of natural processes and the regularity they exhibit” (88). To do this, 
Siemens sees Nietzsche attempting to move away from viewing what regularity the 
natural world seems to display in terms of “sollen; the constraint, compulsion (zwang) 
to follow the moral law”. Necessity instead becomes “an impersonal, amoral Mussen” 
“that which remains after thinking away anthropomorphic laws of nature”. We can 
further outline this framework by showing how the perennial theme of ‘law’ in 
Heraclitus is (despite appearance to the contrary) commensurate with this idea. Kahn 
notes that while Heraclitus was undoubtedly the father of natural law, this term (νόμος 
– nomos157) did not carry the same implications for his archaic tongue than it would for 
his later Stoic interpreters (118)158. Law is instead conceived of as “every manifestation 
of cosmic order”, including the fact that creatures kill and eat one another (DK.21.B.80), 
and human law- the law of the city- is just another form this order takes: “there is no 
split in principle between law and nature. As an institution, law is neither manmade nor 
conventional: it is an expression in social terms of cosmic order” (Kahn 2001 15). The 
‘written’ institutions of a city are regarded as simply codifications of social reality, the 
                                                 
157 Much closer to ‘custom’, the word derived from νέμω (némō) meaning ‘allotment’ or ‘distribution’ and referred 
as much to boundaries (between territories and musical styles) as to the specific laws of cities etc). This will have 
important inference for the notion of ‘wisdom’ as the ability to delineate what is to be ‘allotted’ to one or another- 
where the ‘boundary’ should lie.  
158 “later writers had no hesitation in speaking here of 'divine law' or 'natural law' (as in Lucretius' Lex natural)”, 
but Heraclitus does not express the notion of a 'divine law' theios nomos. Instead he leaves us with a 
characterization of the common as 'the divine one'” (Kahn  2001 118).  
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“unifying principles of the political community” that arises “as a consequence of the 
common human possession of speech and understanding”159. 
 Far from transplanting the human legislative law into nature, Heraclitus offers a 
naturalist understanding of the institution as a formalisation of actuality: of the way it 
is and must be. A city is its laws: it only exists as the political enactment of the dynamics 
of community, and those dynamics are nothing more than the actuality of creatures 
living together in a polis. Similarly, natural law is the playing out of physical dynamics, 
and in neither case is law a case of compliance with a pre-eminent dictate or 
commandment. You either live ’lawfully’, or hybris (‘en-harmony’/lawlessness) 
disintegrates the community, like a hearth fire that has spread out of bounds and 
consumed the house160. We should understand Heraclitus’ discussions of the ‘natural 
laws’ that ensure the sun does not set out of bounds according to this framework161. 
There is no ‘lawgiver’ who has ordained the order of nature; it is simply that to overstep 
(hyperbesetai) the ‘limits’ (termata) would mean instantaneous annihilation by the 
unstoppable furies. It would not contradict any ‘law’, but would go against the 
‘lawfulness’ by which the universe operates.  
 This is the distinction that Nietzsche appears to be arguing for when he says that 
the nous wills its creations, while aeon simply acts lawfully and without a determinate 
will162. We should therefore say that the difference between sollen and mussen is 
translatable into the distinction between the Stoic and Heraclitan nomos; between ‘law’ 
and ‘lawfulness’. Nietzsche’s philosophy of necessity requires that the universe act 
‘lawfully’ without this lawfulness ever ossifying out into determinate ‘law’, and it was 
aesthetics that provided the framework for understanding this possibility. 
 In Aesthetic Theory, Theodore Adorno identifies the essence of aesthetic 
phenomena as lying in their ‘autonomy’. Elaborating on Kant, we are told that  “artworks 
detach themselves from the empirical world and bring forth another. Thus, however 
tragic they appear, artworks tend a priori towards affirmation” (1). On one level, this 
just means that for something to be considered aesthetic, it must be ‘free’ – i.e. 
                                                 
159 This can be seen highlighted by the tripartite pun on the Greek word for ‘understanding’ found in fragment 
XXX: understanding as ‘what is shared/common and ‘what is law’ (Kahan 43) 
160 See Kahn  2001 pp.179-181. 
161 See Heraclitus XLV, XLVI 
162 See §2.3 p.96 
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undetermined by natural causal law163 or moral law164. Douglas Smith points to 
contemporary approaches to musical aesthetics, with their “insistence upon the 
autonomy of art from outside forces and the primacy of aesthetic over moral criteria”, 
as hugely influential for Nietzsche165. We can see, in this claim that the aesthetic is 
exempt from externally imposed moral dictates, why Nietzsche gravitated towards the 
aesthetic phenomenon as a model for a godless world. However, the principle of 
autonomy goes further. Without the interference of external ordering rules, the artwork 
is beholden to itself for its own order. An artwork that has no ordering is dispersion, a 
fragmented, incoherent mess: “Without its immanent necessity no work would gain 
objectivation” (Adorno 187). This middle space leaves aesthetics (both creation and 
judgement) as, in Kant’s formulation, the practice of an ‘art’ (Kunst), a practice that 
“relies upon the ability to use rules, as one does in a craft, but [in which] the application 
of rules cannot be made rule bound”166 (Bowie 189). Thus, while the aesthetic adheres 
to a form of ‘logic’ – its ‘inner necessity’ – this logic is “a paradox for extra-aesthetic logic 
[…] a syllogism without concept” (Adorno 187). Aesthetics cannot permit of determinate 
law dictating its unfolding,  yet cannot exist without adhering to lawfulness in that 
unfolding. 
 Nietzsche was far from the only philosopher in the wake of Kant to look to the 
aesthetic for a model of ‘lawfulness without law’. But unlike others – such as Schiller 
and Schleiermacher – he leaves us with no formalised aesthetic theory to interrogate. 
We must piece together his views on the subject from disparate sources. The most stable 
and coherent way to do this is from the ground up, with the conception of reality that 
Nietzsche saw as underlying this world of necessity and contingency. Once this has been 
established, we can then set about piecing together how this ‘physic’ relates back to a 
specifically aesthetic view of the world. Nietzsche’s understanding of physical reality 
was, by the end of the period under discussion, taking its final form as the theory of the 
                                                 
163 Which would make it “pleasant”: that which conforms to our embodied interest (CJ §3) 
164 Which would make it “good”: that which conforms to our moral interest (CJ §4) 
165 Smith cites the Symbolist movement and especially Walter Pater here, but his link between Nietzsche and the 
‘art for art’s sake’ movement is puzzling, given Nietzsche’s explicit rejection of that aesthetic ethos. See Pothen 
chapter 5 for commentary. 
166 This is not simply a question of autonomy for Kant – he rather seeks to show that a rule-bounded aesthetic 
would mean a regress of rules for rules (for commentary see Kukla 10-12).  
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‘will to power’167. But a series of notebook entries from 1872168 – scattered amid (or often 
as part of) fragments that would evolve into “On Truth” 169 and Tragic Age – set out the 
initial suppositions of a ‘physic of forces’. This theory shows an obvious debt to 
Boscovich’s ‘dynamic physics’170 in so far as it rejects ‘corpuscularian’ physics171 and 
proposes a view of physical reality as the inter-relations of quality-less, extension-less 
‘constellations’ of energy172.  
 Nietzsche begins by positing ‘sensation’ as the “primordial fact of matter”173. All 
motion in the universe is speculated to derive from ‘attraction or repulsion’ of one 
‘quantum’ of force for another. The meeting of the two gives rise to ‘sensation’174, a 
change in the effected quanta that manifests as one of these two motions: drawing either 
towards or away. It is worth noting that Nietzsche resolves this into quite 
anthropomorphic terms: “the entire logic of nature is reduced to a system of pleasure 
and displeasure. Everything grasps for pleasure and flees displeasure, these are the 
eternal laws of nature”175. This may seem problematic- both for the dismissal of ‘eternal 
laws’ and for the critique of hedonism outlined in the first chapter. But it appears that 
Nietzsche envisaged this to be as bare an essential rule of reality as possible, and that it 
has little to do with anything so essentialist as hedonism. This will be revealed as our 
investigation goes on.  
                                                 
167 For commentary on the importance of the 1872 notes for Nietzsche’s later thought, see Gray 488-90, Danto 
38. 
168 Notebook 19, dated “summer 1872- early 1873” by Colli and Montinari (KGW). For brevity, the following 
footnotes (for the remainder to §3.1) will simply cite the note numbers assigned by this edition (or more 
specifically R.T Gray’s translation: CW 11). All note numbers in square brackets (e.g. [123]) refer to book 19, 
unless specified.   
169 [43], [66], [67], [77], [78], [84], [97], [141], [144], [153], [155-6], [160], [166], [172], [175], [178], [228], 
[230] and [235] are among those notes that express ideas or themes discussed in “On Truth”. [79] and [140] 
specifically use the ‘Chladni sound figure’ example (see TL 144) while [236] discusses object identity with 
reference to trees (TL 148).  
170 See n.170170 p.61  
171 One of the foundational notes for this theory [159] does refer to “impact, the influence of one atom upon 
another” (51) which is clearly at odds with the Boscovich theory of ‘force over distance’: nothing ‘touches’ and 
there is nothing that could ‘touch’. The very reference to force as concerning ‘atoms’ is also problematic for this 
thesis. Ultimately it is to be left to the discerning reader if the rest of theory (and the discussion of ancient atomism 
in PP§15) is compelling enough reason to view this as the sort of laxity of terms permissible in a rough notebook 
draft- or if this fatally undermines the argument being presented here.  
172 The terminology I will be employing here is borrowed from Grimm: ‘quanta’, ‘constellation’ ‘power centre’. 
Boscovich originally referred to all these as ‘puncta’, while Moles uses ‘neighborhoods’. Nietzsche himself begins 
to use the term ‘quantum’ in later notes, but only seems to refer to ‘forces’ in the 1872 notes. 
173 [146] 
174 [159], [164] 
175 [161], [164] 
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 Having presumed that motion is decided by sensation, he then posits that the 
only other thing needed for the emergence of complex formations is ‘memory’: for a 
sensation to not be exhausted in the initial moment of interaction but ‘preserved’ in the 
quanta176. This is regarded as ‘essential’ along with sensation; indeed it is “part of the 
essence of sensation”177 and Nietzsche is careful to distance his use of these terms from 
the organic: like sensation, “memory has nothing to do with nerves, with a brain”178. 
They are “primordial” to the play of forces, and memory is argued to be a requirement 
for the emergence of the brain and of consciousness, not an artefact of them179. It is here 
that Nietzsche seemingly doubles down on the determinism and fixity of his new 
universe of forces by speaking, once again, of ‘eternal things’:  
“The inviolability of the laws of nature means: sensation and memory are part of the 
essence of things. The fact that a substance reacts in a certain way to contact with another 
is a matter of memory and sensation” (CW 11 19[161]).  
What we have here is Nietzsche’s formulation of the ‘necessity’ of the force world. But 
these necessities – that sensation gives rise to motion, and is preserved as memory – 
mark the frontier of fixed invariability in the interaction of forces. Nietzsche goes on to 
say that, while the way quanta act when confronted with another is wholly down to 
memory and sensation, “the actions of substances are derived laws”: a quantum will react 
in a determined way, but “at some time it learned this”180. When a meeting gives rise to 
a sensation, something of this is preserved in the quanta involved as a form of ‘echo’. 
The sensation itself will give rise to motion – attraction or repulsion – but critically it is 
only the existence and the inescapability of these mechanisms that are fixed: quanta will 
always be drawn towards ‘pleasure’. But what elicits this attraction is entirely contingent 
upon the memories of the quanta and the way that these memories have conditioned it 
to ‘interpret’ sensation. 
 Nietzsche envisages a system whereby quanta that are attracted and drawn 
together combine into “complexes of sensations, larger or smaller [which] could be 




179 [159]. See also (CW 11 27[37]:167); “the world is not a quality produced by the brain, rather, the brain is itself 
a part of these sensations and representations”. 
180 [159] 
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called ‘wills’”181. As these ‘constellations’ grow, absorbing, destroying, repelling other 
quanta or complexes of quanta, they accumulate memories, which, since they are 
merely the reverberating persistence of sensations, spread through the constellation. 
The accumulation and interaction of memories gives to these quanta a sort of 
‘character’- a collection of “habits”182, as Nietzsche terms the tendency of memory to 
form sensation along certain lines- “a number of protean qualities” which determine the 
effect that they have on other quanta183. But these are in no way fixed or essential to the 
quanta- which is nothing more than a locus of energy attracted to or repelled by other 
loci on the basis of pleasure or displeasure: all qualities are “nothing but particular 
modified activities of a single material”184. In this vision, we see replicated the central 
tenets of Boscovich’s ‘dynamic physics’, with all properties and attributes of the universe 
reduced to a single immutable ‘law of motion’185. Boscovich’s universe is  
“a place of constant motion and change, with points of matter (punctorum materiae) 
permanently approaching and receding from one another and arranging and rearranging 
themselves into smaller or larger conglomerates of matter in an ‘immense vacuum’ (TPhN 
§7)” (Koznjak 45) 
In such a world, “nothing is immutable except the very simple, indivisible, non-
extended, and homogenous points of matter and the law of forces itself”; a law which is 
itself nothing more than “the propensity (determinationem) for mutual approaching or 
receding of points of matter” (Koznjak 45). Like Nietzsche, we have quanta, and we have 
‘force’- the propensity for quanta to attract or repel186. But the critical distinction is that, 
for Boscovich, the interactions of the quanta are fixed by the law of force and are thus 
always predictable: “the force between particles oscillates between repulsion and 
attraction, depending on their mutual distances” (Koznjak 44). Postulating this 
‘logarithmic scaling’ of force over distance, Boscovich then felt able to create his ‘curva 
Boscovichiana’ algorithm, a mathematical formula that would allow anyone who knew 
the distance between quanta and their momentum to perfectly calculate how the 





185 See Koznjak pp.43-6. 
186 “the propensity (determination) for mutual approaching or receding of points of matter, which is actually the 
very definition of ‘force’ in his system (see TPhN §9)” (Koznjak 45).  
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attractive or repulsive forces would act187. But Nietzsche did not follow Boscovich in 
positing such a universal and immutable determination behind which of the two 
motions would arise in any given situation. And it is here that we find the contingency 
in the heart of absolute lawfulness. 
 Though Boscovich attributed to the quanta themselves a degree of determining 
influence188, in Nietzsche’s eyes it seems that attraction or repulsion are entirely 
determined by the sensation that the quanta elicit in one-another. And, critically, the 
way these sensations are received is entirely down to the composition of the quanta 
involved: their habitual ‘character’. The ‘memories’ of preserved sensations inform the 
reception of new ones, and the habits that they engender in the quanta in its relation to 
others is subject to “change” through the development and interaction of these 
memories, which “depending on the nature of the attack [encounter] it [the quanta] 
stresses, re-enforces, and employs for the benefit of the whole”189. Nietzsche here goes 
so far as to theorise “a kind of free will that modifies the essence of a thing, out of 
pleasure and a flight from displeasure”. But this is once more regarded as something 
both learnt and automatic/nonconscious, entirely governed by the quanta’s singular 
determining imperative: to seek ‘pleasure’ and avoid ‘displeasure’190. Indeed, the first 
note that appears to directly relate to these speculations on the nature of physical 
materiality in the 19th notebook (note 54) kicks off the enquiry by postulating that 
“chemical transformations in inorganic matter” show the same principle of discernment 
that we find in organic evolution: attraction or rejection depending on the “mimetic 
roles that are acted out by a force”. It is not a question of ‘will’ -which, in this theory, 
emerges from the interactions of quanta- nor is it a question of volitional ‘choice’. The 
motions of quanta are always lawful: they cannot but repel or attract, based on 
                                                 
187 Koznjak replicates the ‘curva Boscovichiana’ diagram (44) and demonstrates the mathematical formula needed 
to calculate it (48).’ 
188 Mostly related to the ‘size’, ‘influence’ and ‘relative power’ of a constellation; e.g.: “The smaller the 
conglomerates, the more “tenacious of form” they become, i.e., the more capable of preserving “their forms in 
opposition to even very strong forces from without” (TPhN §398)” (Koznjak 45)  
189 [164] 
190 This categorisation is better understood in terms of its later development in the theory of the will to power, 
which removes the biological association of these determinations. By Nietzsche’s famous later formulation, 
‘pleasure’ is to be understood as an increase in power- displeasure a decrease. (See §2 of The Antichrist: “What 
is happiness? The feeling that power is growing, that resistance is overcome”). Thus, sensation and the way it 
manifests should be understood- even in this early formulation- as discernment based on “the sole criteria [of] the 
relative increase or decrease of power” that an encounter with another quanta engenders (Grimm 156). 
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sensations. But this does not mean that they are ‘fixed’ or ‘predetermined’: all ‘chemical 
transformations’ are lawful, “but there are several! That it can play!”191. 
 
For the Purpose of Play 
 
The notion of ‘play’ introduced here is of critical importance for Nietzsche’s physics. 
The necessities of the force world provide a determinate framework of lawfulness. 
However, this is only a framework. As an 1887 note clarifies, “absolute necessity […] is 
not a determinism ruling events, but merely the expression of the fact that the 
impossible is not possible” (WP§639). Nothing can happen that is not within the realm 
of ‘lawfulness’, and thus is not the result of a sensation being interpreted through the 
memory-character of the quanta. However, as with the chemical reaction discussed 
above, this does not mean that there is only a single, mechanically determined possible 
outcome. In laying out the conception of aesthetic logic as immanent necessity, Adorno 
directs us to   
Nietzsche’s comment […] that in artworks everything only appears as if it must be as it is 
and could not be otherwise. The logic of artworks […] grants every particular event and 
resolution an incomparably greater latitude than [conceptual logic] does (Adorno 181). 
The artwork provides a model for something that is wholly an accretion of its own inner 
necessities, but whose product is not reducible to a mechanical product of those 
necessities. Later in this chapter, it will be necessary to examine Nietzsche’s discussion 
of the ‘cultic aura’ that adheres in works of art once the ‘contingency’ of its logic is 
forgotten and they begin to be viewed only as ‘divine necessity’. This discussion is best 
saved for a context in which justice can be done to the breadth of its importance. For 
now, it is critical to note that Nietzsche’s ideas of this draw firm parallels with Adorno’s 
claim that a work of art is nothing more than the playing out of its inner necessities 
through ‘logical’ developments that “have the shadowy quality of being both binding 
and slack” (Adorno 181), like the rules that govern the games of children.  
 Taking this model, we are left with a view of the force world which is entirely 
‘determinate’, and to this extent Young is correct about Nietzsche’s relation to 
                                                 
191 [54] 
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Boscovich: “the total state of the universe at a later time is a function of its state at an 
earlier time” (63). All motion arises from sensation and memory – from the state of the 
quanta – and occurs within the limits set by that state. It should be understood however 
that, though every event is determinate, it is not ‘determined’. This is where Young 
oversteps Nietzsche’s definition of ‘necessity’ and claims that the latter state of the 
universe is not simply a function of its earlier state but the causally pre-determined 
result of it. Nietzsche avoids this ossification into teleology by presenting the necessity 
of each event as shot through with an irresolvable element of contingency. The ‘chain 
of causality’ in which every state is absolutely purposive towards the goal of producing 
the next state is denied, and a new understanding of ‘causality’ is substituted. This 
causation is one of necessity and play, a relation that we must now do more to develop, 
if we are to arrive at a meaningful understanding of this new model. 
 Historically speaking, Nietzsche’s interest in aesthetics as the meeting point of 
‘necessity and random play’ places his thought in dialogue with Kant’s third Critique. 
The Kantian critical project formalised division between human freedom and natural 
necessity: Humanity is free, while the rest of the world is governed by the natural laws 
of causality. In the Critique of Judgement, we are told that our capacity for aesthetic 
determinations marks the meeting point between freedom and determination: “the 
judgement of taste must rest on a mere sensation of the reciprocal activity of the 
imagination in its freedom and the understanding with its conformity to law” (CJ 
§35:129). F.X.J. Coleman calls the book “a work of philosophical diplomacy in which 
Kant attempts to reconcile the laws of nature […] with the laws of freedom” (3).  It stands 
as the ‘capstone’ of the critical project, which took as one of its goals a reconciliation of 
‘freedom’ - “a self-determining agent acting in accordance with the universal principles 
of morality” (Coleman 5) – with the mechanically determinate nature of physical reality. 
Presentations of the sublime in the work  (and to an extent of beauty also) were intended 
to show that freedom from the dominion of natural causality is possible in the sensate 
world itself. The capacity to judge a scene as sublime is bound up with “an ability to 
judge ourselves as independent of nature, [which] reveals in us a superiority over 
nature” (CJ §28). Similarly, “the experience of beauty is felt to be an experience of 
freedom [..] a sensate representation which can symbolise an otherwise unintuitable 
object of pure thought” (Guyer 252, CJ §59). 
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 The third Critique’s attempt to reconcile freedom and nature through the 
aesthetic is often regarded as the great failure of Kant’s critical system. Indeed, in Kai 
Hammermeister’s estimation “the problems that arise from the separation of freedom 
and nature, beauty and morality” in the work, its “inability to reconnect the autonomous 
spheres to each other convincingly [gave] rise to one of the most exciting periods in the 
history of philosophy, namely, German Idealism” (Hammermeister 154). The prominent 
role that aesthetics played for Idealist and Romantic thinkers who followed in Kant’s 
wake speaks to the enduring allure of the field as a means of overcoming this gap, as 
well as of developing a relation to ‘reason’ that transcended its cold and rigid conceptual 
instantiations. Thinkers like Schelling, Schiller, Hegel, and Schopenhauer looked to the 
aesthetic as something redemptive, a nexus of freedom that either afforded, or signified 
the human’s escape from the base, causal world of the natural.  
Unlike the “various idealistic metaphysics of art” he inspired, “Kant himself did not 
think that mediation as a higher, synthetic unity of nature and freedom” (Dusing 79), 
instead seeing the aesthetic as a sign of humanity’s ascendency over nature: the sensate 
triumph of freedom in the material world of un-freedom. He locates in the aesthetic a 
“‘super sensuous substrate’ in which conditioned nature and freedom can be 
reconciled”, and puts it to work  
“to find a way of showing how the existence of rational beings who can transcend nature 
is the final purpose of creation, an idea he infers from the independence of moral self-
determination from the chain of natural causality” (Bowie 42).  
But Nietzsche, on the other hand, sees the aesthetic as a means, not of raising man above 
nature, as its goal or purpose, but to undermine the very idea of purposive in nature. 
And play served a pivotal role in this.  
 Play is roughly defined by Kant as ‘purposeless activity’, or rather as an activity 
“which could only prove purposive as play, i.e. an occupation which is agreeable on its 
own account” (CJ §43:133). Play is purposive -i.e. is directed towards an aim- but its only 
purpose is to be ‘agreeable in itself’: to exist as play. It is introduced into the critiques 
as the basis of differentiation between the aesthetic cognition of beauty, and the 
everyday, ‘practical’ form of cognition employed by theoretical reason. In such 
cognitions, the understanding, provides a set of ‘conceptual rules’ which governs the 
imagination in its task of assembling manifold sense perceptions into images “as a 
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servant of the understanding, readying intuition for understanding’s rule according to 
the latter’s own, discursive principles” (Kukla 10). But when we have only a disinterested 
concern’ with what is being perceived- the cognitive powers enter into a “free play of 
imagination” in which “no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of 
cognition” (CJ §9:48-9). Interested cognition attempts to identify the nature of objects 
in the name of survival- of our ‘interest’ as living, embodied creatures. But when not 
governed by this requirement, the cognitive powers are left free to ‘experiment’ and 
produce representations that are simply ‘pleasing’ to them, or rather “to the subject and 
its feeling for pleasure or displeasure […] its feeling of life” (§1:35).  
From this we can already see why the third Critique would have held a special 
place for Nietzsche, and why the presentation of the aesthetic found here should have 
been so appealing. We can only imagine with what enthused wonderment the 
developing ‘Dionysian philosopher’ read the “Remark” Kant attached to his “Analytic of 
the Sublime”:  
The changing free play of sensations (which do not follow any preconceived plan) is 
always a source of gratification [to the subject], because it promotes the feeling of health; 
and it is immaterial whether or not we experience delight in the object of this play, or 
even in the gratification itself when judged in the light of reason (CJ §54:159). 
Play is an activity that produces, without determined law, representations that have no 
aim or purpose save the stimulation of life; the ‘feeling of health’. If we take this to be 
the grounding supposition of Kantian aesthetics, then it becomes evident why the 
Heraclitean image of the ‘child at play’ should have resonated for Nietzsche- and why 
he took pains to link this image so strongly with aesthetic activity. To conceive of the 
world as aesthetic phenomenon it to claim life itself as play, as a purposeless, aimless 
seeking after delight, which pays no heed to reason – precisely what Nietzsche was 
looking for in a view with which to oppose both teleology (the subjugation of life to final 
purpose) and pessimism (a condemnation of the world for its purposelessness). Both 
play and art are purposeless; yet remain justified in and of themselves. The importance 
of this purposelessness for Nietzsche’s thought is not restricted to the ‘cosmic’; It is also 
central to his new form of science, and helps to break apart the concept of causal 
determination, on both the macroscopic and the ‘quantum’ levels.  
  There are, however, problems with simply designating the world as aesthetic, 
especially within the Kantian framework. We have already touched upon the issues that 
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Nietzsche had with disinterest, and this was, for Kant, precisely the quality that allows 
aesthetic play to exist as undetermined and without purpose. Indeed, in the Kantian 
framework, the aesthetic is specifically contrasted to the natural world - a matrix of 
interconnected ‘interests’ which aesthetic ‘disinterest’ draws us away from. Joao 
Constantcio stands as an example in recent scholarship of an attempt to bridge the 
antithesis between Nietzsche and Kant on the matter of disinterest192. Pointing to the 
pleasurable ‘feeling for life’ that persists in the state of disinterested aesthetic 
speculation, Constantcio draws parallels with the aesthetics advocated in On The 
Genealogy of Morals – a Stendhal inspired grounding of aesthetics in the sensuality of 
sexual attraction193. This can be seen to share a degree of overlap with the Dionysian 
and the link it draws between reproduction and aesthetic creation, but the conclusion 
that Constantcio draws – that Nietzsche had misunderstood Kant, conflating his 
disinterest with Schopenhauer’s to produce a ‘vulgar Kantian’ straw-man (77-82) – is 
hard to fully endorse194. It also seems to be an unsatisfactory resolution to the issue of 
disinterest, one which fails to contend with Birth’s stated intention of overcoming and 
doing away with the very concept. In pursuing this aim instead of a reconciliation with 
Kant, we can better arrive at an understanding of how Nietzsche felt able to extend the 
aesthetic to encompass all of existence.  
 
 
§3.2 Nature, Freedom, and Purpose? 
 
As R.K. Hill notes, critical engagement with the third Critique has tended to overlook 
the overarching structure of the work, which ties the discussion of aesthetics to a 
prolonged exegesis on the teleology of nature. This is partly as a result of the gulf 
                                                 
192 See “’Who is Right, Kant or Stendhal?’: On Nietzsche’s Kantian Critique of Kant’s Ethics”, Nietzsche and 
Kant on Aesthetics and Anthropology, ed. M.J. M Branco, K. Hay, Bloomsbury 2017, pp. 63-98 
193 “beauty is a promise of happiness" (See GM III §6 83-5) 
194 Constantcito’s argument appears to overlook Kant’s discussion of Epicurus in CJ §54, which specifica lly 
delineates the pleasure of gratification which “pleases in sensation” from that which “pleases simply in the judging 
of it” (159). The former of these is grounded in “animal, i.e. bodily sensation” (163) and is quite separate from 
the contemplative, intellectual pleasure associated with morality and aesthetic appreciation. 
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between the disciplines that the two halves of it are concerned with195, but arguably 
more significant is the fact that “The Critique of Teleological Judgement” “seems to 
commit [Kant] to a theology rendered obsolete by Darwin” (Hill 40). Readings thus tend 
to minimise the argumentative thrust that informs this structure and in doing so to 
push aside the ultimate aim that compelled Kant to address aesthetics in the first place: 
“[an attempt] to link the harmony manifest in aesthetic apprehension of natural objects 
with the idea of natural teleology, thereby revealing the ultimate connection of nature as 
a whole to the ways in which we think about it and relate to it” (Bowie 32).  
The ‘purposelessness’ of aesthetic play is deliberately contrasted to the teleologically 
ordered and purposeful world of nature. That we are able to find aesthetic beauty in the 
world is taken to demonstrate 
a ‘mimetic’ side to the imagination which suggests we can indeed in some sense 
harmonise with nature. We do not in this case wish to order nature in any other way than 
it is already constituted when we feel the disinterested pleasure it gives to us by appearing 
to be formed in terms of ideas (Bowie 32)196. 
Teleological judgement, which ‘reveals’ nature to be a purposeful chain of casual 
moments, is justified by aesthetic judgement. 
 The ‘unity of reflective judgements’ outlined in the Critique means that for Kant 
“aesthetics and teleology fit together […] such that organisms, people, and even the 
world itself become works of art” (Hill 75). Kant resolves this unity to the favour of 
theology, with the ‘art-like’ nature of the world being used to show that it is the ‘work’ 
of an ordering, creating intellect. The world is specifically not an aesthetic creation, but 
rather the purposive unity that it forms finds its closest analogy in a work of art197, and 
the unifying systems that inform aesthetic constructions are employed to argue for the 
purposive interconnection of the system of nature. Nietzsche, on the other hand, sees 
this unity in quite a different light and uses Kant’s theory to work towards a dismantling 
of his teleology, and ultimately of the distinction that separates nature and the aesthetic.  
 The Critique of Judgement uses aesthetic judgements to prove teleological ones 
through its play with the distinction between purpose and purposiveness. When 
bringing multiplicity into a unified schema, the imagination must have a “cause” for 
                                                 
195 It is not many philosophers who seek to combine aesthetics and the philosophy of biology. But Nietzsche was 
one such thinker. 
196 See also Hill pp.58-67 
197 CJ §65:203 
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producing in that way. In reasoned cognition, this is provided by the understanding in 
the form of a concept: “concept is regarded as the cause of an object […] the causality” 
(CJ§10:51). The faculty of desire can produce only with regards to ‘ends’- to a definitive 
purpose. But free from desire and its imposition of concepts, the imagination is left to 
impose its own causality on its constructions, leading to “a purposiveness with respect 
to form […] without resting it upon an end”- a determinate ‘goal’ for that production 
(52). The aesthetic construction is ‘purposive’ in so far as it has ‘causality: its parts fit 
together in the service of the whole - the ‘formal unity’ that is the cause of that 
arrangement. But it has no ‘purpose’, in so far as that unity serves no determinate end 
beyond itself. The ‘goal’ that its causation works towards is nothing more than its own 
existence as a formal unity- its ‘end’ is itself. “Purposiveness, therefore, may exist apart 
from purpose”, and we have here an explanation for aesthetic representations - 
cognitions that emerge from the imagination without conceptual determination.  
Kant then goes on to show that the formal unity we find in aesthetic 
representation is the same as that which is to be found in our representation of the 
‘organisms’- naturally exiting “formal unities which exhibit, like works of art in this 
respect, a different and more internal kind of purposiveness and appear to exist for their 
own sake, and that of the species”, rather than  “[serving] something entirely beyond 
and independent of itself” (Walker xviii). Such naturally existing formal unities - the 
recognition of which does not rely on the mind’s concepts - is then taken to ‘prove’ the 
existence of formal order in the world apart from the order imposed by our conceptual 
cognition. And, ultimately, it is argued that we must see “our purposive productivity [of 
formal unity as] being of the same kind as that which results in natural organisms” 
“which would make our spontaneity an aspect of nature in itself” (Bowie 32).  
Nietzsche’s idea that human artistry is simply a ‘participation’ in the ‘artistic 
powers of nature’ should be seen as descending from this idea. But a critical difference 
between these two notions lies in the division that Kant makes between natural and 
aesthetic forms. Like art objects, organisms for Kant are purely formal unities. Their 
‘causation’ is not a purpose that lies beyond them, but rests instead in the unity that 
their parts comprise. In the case of an animal or plant, this means that the whole relies 
on the functioning of the parts, and the parts depend entirely on the functioning of the 
whole (CJ §65-6). The organism would not exist if it were not a unity of its parts; but is 
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not just a ‘sum’ of parts - since the parts would not exist in the way they do were they 
not united in the whole. But the difference comes in the question of where this unifying 
form emerges. For Kant, to recognise the systematic unity of a thing - and the necessary 
interdependence of whole and part - is to make of it art, which is to say that the idea of 
unity under which the parts are subsumed is provided by the observing subject: “it is 
the product, in other words, of an intelligent cause, distinct from the matter, or parts, 
of the thing […] determined by its idea of a whole made possible through that idea, and 
consequently, not by external nature” (§65:201). The unity of the ‘art-object’ is imposed 
upon a manifold by the viewer (or by its creator in the first instance). But the natural 
product is one that contains that idea within itself so that parts “combine themselves 
into the unity of a whole by being reciprocally cause and effect of their form”. The art-
object is ordered by a rationality external to it, while the organism is ordered by its own 
inherent ‘idea’. 
This division is further underscored by the fact that while both art and organism 
exist in isolation as ‘intrinsic unities’ – ordered by their own qualities, rather than 
according to a definitive external purpose- natural forms are also embedded in a system 
of ‘extrinsic qualities’. Organisms may be their own end and purpose, but they also rely 
on one another for their existence -with procreation being the one irrefutable sign Kant 
can identify of the interrelation between the intrinsic and extrinsic (§82:255). So while 
an aesthetic object is ‘internally purposive’ but ultimately purposeless, the organism can 
only be conceived of as part of a web of “extrinsic relation” that constitutes “a system of 
the whole kingdom of nature following final causes” (256). Kant argues that once we 
have established the existence of an organism (as self-ordering system) we are 
compelled to see nature as a system of extrinsic ends connecting these organisms in 
necessary interdependence. He then goes further to claim that the unity of the world 
can only be conceived if it has, like the teleologically ordered organism, a unifying 
principle under which its manifold may be subsumed: an “ultimate end of nature, in 
relation to whom all other natural things constitute a system of ends” (§83:258). This 
‘goal’ is the moral human being.  
We thus begin from the claim that organisms “appear to contain an ‘idea’ which 
makes them take the form they do […] as if the whole of an organism preceded the parts 
which we can analyse in the terms of the understanding” (Bowie 27). From here it is 
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argued that we are forced to concede, if we accept the existence of the organism, the 
existence of “an organisation suitably constituted with a view to all these forms of life”, 
without which “the possibility of the purposive form of the products of the animal and 
plant kingdoms is quite unthinkable” (§80:248). Where the first book on aesthetic 
representations argued to show that we “are able to render the explanation of [an 
aesthetic form’s] possibility intelligible to ourselves only by deriving it from a will” 
(CJ§10:52), the same principle “necessarily leads us to the idea of aggregate nature as a 
system following the rule of ends, to which idea, again, the whole mechanism of nature 
has to be subordinated on principles of reason” (§67:207). We are therefore forced, on 
the basis of the internal self-organisation of the natural form, to posit “an intelligent 
world cause, regarded as the supreme artist” (§85:266) and a final end198 that will provide 
the ‘causation’ for what Nietzsche calls the “world organism” (KGW i.4 565). Without 
such a final end, Kant argues, the internal ordered consistency of the organism becomes 
unthinkable. This is a lesson that the young Nietzsche seems to have taken very 
seriously, but which he adopted to rigorously sceptical ends.  
In Nietzsche’s 1868 notebooks, among passages copied from the third Critique 
on purpose and teleology (notes made for the abandoned doctoral thesis “On the 
Concept of the Organic Since Kant”), Hill draws our attention to a quotation from 
Goethe’s “On Morphology”: “no living thing is unitary in nature; every such thing is a 
plurality. Even the organism, which appears to us as individual, exists as a collection of 
independent living entities”199. Positioned as it is, this can only be Nietzsche 
introducing, via Goethe, a rebuttal to the grounding supposition of Kant’s teleology. As 
the notes go on to say: 
 The concept of the whole does not lie in things but in us. These unities that we call 
organisms are also only multiplicities. There are in reality no individuals; rather 
                                                 
198“For apart from a final purpose we are unable to relate all these natural ends to a common point of reference, 
or form an adequate teleological principle, be it for combining all the ends in a known system, or be it for 
framing such a conception of the supreme Intelligence, as cause of a nature like this, as could act as a standard 
for our judgement in its teleological reflection upon nature. I should have, it is true, in that case an artistic 
intelligence for miscellaneous ends, but no wisdom for a final end, which nevertheless is what must, properly 
speaking, contain the ground by which such intelligence is determined. I require a final end, and it is only pure 
reason that can supply this a priori for all ends in the world are empirically conditioned and can contain nothi ng 
that is absolutely good, but only what is good for this or that purpose  regarded as contingent. Such a final end 
alone would instruct me how I am to conceive the supreme cause of nature” (CJ §85:269)  
199 Cited Hill 89 
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individuals and organisms are nothing but abstractions. Into these unities, made by us, 
we later transfer the idea of designedness” (KGW i.4 560. trans. Hill 89). 
Kant took the organisation of the organism to be conceivable only as the result of 
artistry: of τέχνη (tékhnē)200. The subjugation of multiplicity to a unity that is the cause 
of that multiplicity, the existence of an organised whole “in which everything is an end 
and on the other hand also a means” and “nothing in it is in vain, pointless, or to be 
attributed to a blind mechanism of nature” (CJ §65), proves that the universe is designed. 
But in Nietzsche’s eyes, the unity that proves the necessary existence of all other unities 
is itself an invention. Organisms do require a ‘τέχνη’ for their form. But its ‘artist’ is not 
god: it is us.  
 The possibility that natural form, like aesthetic form, is provided by the subject- 
rather than being inherent to the organism itself- is dismissed by Kant on the grounds 
that  
Intrinsic natural perfection, as possessed by things that are only possible as natural ends, 
and that are therefore called organisms, is unthinkable and inexplicable on any analogy 
to any known physical, or natural, agency, not even excepting—since we ourselves are 
part of nature in the widest sense—the suggestion of any strictly apt analogy to human 
art (CJ §65:203). 
They are ‘too perfectly formed’, too ‘ideally suited’ to their teleological purpose to be the 
products of our imaginations. But for Nietzsche, this ‘awe’ at perfection is just a bluff, a 
means by which we disguise our own artistry. The dissertation notes discuss the way we 
only marvel at the ‘designed’ complexities of organic systems- of that which most 
resembles our idea of our own perfection201. Later, “On Truth” was to mock us for our 
surprise at ‘discerning’ such neat and perfect conceptual categories in Nature as species 
and genus: “If someone hides something behind a bush, looks for it in the same place 
and then finds it there, his seeking and finding is nothing much to boast about” (TL 
147)202. The human wishes to be amazed by the intricate complexities of the world it 
                                                 
200 “’Art’ here has the Greek sense of techne; the capacity to produce in a purposive way” (Bowie 27). See also 
CJ viii 
201 See Hill 88 
202 See also TL pp.149-50: “how little all of this resembles a product of the imagination, for if it were such a thing, 
the illusion and the unreality would be bound to be detectable somewhere […] but if we are forced to comprehend 
all things under these forms alone then it is no longer wonderful that what we comprehend in all these things is 
nothing other than these very forms” 
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‘finds itself confronted with’, so it constructs marvelous architectonics out of reality in 
order to be amazed- and then marvels as ‘Nature’s’ capacity to amaze.  
This amazement is in fact central to Kant’s theory of both beauty and teleological 
order:  
When the imagination manages to grasp nature as purposive […] we feel pleasure 
necessarily, delighting in the contingent gift that enables us to satisfy our necessary desire 
to find articulable order in nature. This pleasure in the discovered suitability of nature for 
comprehension by the discursive understanding – or in other words, pleasure in the 
purposive- ness of nature – is at least closely related to the aesthetic pleasure we take in 
the beautiful, which concerns the harmony between our sensible presentations and the 
goals of the understanding in general (Kukla 19). 
This Judgment of formal purposiveness is “grounded in the pleasure derived from 
contemplating how each part of the object contributes to the whole of that object 
without losing its own value – how each part can be both a means and an end in itself” 
(Bowie 6). When we see beauty in nature, we are pleased by the fact that it is formed as 
our reason says it should be- according to ‘ideas’ (32). But for Nietzsche, this pleasure 
just shows that we have made of the world something that pleases and flatters our 
intellect.  
  
Nature as art-work 
 
In the ‘play’ of aesthetic cognition, the imagination creates freely from the material 
given to it by intuition (reconstituted sense data), forming it into arrangements that 
please it (or rather, that pleases ‘the subject’). But where Kant goes on to differentiate 
these aesthetic creations from ‘truly existent’ natural forms, Nietzsche sees no reason to 
make that leap and regards the organism as just another of the aesthetic forms produced 
by the imagination in its play. The unifying idea “organism [does] not belong to the 
thing in itself. The organism is form. If we abstract away that form, it is a multiplicity… 
organism as a product of our organisation” (KGW i.4 558 trans. Hill, emphasis added). 
Thus in so far as the unifying idea is given and not inherent, the ‘organism’ is, by Kant’s 
definition, an aesthetic representation. It is a product of our judgement. In “On Truth” 
and its attendant notes, we see this scepticism extended beyond organic forms to all 
objects and concepts, which we believe to exist  
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Only by virtue of the fact that a mass of images, originally flowed in a hot, liquid stream 
from the primal power of the human imagination has become hard and rigid, only because 
of the invincible faith that this sun, this window, this table is a truth in itself – in short 
only because man forgets himself as a subject, and indeed as an artistically creative subject 
(TL 148). 
  The ‘subject-object’ distinction that the essay seems grounded in appears at first 
to problematize this presentation into a form of solipsism. The ‘mind-dependent’ nature 
of the world under discussion would seem to place the human subject as a form of 
‘creative god’, responsible for engendering objects into existence. But only for itself: the 
god is stupid, deluded, blinded to the abyssal reality that “would mean the end of his 
‘consciousness of self’ (Selbstbewußstein)”. This understanding of ‘mind-dependence’ 
leads Hill to frame the ‘world-artist’ as a form of ‘transcendental subjectivity’: 
The only way [Nietzsche] could maintain that nature is mind-dependent was to posit a 
noumenal perceiver to produce the phenomenal world before the existence of animals 
and human beings, thus preserving his intuition that the world has a structure, cohesion, 
and intelligibility that transcends the plurality of individual experiences    (Hill 99). 
This is a strange claim, given that Nietzsche appears to expressly deny order, structure, 
and particularly intelligibility203. Moreover, this understanding of mind dependence is 
directly argued against in a draft note for “On Truth”, in which Nietzsche casts derision 
on a humanity that “immediately exploited Kantian epistemology for a glorification of 
the human being: the world only has reality in them. It is tossed back and forth in their 
heads like a ball”204. The correction that he offers to this view is that  
There is a work of art, and a stupid human being to contemplate it. To be sure it exists as 
a mental phenomenon for that stupid being only in so far as he himself is an artist and 
carries the forms about in his own head. He could boldly assert: outside my brain it has 
no reality (CW11 19[153]:49). 
This is a profoundly important and pregnant formulation, the full implications of which 
will take some time to unpack. But we can begin by looking back to the Dionysian 
tragedy, and the insight into the relation between the ‘stupid human’ and the ‘artwork’ 
it observes. 
 In §2.3, we discussed the collapse of spectatorial distance that Nietzsche saw 
enacted through the satyr chorus, who act to efface the line between stage and audience. 
But we must now ask how this is to be reconciled with the characterisation of the chorus 
                                                 
203 See §2.2 for Nietzsche’s discussion of intelligibility as another form of metaphysics 
204 [153] 
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as a “living wall erected against the pounding storm of reality” (BT §8:47). This has 
typically been read to mean that tragedy substitutes a deceptive counterfeit reality for 
the unacceptable ‘true’ one. But we should take Nietzsche more seriously when he 
insists that the vision ‘summoned’ by the chorus (whose enthused, enchanted ‘psychic 
distortion’ of the world allows us to perceive the immanence of Dionysus) is “a portrayal 
of a more truthful, more real, more complete image of existence than that of the man 
of culture who commonly considers himself the sole reality”205. What we are told is that 
the chorus in fact serves to exorcise the spectre of “naturalism in art” (§7:44), a notion 
that might seem odd given the weight of emphasis given so far to naturalism in this 
study. But what we are in fact seeing here is a re-affirmation of philosophic naturalism 
against a sentimental aesthetic naturalism. Adorno’s discussion of ‘natural beauty’ in 
relation to Hölderlin and Hegel is instructive here. Adorno sees in Hölderlin’s poetry 
what Nietzsche sees’ in Messina’s chorus: a war on “the fetishism of nature- the 
pantheistic subterfuge that would amount to nothing but an affirmative mask appended 
to an endlessly repetitive fate” (Adorno 74). This is then laid against Hegel, whose view 
of natural beauty is claimed to offer “a theodicy of the real”: 
As physically objectivated idea, life that animates nature is beautiful in that as life the 
true, the idea, is immediately present […] because the idea can take no other form than 
that in which it is realised, its ‘first appearance’ [as the system of nature] is ‘suitable’ and 
therefore beautiful (Adorno 74) 
 We can explain this difference by grounding it in Nietzsche’s objection to the 
idyllic, briefly touched on in §1.2. The difference between the satyr – the ‘nature creature 
among nature creatures’ – and the shepherd – languishing in a peaceful, munificent, 
reconciled nature-world – reproduces this dichotomy nicely. In the idyllic world of the 
latter 
 Nature and ideal […] are objects of joy, in that they are imagined as real […] the ideal is 
neither felt to be unattained, nor nature felt to be lost. This sentiment assumes the 
existence of an original age of man when he lay at the heart of nature and in this natural 
state had simultaneously achieved the ideal of humanity, in a paradisiacal goodness   
(BT §19:104) 
                                                 
205 “der Chor ist eine lebendige Mauer gegen die anstürmende Wirklichkeit, weil er — der Satyrchor — 
das Dasein wahrhaftiger, wirklicher, vollständiger abbildet als der gemeinhin sich als einzige Realität 
achtende Culturmensch” (BT §8 My translation) 
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Aesthetics of idyllic beauty cast the pleasurable feeling that arises from nature as 
expressive of a grand harmony and the human’s privileged place within it. It speaks to 
the pre-eminence of ‘idea’, a fixed essentia that speaks to humans in their own language. 
But the satyr experiences nature in all its untamed, satanic indeterminacy; without 
‘idea’, without ‘nature’, at least in terms of a fixed ‘identity’. Rather, “as Hölderlin taught 
[…] nature, as it stirs mortally and tenderly in its beauty, does not yet exist” (Adorno 
74). Adorno sees this experience as manifesting in a “shame felt in the face of natural 
beauty” that “stems from the damage done to what does not yet exist by taking it for 
existent”: the ‘violence’ done to reality by Idealism’s identity thinking206. In his 
‘redemptive critique’, Adorno casts this realisation as to the illusory character of natural 
beauty as heralding a divine promise: that nature will one day find the identity we now 
only pretend that it has. But Nietzsche’s approach substitutes the promissory ‘not-yet-
existent’ for a more properly Dionysian rejection of even the possibility of identity. 
 If we trade Adorno’s redemptive ‘not yet’ for the Heraclitean ‘is-and-is-not’, then 
we have a view of nature’s redemption into self-identity as both ‘never-achievable’ and 
‘always-already-archived’. By this light we can begin to gain a sense for what Nietzsche 
sought to express in his paradoxical assertion that the Dionysian is both ‘truth’ and 
‘illusion’207 together. The satyr is presented as both the reality of the human’s relation 
to nature (immersed in it as ‘nature being’, as opposed to the autonomous ‘noble animal’ 
of the idyll) and a “fictitious creature of nature” inhabiting a “fictitious state of nature” 
(BT §7). The Hellenes are claimed to have ‘created’ nature in order to place their satyr 
into it208. This paradox is resolved however, if we recall that the collapse of spectatorial 
distance, the enfolding of the individual in the mass of the chorus and in the artwork, 
serves to extend the ‘art world’ of the stage.  
Under its influence, the audience “do not see the awkwardly masked man” but 
instead “the arrival onstage of the god” (BT §8:52). As with one whose mind sees flashing 
visions of a lost love in anyone “of similar build and gait” who catches their eye, the 
                                                 
206 See Minima Moralia §153, Aesthetic Theory pp. xiii-v, 60-72,  
207 In BT §15 Nietzsche places his own Dionysian vision of a world that ‘flows eternally on’ alongside the 
apollonian and Socratic deceptions. 
208 This notion may owe its origin to AE §2 pp.23-4, though Schiller’s assertion that the invented state “is the 
necessary result of [man’s] rationality” seems to indicate that, despite knowledge that this invented state is 
different to the ‘True’ state of nature, Schiller never the less remains close to Rousseau in his postulation of a 
determining ‘Idea’ of the natural life. 
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reveller transfers “the whole image of the god” into the masked figure and dissolves its 
empirical reality into a “ghostly unreality”. But critically, this is not a narcotic 
‘hallucination’; at least not in the sense of something ‘false’ or ‘unreal’ taking the place 
of ‘reality’. Rather, the aesthetic world of the stage washes over the audience, enveloping 
them in an art world that renders ‘empirical reality’ “ghostly and unreal” but does not 
to dispel or erase it. The audience member is made “insensitive and unresponsive to the 
impression of reality […] occupying the rows of seats around him” but this world still 
remains (BT §8:49).  
 While in a dream we are so thoroughly blocked off from the waking world that 
we might forget we are dreaming, the tragic drama reminds us constantly that what it 
presents is an ‘effect’. In it we constantly have “the vision together with its transfiguring 
frame [..] visible to every eye” (52). The wildly deformed tragic masks and the sparse, 
deliberately artificial scenery of the θέατρον (théatron) serve the effect of ‘alienating’ 
the dream of the stage into “symbol […] drama props do not stimulate the pleasure of 
illusion, rather we understand them as symbol and understand the reality which is 
meant by them” (DW IV:93). Their anti-naturalism serves to aid, rather than hinder, the 
audience’s immersion beneath the spell precisely by resisting a merging of the vision 
with the mask. Rather than eclipsing the mundane world, the art world ‘trades places’ 
with it, as it were: what was previously experienced as the ‘solid’, ‘immutable’, ‘true’ 
world of the everyday becomes as ethereal and insubstantial as dream. If a mask could 
become as real as a living person, while at the same time remaining an uncanny and 
impossible parody of the human face, if the theatre with its painted scenery and carved 
stones could be experienced as a mountain pass filled with trees, then why should we 
believe in the ‘Truth’ of our apparently solid everyday experiences? ‘All that is solid 
melts into air’. 
 The grotesque distortions of the mask serve to prevent the dream from merging 
too completely with the empirical – as is the case in our delusional belief in an Idyllic 
nature: “Natural beauty is ideological where it serves to disguise mediatedness as 
immediacy […] [in idyllic beauty] the experience of nature is deformed”” (Adorno pp.68-
9). The naïve takes nature to be ‘given’ – immediate – and thus disguises from us the 
fact that these forms are our own creations. But in the anti-naturalism of the stage, the 
fact that something so clearly ‘non-natural’ could have the effect of becoming natural 
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and taking on life breaks apart the ‘ideology’ of a ‘given’ world. If the ‘mirage’ of the 
stage can appear as real as the nature world, can distort and supplant it, then both are 
revealed as constructed artifice209. But we should not rush to call either world ‘false’ on 
this account.  
The legend that “Worldview” relates, of Dionysus’s re-birth, is instructive for 
understanding this. We are told that Apollo ‘reconstructed’ the dismembered Zagreus, 
bringing together the fragments of the god that had previously wandered the world 
broken, vicious, and raging, sewed them together, and gave to Dionysus a human 
form210. This act - in which Dionysus is “rescued from Asiatic dismemberment” (I:84) - 
is allegorical of the ‘embodiment’ that the drama was finally able to give to the “eternal 
sea” and “changing weave” of the dithyramb (BT §8:52). In this form, Dionysus can 
finally ‘speak’, “no longer restricted to those forces that were only sensed”, but he does 
not use this speech to ‘condemn’ his brother as a fantasy and deception. Tragic drama 
instead voices the ‘harmony’ of his union with Apollo: without Apollo, Dionysus is the 
dismembered Zagreus. Without Dionysus, Apollo’s weapon against chaos, “the 
medusa’s head” (§2:25) would freeze the world into rigid, statuesque un-life. It is in this 
union that Nietzsche locates the essence of art.  
In his aesthetics of tragedy, Nietzsche frames the effect of the tragic drama as 
inducing in its audience an insight into the aesthetically mediated nature of our 
everyday reality. Just as Apollo gave form to Zagreus, the empirical world we assume to 
simply ‘present itself’ to us is stitched together by our Apollonian minds from 
dismembered parts. But perhaps the most important insight comes in the dissolution 
of ourselves as ‘observing subjects’. The breakdown of divisions – of subject and object, 
observer and observed, even between the individuals in the audience – points us to the 
realisation that as ‘nature creatures among nature creatures’, we ourselves are aesthetic 
creations as well. Like the Zagreus, like the teleological ‘unity’ of the organism, we too 
are stitched together from dismembered parts. 
 
 
                                                 
209 “the world of day veils itself and a new world, clearer, more intelligible, more gripping than the other…  is 
born before our eyes” (BT §5:52) 
210 DW I:84. See also Sloterdijk 1989 pp.31-2 







Worlds without ends. 
 
[nature] vanished from aesthetics as a result of the burgeoning domination of the concept 
of freedom and human dignity, which was inaugurated by Kant and then rigorously 
transplanted into aesthetics by Schiller and Hegel […] perhaps nowhere else is the 
desiccation of everything not ruled by the subject more apparent, nowhere else is the dark 
shadow of Idealism more obvious, than in aesthetics (Adorno 82). 
 
In breaking down the barriers between nature and aesthetic creation, Nietzsche can be 
seen as attempting to enact dissolution of a foundational division erected by idealism. 
In line with that tradition (and its Romantic offshoots) he sees the aesthetic as the 
answer to overcoming the “great gulf” dividing unfree nature, and free humanity (CJ 
IX). But in contrast to his predecessors, he sees in the aesthetic a means to efface the 
difference all together, challenging the very grounds on which the distinction was made. 
For Kant, the difference between interest and disinterest, between the rational and the 
aesthetic, comes down to a division between the ‘interested desire’ of the embodied 
creature in a system of ends, and the disinterested purposelessness of play. Through his 
Dionysian insight into the artificiality of the individual, and his biological insight into 
the artificiality of the organism, Nietzsche’s vision of nature strives to render this 
division obsolete – and with it, the distinction between the un-free world of purpose, 
and the free world of purposelessness. In doing this, he strives to secure for life that 
which art strives for: “[aesthetics’] task is to divest itself, in opposition to all imposed 
order, both of hopeless natural necessity, and chaotic contingency” (Adorno 150). In 
order to understand the nature and implications of this shift, we now turn to a work 
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that that undoubtedly exercised a significant (though not explicitly admitted) influence 
over The Birth of Tragedy: Frederic Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man211.  
This connection is notably under-discussed by commentators212. 
Hammermeister points to this indebtedness as part of an attempt to demonstrate the 
unoriginality of Nietzsche’s aesthetics (142-3), but discussions of play are almost wholly 
absent from both Nicholas Martin’s full-length study of the Nietzsche-Schiller 
connection, and either Brent Kaver or Adrian Del Caro’s (1989) shorter discussions. And 
though Paul Bishop and R.H Stephenson’s masterly study of Nietzsche and Weimar 
Classicism addresses the connection, attributing Nietzsche’s conception of the aeon as 
a child at play directly to Aesthetic Education,213 the point is not elaborated to any great 
extent. 
Schiller’s conception of play follows Kant insofar as he conceives of it as free 
activity that is its own ‘end’. In framing the phenomena, he builds upon Kant’s division 
between art and mere labour or ‘drudgery’ (CJ §43) – putting aside the epistemological 
element in favour of a more practical approach to ‘play’. The division between the 
aesthetic and the determinative in Kantian cognitive theory is traced back to an origin 
in the world, and to two different orders of activity that map onto this division. Schiller 
envisages a boundary that the living creature crosses over when its activities are no 
longer governed by the “physical seriousness” of the ‘unfree’ nature-world- no longer 
ruled by “the sanction of need” (AE §27:105). The merely animal life is one that is lived 
enslaved to blind desire: it is ‘passive’ and governed entirely by natural causation. All its 
activity is aimed towards the alleviation of want, of instinctual needs that the embodied 
creature experiences as lack. But when it is freed of this dominion, when all animal want 
is satiated, the creature’s actions can transcend desire and act under “the sanction of 
superfluity”: “the animal works when privation is the mainspring of its activity, and it 
plays when the fullness of its strength is this mainspring, when superabundant life is its 
own stimulus to activity”. 
                                                 
211 There is little doubt that Nietzsche read Aesthetic Education while at school (Brobjer 44) and Nicholas Martin 
draws a close association between the Form Treib and Sinnlicher Treib outlined in the le tters, and the Apollonian 
and Dionysian (56-8). But the work’s influence over Nietzsche’s early aesthetics is not universally accepted by 
scholarship (cf. Nicholas Rennie argument that Birth owes its aesthetic sensibilities to Lessing’s Laokoon, for e.g. 
(186)).  
212 At least in the Anglophone sphere. 
213 See Bishop and Stephenson 52 n.8 
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  Aesthetic activity emerges as the highest form of this play, when the human, 
“not content with what simply satisfies Nature and meets her need, demands 
superfluity” in order to satisfy her “formal [play] instinct […] to extend her enjoyment 
beyond every need” (§27:104-5). 
 Superfluity expresses itself as “superabundant life”, and Schiller’s presentations 
of it in the nature-world is illustrated through the fecundity of spring, in poetic images 
that clearly prefigure the Dionysian vision offered in works like “The Greek Music 
Drama” (see §1.2): 
The insect swarms with joyous life in the sunbeam; and it is surely not the cry of desire 
that we hear in the melodious warbling of the song-bird […] the tree puts out innumerable 
buds which perish without developing […] what the tree returns from its lavish profusion 
unused and un-enjoyed to the kingdom of the elements, the living creature may squander 
in joyous movements. So, nature gives us even in her material realm a prelude to the 
infinite, and even here partly casts off the chains (AE §27:105) 
In the state of play, the animal expends the excess energy that nature has invested it 
with: a vitality that courses through the creature and animates it. The animal expresses 
this energy in a form that has no other meaning than as a delighted display of power in 
excess. Take for example the lion, whose “idle energy creates for itself an object; he fills 
the echoing desert with his high spirited roaring, and his exuberant power enjoys itself 
in purposeless display” (AE §27:105). Play is the ecstatic “free movement” by which the 
creature “simply delights in its absolute and unfettered power” (106).  
The significance of ‘revelling in one’s power’ for Nietzsche’s thought is obvious, 
but we also see a direct association drawn between superfluity and play in a Nachlass 
fragment from 1885 (contemporary with book 4 of Zarathustra): “’Play’, what is useless 
(Unnnützliche), as the ideal of someone who is overfull of strength, as childlike […] παῖϛ 
παίζων [a child at play]214” (WP §797). Like Kant, Nietzsche here offers play as the 
distinguishing mark of “the phenomenon ‘artist’”, and Schiller too identifies play in its 
purest form with aesthetic activity. However, the caveat ‘purest’ marks a critical divide 
between Nietzsche and Schiller - for in Schiller’s eyes, aesthetic play is transcendent of 
the ‘merely natural’ phenomena of “physical play”. Play as exhibited by animals - and by 
humans so long as they remain bound to their “purely animal life” - is “still of a material 
                                                 
214 Referencing Heraclitus XCIV 
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kind and declares itself by simple natural laws”, while the truly free play of the aesthetic 
is reachable only by a “leap” away from nature and animality:
 “A leap we must call it, since the wholly new force now comes into play; here, for the 
first time, the legislative faculty [reason] interferes with the operations of a blind instinct 
[…] so long as Nature, which knows no law other than hurrying restlessly from variation 
to variation, is still too powerful, it will oppose that necessity [of lawful reason]” (AE 
§27:106) 
The infinite - total freedom from “external sensuous restraint” though a world of 
“independent creative power” - is only attainable for humans. Animal play can merely 
gesture towards that promise.  
 It is not only the ‘un-freedom’ of determining desires that must be overcome, but 
the restriction of the individuated world of change, and of difference. The wild, 
subconscious animal imagination must always remain trapped in the flux of what is 
“variable”, “arbitrary”, ‘indigent’, ‘insatiable’ in its “unrest”, all that is forever “hurrying 
restlessly from variation to variation”- in short, all that is “sensuous”. The animal’s play 
act is partially free, in so far as it is not occasioned or conditioned by desire; in it, the 
creature “is already approaching independence, at least from a distance” (AE §27:105). 
But only reason, in stepping in to ‘control’ the imagination, grants access to what is 
‘truly free’- the infinite world of “immutable and eternal unity” that lies behind the 
individuated, sensate world of natural immanence (106). We find here an almost 
religious vision, a metaphysic that looks to art to ‘liberate’ us from our enslavement to 
nature and desire. Animal instinct corrupts play and keeps us tied to our un-freedom: 
“the aesthetic play impulse [is] hardly recognisable yet in its first attempts, as the 
sensuous impulse, wherever it appears, is incessantly interfering, with its headstrong 
caprice and its savage appetite” (pp.106-7). Only aesthetic man, who with the help of 
reason raises himself above nature, can realise the promise of play.  
Play, for Schiller, thus gestures away from nature and towards the infinite that is 
its opposite. But for Nietzsche, the aesthetic gestures the other way, and in the 
phenomenon ‘artist’, we see straight through “to the basic instincts of power, nature, 
etc” (WP §797). He too sees this as a gesture towards the infinite – but it is the infinite 
as source; the origin of all that lives, not the ethereal, unbounded unity that lies beyond 
a limited and unfree nature world. Schiller’s animal strains to escape its bonds, grasping 
out for the freedom that will come when its enslaving, conditioning law bound 
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animality no longer determines it: when the ‘forms’ its action takes is no longer passively 
derived from nature. For, in being tied to the nature world, its actions are still governed 
by ends- even in animal play, “which is itself ends and means” it has not reached “the 
lofty freedom of the beautiful, above the fetters of every purposed end” (AE §27:105). 
But if, like Nietzsche, we conceive of a nature world without organisms that ‘unfree’ 
actions might serve; without a mesh of embodied ‘ends’; without ‘given forms’ that tie 
action passively to the determinations of nature – in short, a world in which nothing is 
ever ‘means to an end’ but is always both means and end combined - then does talk of 
‘breaking free’ from determination and enslavement towards unfree ends not lose its 
meaning? 
Throughout the Free Spirit works, we see Nietzsche attempting to develop a new 
theory of ‘causes’ to do away with the Kantian notion of ‘purposive causation”. In GS 
§360, Nietzsche holds up as “one of my most essential steps forward” the realisation that 
we are prone to mistake “causation” for “cause”: to look at the notion of cause from 
entirely the wrong end of an action (GS §360:225). To seek for the cause of an event 
should be to look for its origin- the “driving force” behind it. But a “very ancient error” 
means that we have become habituated to seek for this instigating cause at the end of 
an act instead of its beginning: in its goal or purpose. Purposive causation holds events 
to be determined by their goals: I am hungry, so I find food and eat it – the instigating 
cause (hunger) determines the end (finding food). In this way, purposiveness marks the 
action as ‘unfree’: the path that I take to that goal- the ‘causality’ of steps between it and 
me- would also be determined by that goal. But Nietzsche argues that a goal is not a 
“cause of acting” but rather “the cause of acting in a certain way, in a certain direction”. 
Instead, he holds that all events are the result of an overabundance that must be 
expended: “a quantum of damned up energy waiting to be used up somehow, for 
something”. All ‘causes’ are identical (save in the volume and intensity of the 
overabundance that seeks after discharge). Overabundance has no ‘intention’ 
determining how it will expend itself: It is simply necessary that it does so. The quantum 
has no intentional, predetermined goal in its expenditure (save to expend) and the ‘ends’ 
towards which the action is (apparently) directed should be seen as “quite insignificant, 
mostly a small accident in accordance with which this quantum ‘discharges’ itself”. The 
quantum is driven only to express its energy; it only needs a means through which to 
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manifest that drive. And ‘the event’ is merely that opportunity. It is the ‘match’ that 
allows the keg to explode.  
Consider the analogy of a river: it begins as a mountain pool and ends where its 
great delta meets the sea. Is that delta its ‘purpose’? Is that purpose the cause of the 
river? The river was, in fact, ‘caused’ when the pool grew too full for its bounds, 
overpowered and overflowed their restraints, and began to discharge itself. And it is 
Nietzsche’s reasoning that we should place just as little emphasis on the apparent 
‘motivation’ behind an event as we do on the weakness of the pool’s edge that was the 
site of the first overflow:  
Among these small accidents and matches I consider all so-called 'purposes' as well as the 
even more so-called 'vocations': they are relatively random, arbitrary, nearly in- different 
in relation to the enormous force of energy that presses on, as I said, to be used up 
somehow” (GS §360:225). 
We are ‘driven’ to eat, or mate, or fight? No. We are ‘driven’ to expend. These are simply 
the forms that expenditure happens to take. But can we really take this seriously as an 
understanding of biological life? Does this adequately serve to efface the difference 
between the ‘serious’ and apparently highly regular and restricted actions of survival, 
and the care-free ‘fröhliche’ play-act? All action may well result from ‘overabundance’- 
and thus be technically play, by Schiller’s definition- but surely, we cannot view the 
struggle against starvation in the same light as a child’s game? Here we should recall 
the answer Nietzsche ventriloquized into the mouth of Heraclitus- ‘do not act so 
pathetically’. The reason that we view these events so differently is because we believe 
that they have consequences beyond themselves: if I do not eat, I will die. If I do not 
play, I will be bored. These are not the same thing. But it is only our pathos that 
differentiates them. 
 As Nietzsche puts it in the 1886 notes, when Life “draws a lot out of the urn, and 
it is not death, [what is drawn] is neither designed nor undersigned, but […] chance, 
that means without prior intention”; and what is drawn is simply “the conditions of … 
further existence”215. Think of the stream as it trickles around roots and stones, seeking 
for a path to cut. Every instant of its flow repeats the moment of its first overflowing; 
every moment it is bound to either overcome, or be overcome by, the resistance it faces. 
                                                 
215 KGW i.4 556. trans and cited Hill 89 
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No ‘chain of causation’ is at play here; rather “every power draws its ultimate 
consequence at every moment” (Moles 212). Expend the energy and keep flowing or be 
overcome and cease. That, to Nietzsche’s Heraclitean eye, is all that is at play in the 
world: from the smallest to the largest phenomena, there is nothing but this dynamic 
confrontation of forces, playing itself out on multitudinous levels of reality. In GS §127, 
Nietzsche marks the belief that “no suffering of an effect is ever pure and without 
consequences” as one of the “Aftereffects of the Oldest Religiosity”: the “primordial 
mythology” that sees our will as something real and persistent in time (121). This same 
mythology led early humans to believe that (for example) natural disasters were the 
result of displeased gods: that some prior wrong had ‘caused’ a present retribution. This 
is precisely the ‘pathos’ that we apply to all events: because we (mistakenly) believe that 
we are discrete, existing wills, we believe that actions carry consequences for future 
events: “the feeling of will suffices for him to assume cause and effect, but also to believe 
that he understands their relation”. 
 Do we mourn those streams that fail, dry up before they reach the sea? Do we 
think it a cruel game of fate for them to end in swamps or lakes and never see the delta? 
Clearly not.  So why do we assign more significance to acts that continue to (or rather 
appear to us to) support the organism - that ‘drain into’ the ‘telos’ of the river’s delta? 
Only because we assume that this end or that outcome is somehow more important 
than another, when in fact all that matters in the playing of the game is that it continues 
to be played. If we understand the motions of the world in terms of aesthetic play, an 
act that finds its only ‘purpose’ in its very enactment, then we have envisaged a world 
that is its own continually manifesting self-justification. At every moment, it does 
precisely what it is ‘supposed to’, fulfilling its only aim and ‘goal’ in every instant216.  
Nietzsche extends ‘free play’ to all of existence by presenting a picture of a world 
in which the idea of a coercive, external determinism conditioning events is 
                                                 
216 Perhaps we may object that a tributary is better if it feeds into something ‘grander’, that the internal logic of 
the game itself encourages us to see more value in those tributaries that have overcome enough to develop into 
sublime, picturesque rapids or majestic canyons. However, this is to privilege complex constellations that arise 
from multitudinous incidental force actions over those actions themselves: a valuation that is bound to arise in a 
being that judges itself to be the example par excellence of such complex systems. In truth, we have no grounds 
(save anthropocentric arrogance) to claim the ‘unity’ of the river (a unity that we ourselves impose or overlay onto 
things) as the ‘aim’ and ‘purpose’ of these aimless, purposeless events.  
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meaningless. But he also does away with the idea of a ‘free agent’ acting according to 
‘choice’, dismissing the idea that ‘we’ exist as the sovereign helmsman of the ship of our 
lives as “a beautifying pretext, a self-deception of vanity after the fact that does not want 
to acknowledge that the ship is following the current” (225). The ship “certainly has a 
direction”, but perhaps this is just the current, and there is “no helmsman whatsoever?” 
Even if there is, how can we be sure what ‘its’ free will would be? Perhaps “it ‘wills’ to go 
that way because it – must?” Not only the organism, but now even the ‘willing agent’ is 
just a shadow, a ‘result’ rather than a cause of anything.  But can we say that Nietzsche 
has totally removed the subject from his world? What about the ‘artistically creative 
subject’ that “On Truth” saw as the origin of all discrete objects? What is it that ‘gives 
form’ to manifolds of difference to create the semblance of organisms? The answer to 
this lies in the world of forces, and the nature of the ‘quanta’ that are the ‘subjects’ of all 
action. 
 
§3.3 Illusion and the Aesthetic Self 
 
The analogy of the river offered in the previous section embodies what Alistair Moles 
dubs an “occasionalist”217 understanding of necessity218. Each ‘event’ of power 
fluctuations is understood to be simply the occasion for some expenditure of power, 
one which is entirely embodied and expended in its moment of enactment. The only 
thing that arises from each occasion is the necessity of subsequent occasions. This 
(ostensibly) prevents the unbroken succession of events from becoming a causal chain, 
in which each event conditions the next: it necessitates the next but has no control or 
influence over it. In this way, each event immediately accomplishes its end (the 
displacement of force) in its means (force displacing). In each moment, the universe is 
purposive towards the resolution of that moment of harmonic tension, and each 
subsequent moment is just a fresh tension occasioned by the prior shift of forces. In 
their ‘totality’, all these occasions are aimless, but in their individual occasions, they are 
                                                 
217 This should be differentiated from the theological meaning of this term outlined by Kant in CJ §81, which 
holds God (and not any earthly conditions) to be the only true cause of any event.  
218 See Moles 207-222 
~ 160 ~ 
 
the absolute expression of their momentary necessity. All is expended in the occasion, 
and thus necessity never ‘totalises’ out into a rigid, grand uniformity: the universe as a 
whole “does not maximise itself. Yet every force within the universe maximises itself […] 
and consequently necessity is the rule. The necessity of the universe is the totality of 
such ‘local’ necessities” (Moles 218). So we have a universe that is, taken together, 
purposeless, but that is absolute necessity in all its ‘local’ iterations. Beyond their own 
(contingent) ‘characters’ “there is no constraint or necessity governing the behaviour of 
power-quanta, nor are there external principles governing their actions” (179). 
In Grimm’s estimation, this absolute expenditure of necessity in the moment 
shows that the theory of the ‘will to power’ emerged to supersede and nullify the 
Heraclitean ‘unity’. If we are to keep necessity isolated to within events, there can be no 
question of the force world being anything other than “isolated power centres” acting 
upon one another (Grimm 175). He firmly emphasises the ‘monadic’ quality of each 
quantum event, as well as the absolute isolation of the individual quanta in their loosely 
aligned ‘constellations’ (pp.171-2). However, this threatens to reduce the force world to 
something like atomism- wholly isolated units acting, collectively, with complete 
arbitrariness. Life is, once again, a “fragment and riddle and fearful chance” (Z II§21). 
Grimm recognises this and tries to avoid it by re-iterating that the quanta are wholly 
“dynamic and relational”- that they have no existence except that which emerges in 
their relation to the other quanta and are thus “unified through necessary reliance” 
(172). This means that the ‘splendid isolation’ he tries to invest the quanta with is 
impossible, since all changes in the force world dynamically affect all its quanta: 
the balance of power between forces in any neighbourhood219 is the momentary occasion 
for a new balance. The changes in one neighbourhood occasion changes in the next. Even 
a small change in the balance of power at one point may lead to big changes in another 
point (Moles 212). 
In the Heraclitean sense: ‘ἓν πάντα εἶναί”220. 
 The problem that we arrive at here is how the local necessities of each force 
moment can be prevented from ‘totalising’ into a ‘rigid, universal necessity’. The answer 
                                                 
219 Moles’ term for ‘constellations’ of quanta: one which advances over Grimm’s in so far as it emphasises the 
looseness of the quanta, but loses a lot of the quality of arrangement that seems important to an understanding of 
them as ‘power centres’ rather than simply quanta adjacent in space.  
220 ‘all things are one’ 
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to this is ‘chance’, the element of ‘chaos’ in the universe that “saves the world from 
becoming petrified into being and moral finality” (Williams 342). Raymond Williams’ 
study pays a great deal of attention to this tension, and (contra Grimm) forwards 
Heraclitus’ harmoníā of opposites as the answer: an idea of unity that resists becoming 
singular and absolute; that 
is not metaphysical in so far as it is not a closed totality, as it does not congeal into a 
system […] opposing terms constantly change roles and intertwine in an endless play of 
compensations of successful or failed attempts at equilibrium (Haar, cited Williams 344).  
Chance ‘disrupts’ the mechanistic patterns of necessity, preventing it from ‘congealing 
over’ into a teleological determination. But the question is, where does this ‘chance’ 
reside? And does its introduction not ‘break’ the necessity of the world and reduce it 
once more to fragment? 
 Moles answer takes the form of a Heraclitean ‘is-and-is-not’. Having said that all 
necessity is local and never totalises (218), he immediately turns around to say that “At 
the local level, chance is everywhere; but when the whole universe is considered, every 
event is strictly necessary” (219). This dichotomy is justified by saying that ‘chance’ and 
‘necessity’ are differentiated by perspective. ‘Necessity’ is that which is “inner” to the 
quanta- what is ‘within its domain of control’- while chance is what is “external” to it: 
“other forces are beyond its domain: they are chance”. The ‘inner necessity’ of some 
‘force centre’ is confronted by forces outside its control- but since this ‘other’ is just a 
competing necessity, we have a world in which the ‘sea of chaos’ is revealed as 
contrasting necessities. Individually, from the perspective of their rivals, they appear as 
chance. But taken together, each is a manifestation of its own absolute necessity. As a 
result of this competing necessary perspectives, “the universe cannot be transformed 
permanently into a single inner necessity. It is in this sense that Nietzsche calls the 
universe essentially chance”. Each force acts to maximise itself at the expense of all the 
others and this continual grabbing for resources means that no one quanta can ever 
come to define the whole of the force world: “for the killer will be killed in his turn […] 
conflict is justice” (Heraclitus LXXXII). 
 This is a compelling construction, and one that seems to fit the criteria we set 
ourselves in discussing the ‘world-artist’s’ redemptive perspective. Unlike the nous, we 
are not required to adopt a special perspective dependent on a certain frame of mind 
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(dispassionate ‘awe’ for the ‘beauty’ of the universe). Instead, just have to understand 
that those things that encounter us as ‘evils’ are no more nor less ‘right’ and ‘necessary’ 
than the things we regard as ‘good’ (our own so called ‘desires’). Moles’ emphasis on the 
predatory nature of the process clearly has precedent in Nietzsche’s writings on the 
subject221, and the image of forces greedily grabbing for more corresponds with the 
images of nature’s deluge (explored in chapter one of this study). However, Moles’ 
presentation threatens to overstep the fine line between a Nietzschean image of this 
process and the Schopenhaurian/Darwinian one – into an image of nature as a vicious 
grabbing after finite resources, rather than an ‘innocent’ striving after ‘more’. Given that 
Nietzsche is so concerned to maintain the ‘innocence’ of becoming and the ‘Agon’ in 
the face of the grim, victimising ‘antagonism’ of the individual alone in a sea of 
viciousness, this seems like a dangerous border to blur. And when combined with the 
language of ‘inner and outer’ -of what is under control and what is not- Moles’ 
presentation of chance becomes alarmingly reminiscent of Epictetus. It would seem that 
‘love of fate’ thereby becomes an injunction to ‘resign ourselves’ to the necessity of the 
events that overpower and destroy us. In addition, we are left to ask ‘if all chance is 
merely necessity misinterpreted, then does chance really exist? Would this mistake be 
‘remedied’ by the ‘correct metaphysical perspective’?” Moles seems to have opened 
Nietzsche up to the possibility that, from the perspective of a ‘god’, all chance would be 
rendered illusory – ‘necessity improperly interpreted’. 
 On top of these issues, Moles’ presentation leaves us with the pressing question 
with which we concluded the last chapter. What can these worlds of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ 
actually mean, in a world that cannot permit of boundaries? Nietzsche is clear in his 
presentation of the wholly quantitative world of the forces: “there is no form in nature, 
because there is no distinction between inner and outer”222; in the force world, “it is only 
a matter of degrees and quantities”223 and what we have been calling ‘quanta’ have no 
discrete existence. They are simply ‘concentrations’ in the force matrix, differentiated 
only by their relative coordinates with respect to the rest of the matrix. Much like 
colours (our experiences of differing intensities [frequencies] of light) they are ‘defined’ 
                                                 
221 See for e.g. WP §728, GS §3 
222 [144] 
223 [80] 
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only as relative stations along a contiguous spectrum. And like colours, it becomes 
impossible to definitively say where one starts and another ends. Moreover, we find that 
since they only exist relationally, they are in fact only really ‘existent’ ‘for and through’ 
all of the rest of the force world: they nowhere exit as ‘things’ but only as ‘effect’: “the 
power quanta are at each moment what they do” (Grimm 179)224. Given all of this, we 
are left to question what we can regard as ‘inner’, and if we can call anything truly 
‘external’ to a quantum if it is defined only in relation to all other quanta.  
 The answer to this would seem to lie in the ‘constellations’, the ‘domains’ of 
control that a quantum gathers as it draws towards others, compelled by pleasure. 
Nietzsche seems to see something like ‘form’ emerging as the relations that the quanta 
develop as they draw together, and this could easily map onto the definition of ‘inner’ 
that Moles offers as ‘under the quantum’s control’. If this is the case however, then we 
are faced with an even more serious objection to Mole’s emphasis on ‘dominion’ and 
‘subjugation’. The idea that quanta ‘appropriate’ one another, overpowering and 
drawing them into their dominion is clearly a part of the way that forces interact. But 
to conceive of this as a ‘conquest’ in the way Moles does would be to say that one quanta 
‘devours’ another- that one specific quanta is the ‘hub’ or ‘unity’ of these constellations 
under whose power all others are subsumed. ‘It’ overpowers and devours, adding power 
to itself. In contrast to this, an 1885 note on the nature of the ‘subject ego’ seems to offer 
a different model for understanding power centres: “A kind of aristocracy of ‘cells’ in 
which dominion resides […] an aristocracy of equals, used to ruling jointly and 
understanding how to command […] the subject as multiplicity” (WP §490). To say that 
one quanta ‘devours’ another would be to say that it’s the two quanta’s ‘difference’ was 
cancelled. But Nietzsche is clear that “Individual power is by no means surrendered […] 
the opponent has not been vanquished, incorporated, disintegrated” (WP §624).  
In this respect, Grimm’s constellation model offers a better explanation. The 
constellations never ‘congeal’ into a cohesive unit, but remain in loose associations, 
retaining their individual drives for more power. Like the organism, they are a 
                                                 
224 See also WP §635: “we eliminate these adjuncts, nothing remains over but dynamic quanta, in a relation of 
tension to all other dynamic quanta: the essence of which resides in their relation to all ot her quanta, in their 
‘influence’ upon the latter” 
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multiplicity whose individual drives happen to coincide with and promote those of its 
associated fellows. The ‘power domains’ thus only exist in so far as these associations 
continue- as long as the bonds of pleasure that draw them together (the increase of 
power they get from their association) are not countered by the differences pushing 
them apart. The differing quanta effects that make up the constellation remain 
compelled to their necessity, and these differing necessities must be kept in equilibrium, 
“if the power constellation is to maintain its integrity” (Grimm 162). This means that 
nowhere is there anything truly ‘inner’ in the sense that Moles argues for. The 
distinction arises only in the structure (since the quanta themselves have no ‘self 
existence’ to be external to), and even here, nothing is truly ‘under control’ or ‘subdued. 
The quanta remain in competition with one another, and so the ‘chance’ that Moles 
locates ‘outside’ the constellation is also present ‘within’ it. 
Imagine the allegory of a political union. Perhaps the admittance of a new 
member strains relations or resources to breaking point. Perhaps a state has simply been 
waiting for its opportunity to secede, or for a neighbour to be weakened. In each case, 
the prospect for the dissolution of the union comes from within, arising from changes 
in the dynamics of their interrelations. An empire is as likely to fall to internal divisions 
as it is to external threat: to call ‘chance’ that which diminishes a constellation and to 
locate it in some external ‘other’ offers an incomplete picture. The movements of the 
force world should be considered as statecraft rather than warfare, which is only a very 
limited aspect of that craft. In the same way that an invasion might be decided as much 
by internal strife weakening a defender’s resistance, the greater force of one centre 
trying to pull in another is only one half of the equation. We might just as easily envisage 
a state breaking away to join another, compelled by the prospect of greater power. This 
movement would come down to the ‘pleasure’ of that state, rather than the 
overwhelming acquisitive desire of the other. This model is not available to Moles, 
because in his construction, forces in the physical world cannot dissimulate. There is 
thus no capacity to move past the ‘warfare’ analogy and develop a ‘diplomacy’ of forces 








Self as ‘Cyber Art’ 
 
For Moles, inorganic forces can confront each other only “nakedly”, which he takes to 
mean ‘in their fullness and without ambiguity’: “Only in the atypical realm of organisms 
is there hiding and deception” (212). But when we consider that the way a quantum acts 
is down to its ‘contingent character’, to the way its memories have conditioned it to 
interpret sensation, this idea of ‘nakedness’ becomes far less clear-cut. Critically, the 
‘contingent’ nature of this character should be firmly emphasised: Nothing is ‘fixed’ or 
‘essential’. Nietzsche insists that these characters are not simply the cumulative sum of 
all the quantum’s prior memories, and while it seems he believes all memories to exert 
some degree of influence over a quantum - that no memory ever disappears entirely225 - 
he is also clear that “it is just as impossible to speak of unerring memory as it is to speak 
of an absolutely purposive action produced by natural laws”226. The influence of 
memories over the reception of sensations varies, and the character that arises from 
them is subject to “change” through the development and interaction of memories; 
which, “depending on the nature of the attack [encounter] it [the quanta] stresses, re-
enforces, and employs for the benefit of the whole”227. We are told that “this must be an 
artistic power. For it creates” by “omitting, overlooking, failing to hear”228, and that 
“memory thrives on this activity and constantly practices it. Misapprehension is the 
primordial phenomenon”229.  
 This ‘omitting’ and ‘overlooking’ seems to go against Moles’ conception of ‘naked’ 
force encounters. Indeed it is hard to see how forces can encounter one another ‘without 
hiding’ when the very ‘characters’ that are responsible for their interactions are the 
result of this process of mediation. While this ‘artistic forgetting’ is more prevalent and 
complex in organic systems - and can even reach the level of wholesale distortions of 
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the sense world230 - there is no reason to believe it is any less a factor in inorganic forces. 
Indeed earlier in his treaties, Moles cites §36 of Beyond Good and Evil in which Nietzsche 
conceives of the inorganic world as “a preform of life”: a “kind of life of drives […] with 
self-regulation, assimilation, nourishment, excretion, and metabolism”231. Given that 
‘memories’ (as they are discussed in the force notes) are simply reverberations of 
sensation persisting in the force constellations themselves, we can easily conceive of the 
memory’s ‘artistic process’ of creative forgetting and emphasising as a part of this 
primordial, inorganic ‘self-regulation’232.  
 If the quanta’s memory were invariable, then their habitual character would be 
the mechanical accretion of its prior experiences. But given the capacity to ‘artistically 
forget’, we see that the necessity of the quanta – their habitual character that shapes 
their interpretation of sensations – is bound up with an element of contingency. We are 
told that necessity means “a force cannot be anything other than what it is” (WP §639). 
But ‘what it is’ is not essential and invariant, and while the quanta are bound by 
necessity to interpret according to their character, that character is itself the product of 
a contingent process of selective forgetting. We are faced with two significant problems 
here. The first is that this would appear to make necessity a hostage of chance. If 
contingency ‘decides’ the grounds of necessity, then randomness holds precedent over 
necessity. The second problem is that in framing this process as ‘artistic selection’, we 
seem to have ‘smuggled’ anthropomorphic bias back into the force world. If there is an 
artistic selection process, then what does the selecting? Does the existence of an artistic 
force “then presuppose the existence of a perceiving being?”233 A kind of ‘artistic 
agency’? 
 The best way to reach an answer to the former is through an investigation of the 
latter. Nietzsche’s aesthetic traces the ‘acting agent’ to its origin in Apollo, whose realm 
is built upon the concept of ‘self-identity’: “[Apollo] knows only one law, the individual, 
                                                 
230 GS§316 for example points to the way that memories can trigger ‘flashbacks’ that serve as a kind of 
premonition- replacing one sensation with a completely different one on the grounds of a strongly recalled 
association: like when an animal feels the coming of a storm: “their pains are prophets for them […] they do not 
see bad weather as weather, but as an enemy whose hands they can already feel” 
231 Cited Moles pp.154-5. 
232 This is further backed up by a series of notes from 1885: see WP §642-644, 646, and esp. 658: “The organic 
functions translated back to the basic will, the will to power-and understood as offshoots”. 
233 [143] 
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that is, respect for the limits of the individual, moderation in the Hellenic sense” 
(BT§2:31). The ‘boundary stones’ of self-identity are placed upon the unitary plain of the 
Dionysian realm, creating the world of individuation: 
for Apollo wants to bring individuals to rest precisely by drawing boundaries between 
them, boundaries which his demand for self-knowledge and moderation impress upon us 
again and again as the most sacred laws of the world (BT§?:58). 
Like stones marking the boarders of kingdoms, the boundaries produced by Apollo 
divide what is materially undivided, and much like geopolitical boarders, they exist only 
as idea- an ‘idea’ that is easily swept away by the violence of Dionysus:  
all that until then was known as boundary, setting of limits, shows itself here as artificial 
illusion […] in the self-forgetting of the Dionysian states the individual with his limits and 
proportions was lost (DW II:88). 
But how are we to understand the illusory nature of Apollo? If this world is illusion in 
the pejorative sense, then how do we explain the (apparently oxymoronic) claim that 
“the god of beautiful illusion must be simultaneously the god of true insight [der wahren 
Erkenntnis]” (I:81)? Why is it that the god of a non-existent dream-fantasy should lead 
us to true insight, and not the god whose festivals dispel that dream? 
 Peter Sloterdijk offers an explanation of the Apollo/Dionysus divide that is 
productive for understanding this apparent paradox. Looking at the world of laws and 
social customs that are only able to arise out of a respect for limit and moderation, 
Sloterdijk proposes that we interpret the Apollonian in terms of a “cybernetic”; a sort of 
‘artificial augmented reality’ that humans overlay onto the Dionysian world in order to 
exist in it as humans (as social, verbal, cumulative, knowing creatures). Rather than 
representing a mystical, metaphysical ‘dualism’- a realm of deception between a 
transcendent reality and us - Apollo is  
nothing other than the necessity of imprinting upon the amorphous compulsion of 
Dionysian forces and the chaotic multiplicity of the individual a controlling form, which 
is ruled by the law of ‘moderation’, individuality, self-limitation, and rationality [… it is] 
the self-regulation of life in the ‘intermediate worlds’ of endurable homeostasis (Sloterdijk 
1898 pp.80-1). 
The Apollonian ‘illusion’ world is not ‘real’ because it does not exist in the physical world 
of undifferentiated energy; just as the information on a computer does not ‘exist’ in the 
world of atoms and electrons. But this does not mean that they have no existence, nor 
does it imply a metaphysical duality (in the sense that Nietzsche is concerned with) 
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between the atom-world and the cyber-world. If we return to the example of the 
geopolitical border, we may well say that this boundary has no ‘material reality’- that it 
is an invisible line on a non-existent map: an ‘illusion’. And indeed territories ‘exist’ only 
in the human’s head- all boundary stones would lose their significance if humans were 
to disappear. We might well “boldly assert: outside my brain it has no reality”. But that 
does not mean that these immaterial lines do not have as much reality as anything we 
might claim to be ‘truly, materially real’. 
 The world of the cybernetic is an interpretation of the play of forces translated 
into the human head, and the dream-world it produces is that which the mind idealises 
the real to be, in both the philosophic and lay senses of the term. In it “we delight in the 
immediate understanding of shape [Gestalt]; all forms speak to us; there is nothing 
unimportant or superfluous” as we transform the undifferentiated matter of a chaotic 
world into the “universally intelligible” (DW I: 81). It is the world filtered to become 
comprehensible: “what calls itself reality in the context of institutional discourse234 can 
be nothing other than a reality in place of reality, an Apollonian explanation, 
ritualization, institutionalisation of the foundations of the world (Weltgrundes) in 
accordance with the criteria of endurability and predictability.” (Sloterdijk 1989 76). But 
by itself this is simply a discussion of human psychology: of the need for one particular 
species to inhabit a world of boundaries and demarcations. Left to this, it would seem 
to feed the pejorative reading of illusion, re-enforcing the image of a poor, simple 
creature oblivious to the ‘Truth’ that its dreams hide from it. But Apollo is not 
exclusively a human god- both he and Dionysus stand equally as ‘voices that speak from 
the heart of nature’. Grimm reminds us that this schematising, interpretative process is 
not exclusive to consciousness- nor it to be understood as an entirely ‘mental’ 
phenomenon. Plants, for example, engage in a process of discriminating and ordering in 
every part of their ‘life-expression’: the ivy reaches and pulls in order to grow, seeks out 
favourable conditions and shrinks from unfavourable ones (Grimm 74). It thus exists in 
its own ‘cybernetic’ of valuations, ordered according to its needs, existing wholly 
without anything like a mind or a consciousness to ‘project’ or ‘house’ it. 
                                                 
234 Here meaning the world ordered into systems of social, conceptual, and linguistic convention 
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 When understood in the context of Nietzsche’s critique of the organism, we see 
that not only does this ‘ordering process’ not require a conscious agent, but that the -as 
it were- ‘material agent’ is also only a result of this process, and not its originator. The 
idea that the human cybernetic is the ‘creation’ of the mind denies the fact that the 
human itself exists only as  
the crossroads; she is alive only to the extent that she is a meeting point between the 
Dionysian and the Apollonian, i.e., that she occupies the position wherein reality, in its 
incapacity to be represented, encounters the institutional ‘reality in the place of reality’ 
(Sloterdijk 1989 76). 
 The organism is an ‘idea’ of the mind, one that is created by positing a boundary 
demarcating what ‘belongs’ to the organism, and what does not. Just as the human 
‘posits’ this boundary, she is herself a boundary posited by (generated within the field 
of) the Apollonian. In forwarding his claim that the world artist must exist as a 
“noumenal perceiver to produce the phenomenal world”, Hill reasons that “it could not 
be that the agent of the construction, and the act of constructing, belonged only to the 
world of appearances and were themselves constructions”235. However, this formulation 
commits the error of assuming that an ‘act’ must follow in from an ‘actor’, something 
that Nietzsche’s revised theory of causation argues firmly against. To claim that the 
‘effect’ - ‘act’ - must arise from a cause – ‘agent’ – results from an “arbitrary division and 
dismemberment” of what is, in reality, the ‘pure act’ of the ‘event’: “Cause and effect: 
there is probably never such a duality; in truth a continuum faces us, from which we 
isolate a few pieces” (GS §112:113). One of these pieces we call the ‘actor’, which we then 
claim to have ‘given rise’ to the effect. But in truth, both are bound together as 
‘enactments’ of the event. 
 In the terms laid out by Hill, we have here a vision of the phenomenal as the 
result of an ‘act’ which is also responsible for enacting the so-called ‘agent’ of that act. 
This applies as much to the constellations of quanta as it does to organic ‘systems’ 
(which are just the exceedingly complex result a multiplicity of force events). Just like a 
human, just like a plant, a power centre exists only in so far as it enacts its existence, as 
it  
edits, arranges, schematises and simplifies the chaos which surrounds it. Each individual 
interprets a world for himself by picking out those elements of his chaos of impressions 
                                                 
235 Ralph Walker, cited Hill 98-9. 
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which are of concern to him, and by simplifying, generalising and structuring them in a 
manner most conducive to his welfare (Grimm 72). 
And, just as with the ‘human individual’, this process of artistic ‘editing’ begins with the 
most primordial of artistic processes; the artistic creation of the ‘self’. After telling us 
that there is no ‘inner and outer’ in the force world, Nietzsche then introduces a 
pregnant metaphor: “all art is based upon the mirror of the eyes”236. All form, structure, 
arrangement is the result of ‘measure’, an ‘ordering’ by relative ‘qualities’ that are 
themselves “measured according to ‘us’”237. Structure presupposes a ‘perspective’ from 
which to interpret relations into existence, but that perspective is as much the result of 
this interpretive process: “images in the human eyes! This governs the entire nature of 
the human being: from the eye! Subject!”238. The ‘eye’, the perspective of the ‘interpreting 
agent’, is an artistically generated ‘mirror’ that not only allows for the emergence of 
(relational) qualities in the ‘outside’ it reflects (through providing a point against which 
to measure these relations) but also ‘defines’ the agent to which the perspective belongs. 
 Translated into the force schema, this insight means that the ‘constellations’ that 
constitute that world’s ‘discrete perspectives’ are the result of the same ‘creative action’ 
that gives rise to its interpretation of other constellations. Its ‘identity’ is enacted purely 
in the event, which simultaneously erects the ‘boundary’ of the constellation (what is a 
‘part’ of it and what ‘belongs’ to what is being confronted), its ‘nature’ (how it ‘interprets 
itself’ into existence through the artistic selection of memories) and engenders the 
qualities of the ‘other’ it is encountering (against that created ‘self-ness’). Understood 
in this way, the ‘illusion’ of self-ness loses its mendacious connotations. Indeed, we now 
understand what Nietzsche meant when he declared “all life is founded on […] art, 
illusion, optic, the necessity of perspective and of error” (AC §5:9). The myth that Birth 
recounts of Apollo’s victory over the Titans reminds us that a world of measure, of 
proportion, indeed a world in which ‘push’ and ‘pull’ are even meaningful is “only 
possible where proportion, the boundary, becomes visible. In order to stay within the 
boundaries, one must know them: therefore, the apollonian reminder; “know thyself’” 
(DW§2:87). The illusion of qualities and of a self-ness against which to measure them 
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holds no correspondence in the ‘material’ manifestation of forces. But that 
manifestation is nothing more than their ‘effects’, which are made possible only by this 
illusion.  
 As Grimm points out, the fact that Apollo ‘falsifies’ something about the world 
“is not meant to be a pejorative. […] our erroneous judgements about the world are not 
to be thought of as 'mistakes' since there is no 'true' (ie unchanging) world about which 
we could be mistaken” (70). Since there are no ‘things’ in the world, and even the 
‘material composition’ of the world is ‘matter interpreting itself into existence’, then the 
idea of a “Truth” to set against the ‘falsehood’ of our interpretive understanding 
becomes utterly meaningless: “perspectival falsification is not an interpretation of some 
underlying reality which continues to exist regardless of how we happen to interpret. 
The world is our interpretation and nothing else” (86). In addition to explaining the 
apparent but illusory nature of the enacting agency, this understanding also explains 
how Apollo can be the ‘god of true insight’ as well as of illusion. Since “all knowing is a 
process of reflecting in quite specific forms, in forms that do not exist from the outset”239 
we see that ‘knowledge’ comes under the remit of the god whose ‘power’ generates these 
forms. In this understanding, we have the first glimpse of the new conception of 
knowledge that Nietzsche’s Free Spirit works seek to establish: knowledge based in 
understanding the aesthetic process that shapes the movements of our dynamic world. 
 
Conclusion: Towards a New Knowledge 
 
Through the Dionysian insight, we come to realise that the apparent ‘agent’ of the 
interpretive/creative act is in fact only one of that act’s ‘effects’. The ‘self’ is not 
responsible for ‘thinking’ the world into existence, “but is itself posited or created 
through a more fundamental act of thinking”; “thinking not only constructs, but is 
constructed” (Grimm pp.164-5). In this way, the ‘conscious’ human agent and its 
‘aesthetic actions’ of world-creation are just another form of the aesthetically creative 
process that ‘interprets’ the world into existence: “mind, consciousness, the thinking 
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ego etc.  are  themselves  not anything different  to  the  world, but aspects of it, and 
without any special ontological cognitive status” (154). The naturalist absorption of the 
human back into the ‘nature-word’ of forces is completed, as and with it is ended any 
idea of “the moral autonomy of the subject and the superstition of free will” (Sloterdijk 
1989 81). But this subject is not ‘dispelled’ – merely “decentred”: “released from its 
fictional central position in the moral cosmos” (82). The question of if ‘artistic action’ 
presupposes an artistic agency has been resolved. Or has it? Having ‘decentred’ the 
subject, it still seems beholden on us to show that what it is decentred ‘in favour of’ is 
not just another ‘agency’. It has been a recurrent concern of this study to show that 
whatever ‘orders’ the world it cannot be reduced to a “pantheism”, a world that is “in 
every moment logically necessary”240 for if it was, then this ‘logic’ would come to take 
the place of god as an ‘identity’ preceding existence. However we must, on the other 
hand, consider this dictate against the problems raised in allowing contingency 
precedent over necessity.   
 Both of these issues find their resolution in the aesthetic. We should recall once 
more the formulation of the aeon that creates without willing. The ‘struggle of the many’ 
bearing within it ‘law and justice’, the tension between “necessity and random play, 
oppositional tension and harmony” - all “must pair to create the work of art” (PTA §7:61). 
Nietzsche’s aesthetic is above all a ‘process of creation’, one which is itself responsible 
for creation. We should recall Adorno’s image of art as the playing out of the work’s own 
‘inner necessity’, and append this understanding to the Heraclitean vision of lawfulness 
as the immanent enactment of necessity. The ‘artistic power’ of the world gives rise to 
formations – to quanta characters, to constellations, to organic and inorganic matter – 
purely through the enactment of immanent necessity. As the world-artist builds, it 
“connects, joins and forms according to inner laws”, and the aeon ‘itself’ should be 
considered as nothing more than this lawfulness enacting itself into existence. Just as 
with the work of art, there is an ‘ordering’ (κόσμος)241 that prevents the fall into chaos 
and allows for the semblance of structure. But this ‘ordering’ is not undertaken 
according to the rigid ‘identity’ orientated logic of reason: rather, it manifests a form of 
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reason that resists this fall into rigidity; “the aim of aesthetic rationality […] is to divest 
itself, in opposition to all imposed order, of both hopeless natural necessity and chaotic 
contingency” (Adorno 150).  
 The task of a ‘new knowledge of necessity’ thus becomes an understanding of 
this rationality, of the ways that the ‘world-process’ manifests our protean world of 
becoming. Traditional ‘conceptual’ rationality – the rationality of ‘the sciences’ and 
‘logic’ – aims to grasp the ‘identity’ of the world. But an insight into the ‘truth’ of 
necessity renders this project untenable. Having established this as part of his early 
aesthetic project, Nietzsche went on to develop the Free Spirit works as both an 
elaboration on, and exercise in, a different approach to knowledge: one in line with the 
“dynamic knowing” that Heraclitus is claimed to have erected against “contemplative 

























Chapter 4: Knowledge and Aesthetics in the Free Spirit 
 
We, however, want to become who we are – human beings who are new, unique, 
incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves! To that end, we must 
become the best students and discoverers of everything lawful and necessary in the world: 
we must become physicists in order to be creators in this sense – while hitherto all 
valuations and ideals have been built upon ignorance of physics or in contradiction to it. 
So, long live physics! And even more, long live what compels us to it – our honesty! (GS 
§335:189). 
In a recent collection of essays on Nietzsche’s Free Spirit works, Duncan Large offers an 
overview of the scholarship surrounding this period (as well as studies concerned with 
Nietzsche’s aesthetics more broadly)242 to support the following characterisation: “the 
standard view of the aesthetics of the Free Spirit trilogy is that, effectively, it doesn’t 
have one” (69). The broadly accepted narrative holds that Nietzsche, motivated by 
‘embarrassment’ for his early writings and their ‘slavish devotion’ to Wagner and 
Schopenhauer, conceived of the Free Spirit as “an ‘overcoming of art’, for the duration 
[…] at least, until the re-assertion of the aesthetic paradigm with the work of art that is 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and a rebirth of interest in the Dionysian aesthetic (now very 
differently conceived from Birth)” (70). In almost all of the studies that Large cites, the 
first work of the trilogy, Human all too Human, is seen as a point of undeniable rupture: 
a clear declaration on Nietzsche’s part that he had thrown away aesthetics in the same 
motion that cast off his professorial robes and Wagner’s Treibshen circle. And indeed, 
this view point seems well founded. There is no denying that Human takes a deeply 
critical and adversarial stance on artists and their works. The task the piece sets itself of 
‘liberating’ humanity from the “blissful and blinding errors that stem from metaphysical 
and artistic ages” (§3:17) would seem to render Nietzsche’s stance on the matter 
unambiguous. And any lingering doubts would appear settled by the means that 
Nietzsche proposes to achieve this task: the development of a “genuine science, as the 
imitation of nature in concepts” (§38:47). 
                                                 
242 See Large pp.69-72 
~ 175 ~ 
 
 With Human as its opening volley, it is easy to see why scholarship on the role 
of the aesthetic is so sparse when it comes to the Free Spirit works. The acerbic critique 
of artists we find in the book, and its crowning of science as the great ally of philosophy 
would seem to show conclusively that the ‘aesthetic values’ praised in the early works 
have been dethroned. The creative ‘aesthetic’ relation to the world praised in Birth and 
“On Truth” seems to have been cast aside in favor of ‘knowledge’. The fact that we find, 
near the end of “St Januarius”, an aphorism entitled “Long Live Physics” shows that this 
commitment is as strong in the closing pages of the trilogy as it was in its opening, as it 
was at its mid-point when Dawn heaped ire upon those who “don't know what it means 
to have the insatiable longing for knowledge rule over [them] as a law” (§270:179) and 
praises them who “discover that our life is consecrated to the pursuit of knowledge” 
(§195:139). But is it right to read this turn towards ‘knowledge’ as a wholesale rejection 
of the aesthetic?  
The dismissal of ‘artistic and metaphysical ages’ would seem to be an explicit 
rejection of the ‘artist’s metaphysic’ – but as was established in chapter 2, much of what 
is assumed in the critical literature about this theory is miscast: including the idea that 
it is a ‘metaphysic’ in the sense that Nietzsche wishes to oppose. And in chapter 3, we 
saw that the ‘physics’ that he came to embrace in Human was derived from this aesthetic 
conception of the world. Moreover, it was argued that this world relies – in ways that 
we must now further examine – upon something expressly ‘aesthetic’ about its motions 
to ground two of its essential attributes: its ‘lawfulness without law’ and its ‘artistry 
without an artist’. If we look at “Long Live Physics”, we can see that these commitments 
are very much still a part of Nietzsche’s image of that subject. The aphorism rejects 
“universal laws”, heralds physics as a means to ‘creation’ and emphasises the need to 
‘give laws to ourselves’ in order to ‘create ourselves’. In this chapter, we will examine the 
Free Spirit project not as a ‘rupture’ in Nietzsche’s relation with the aesthetic but as a 
Volta, a poetical turn of descent and opposition that develops a flow of thought instead 
of invalidating and surpassing it. Far from throwing away the artistic in favour of the 
scientific, the ‘subjective’ for the ‘objective’, the Free Spirit is a process of reconciling 
and bringing back into productive harmony a view that had grown one-sided and 
unbalanced in the name of a new form of knowledge.  
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Nietzsche envisages this new knowledge as a practice, framed in allegorical terms 
as a ‘seafaring quest’. The inseparability of this knowledge from its practice shows itself 
in the ‘style’ that Nietzsche employs as means to his own quest. Large’s characterisation 
of the disjunction between the Free Spirit and ‘the artwork that is Zarathustra’ overlooks 
all that is poetic, rhetorical, and literary about the trilogy itself. A principal concern of 
this chapter will be to examine the way Nietzsche envisaged the ‘quest for knowledge’ 
through its practice in these writings, and in their culmination Thus spoke Zarathustra. 
But before we can do this, we must examine the nature of the so-called ‘scientific turn’ 
and show how it helped to develop, rather than overturn, the early writing’s aesthetic 
philosophy. In doing this, we will finally narrow in on the ‘practice’ of the aesthetic that 
is so central to Nietzsche’s thought, answering questions left hanging in the previous 
chapter and laying the groundwork for an understanding of the ‘experimental’ style of 
the Free Spirit.  
 
§4.1 Alas, All Too Human 
 
Besides Julian Young, whose reading of Human was argued against in the previous 
chapter, the other notable commentator to forcefully argue that this work represents a 
wholesale rejection of the aesthetic is Philip Pothen. In his study, Nietzsche and the Fate 
of Art, Pothen joins Young in arguing that Human serves to denounce the ‘mystical, 
irrational metaphysic’ that was the bedrock of Nietzsche’s early ‘Schopenhaurian’ 
aesthetic243. But where Young reads the work as an attempt to replace a metaphysic of 
irrational capriciousness with one of ‘intelligibility’ – in which the ‘thing-in-itself’ “can 
be known about, quite directly, by human beings” (Ridley 2007 37) – Pothen forwards a 
diametrically opposed explanation for the ‘turn to science’. Where Young understood 
the aesthetic to be too closely aligned with an arbitrary and capricious world of 
groundless flux, Pothen holds that art deforms the experience of flux through its 
inherent tendency towards stability, order, and permanence: 
Artists and their works […] fail to portray anything other than a reality severely 
circumscribed by limitations imposed by the very nature of the production of works, 
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which like language and the prejudices upon which language is based, reveal merely a 
captured moment rather than the flux of genuine experience” (Pothen 54). 
So, for one critic the scientific aims for stability and predictability, and for the other it 
seeks to put experience back in flow. But despite their antithetical readings of both the 
work’s commitments, and its principal coordinates - the artist and the scientist – they 
can be seen to overlap on one critical point. In both interpretations, the aesthetic is 
denounced in the name of a more ‘objective’ view of reality. 
 The focus on ‘objectivity’ marks an undeniable difference between Human and 
works like “On Truth” or “On the Utility and Liability of History for Life”; essays that 
firmly emphasise not only the folly, but the impossibility of seeking after an ‘objectively 
True’ perspective on the world. By the standards of these early works, everything in our 
world that claims ‘objectivity’ is, in fact, nothing more than  
A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, anthropomorphisms, in short the sum of human 
relations, which have been subjected to poetic and rhetorical intensification, translation, 
and decoration, and which, after they have been in use for a long time, strike people as 
firmly established, canonical, and binding; truths are illusions which we have forgotten 
are illusions” (TL 146). 
When contextualised in light of §3.3 of this study and its discussion of illusion, we can 
see why ‘scientific optimism’ and its promise for “the prospect of discovering the law-
governed nature of the whole solar system” (BT §15:84) were so derided by Nietzsche. 
‘Objective Truth’, the ‘stable rock’ upon which reason claims to build its universally 
valid and correct perspective, is a lie that hides the real nature of truth: that it belongs 
entirely to the realm of illusion. Once more it should be emphasised that this is not to 
be understood pejoratively: it simply means that everything that we can have knowledge 
‘about’ exists entirely relatively and referentially. It does not have ‘Being’, undeniable 
existence in and of itself, but is ‘interpreted’ into existence as a part of the dynamic play 
of force relations. And so the scientific claim for ‘objectivity’ is just a mask and a 
dangerous pretence, disguising the fact that ‘objective Truths’ are just interpretations 
like everything else- “[containing] nothing that is ’true in itself’, really and in a generally 
valid sense, regardless of mankind” (TL 147).  
 Both “On Truth” and “Uses and Disadvantages” are centrally concerned with this 
rejection of ‘historic’ and ‘scientific’ dispositions. Since an ‘objective fact’ is just a 
subjective interpretation that has forgotten it is one (or that mendaciously pretends not 
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to be one) there is no reason to privilege established ways of construing our relations to 
either our surroundings or our past over new and daring ones. Where ease and security 
encourages us to follow well-trodden interpretive pathways, “that fundamental human 
drive [to create] which cannot be left out of consideration for even a second without 
also leaving out human beings” is not satisfied with the passive reception of old 
interpretations: the caged beast grows restless, “imprisoned” in the “fortress” it built for 
its own safety (TL pp.150-1). Where meekness leads some to remain in ‘captivity’, away 
from “fearful powers which constantly press in on him and which confront scientific 
truth with ‘truths’ of quite another kind” (150), The artist and the philosopher shun that 
‘cold’ and ‘sterile’ life of easeful security for an existence of ‘free creation’ “guided, not 
by concepts but by intuition” (152). In sharp contrast to this advocacy for a life lived in 
hot, impassioned, delirious intensity, Human calls for the “quenching and cooling” of 
an age grown too hot and spiritual244. And as a means to that cooling, it champions the 
development of a ‘science of concepts’. How are we to interpret this shift? 
 Our examination of Young’s reading of Human in chapter 3 should make it clear 
that it is nonsensical to see the work as arguing for the objective validity of conceptual 
formulation. Concepts claim to directly name objects in the material world, and 
Nietzsche’s theory of physics is unequivocal in its stance that all such ideas of objective 
correspondence are not only impossible but also meaningless. Pothen’s interpretation 
agrees with this and frames the scientific quest for objectivity in terms of an elimination 
of subjective bias from our understanding of the world. It is impossible to firmly and 
objectively ‘grasp’ the world in flux but is possible to work towards eliminating those 
prejudices that encourage us to distort our relation to that world. §9 of Human tells us 
that a belief in metaphysical worlds has been able to persist because these beliefs remain 
“valuable, terrible, pleasurable” as a result of the same things that “engendered” them in 
the first place: “passion, error, and self-deception; the worst of all methods of 
knowledge, not the best of all, have taught us to believe in them” (20). Our passions 
carry us away and lead us to believe things are a certain way, because we ‘passionately 
feel’ that they are that way: 
We have Christianity, the philosophers, poets, and musicians to thank for an 
overabundance of deeply moving sensations: but to keep them from overgrowing us, we 
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have to conjure up the spirit of science which makes us on the whole somewhat colder 
and more sceptical, and in particular, cools down the scorching stream of a faith in final, 
definitive truths (HAH I §244:167-8). 
Art, alongside religion, is a choleric that enflames the passions and clouds our 
judgements. The goal of science is to let us see past this and view the world more clearly. 
 This reading has much that is valuable about it for understanding the role of 
science. But it also succumbs to a dangerous error that is closely bound up with precisely 
the problem Pothen diagnoses in the perspective of the artist. He claims that Nietzsche 
rejects the artist’s insight into the world because the ‘products’ of the artist are nothing 
but ‘reflections’ of the artist. The Scientist, on the other hand, “seek[s] knowledge of the 
world from the world without recourse to fictional embellishments and with no motive 
beyond the need to understand the world and to convey that understanding” (Pothen 
55). In claiming that science is the practice of attaining knowledge ‘about the world 
from the world’ Pothen removes the ‘interpreter’ from the process of interpretation, and 
holds that knowledge is an understanding of the world ‘in itself’, without the distorting 
‘fictional embellishments’ that we bring to that ‘in-itself’. But as the theory of forces 
makes clear, “there is no world apart from interpretations of it: the world is an 
interpretive process” (Grimm 72). To claim that we can know the world free from the 
‘distortions’ of perspective is to deny that    
Knowledge is only possible as a reflection and by measuring oneself according to one 
standard (sensation). We know what the world is: absolute and unconditional knowledge 
is the desire to know without knowledge (CW 11 19[146]:47-8) 
In seeking to remove the ‘interpreter’ from the process of knowledge, we deny the 
wholly referential nature of the world we seek to understand. And to reject wholesale 
the so-called ‘embellishments’ of interpretation is to presuppose that there is a ‘correct’ 
interpretation hidden underneath them. In truth however, Nietzsche’s theory of 
‘dynamic knowledge’ is predicated precisely on the notion that “perspectival 
falsification is not an interpretation of some underlying reality which continues to exist 
regardless of how we happen to interpret. The world is our interpretation and nothing 
else” (Grimm 86).  
 A group of interconnected aphorisms from the first chapter of Human shows 
quite clearly that Nietzsche has not moved away from this understanding in that work. 
After an aphorism on our bad mental habits which highlights the obfuscating role of 
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the feelings – our tendency to take a pleasurable outcome to say something about the 
value of an act (HAH I §30) – and another that opines that the illogical is so firmly 
bound up with “everything that lends value to life that we cannot remove it without 
thereby doing irremediable damage” (§31:39) we are presented with a further two 
aphorisms that reaffirm the premise of Nietzsche’s force theory: that all life is based in 
perspectival interpretation. §32 reminds us that all differentiation relies on measuring 
according to a standard; that this standard – the stable, self-same ‘self’ – is an arbitrary 
illusion; and that aversion and attraction are nothing but relative appraisals. §33 then 
goes on to reiterate that life is grounded in overlooking and emphasising, while §34 
starkly reiterates the definition of knowledge from the notebook fragment cited above: 
“Knowledge can allow only pleasure and pain, utility and harm to persist as motives” 
(41). Clearly Nietzsche is not advocating for the sort of ‘blank slate’ objectivity that 
Pothen appears to be arguing for. And a closer examination of the work’s attitude to art 
also seems to call into question the idea that Nietzsche regarded it as something to be 
‘purged’ from humanity in the name of a more scientific future.  
 Human’s fourth chapter is primarily concerned with art and artists, and is indeed 
centrally occupied with attacking artists for their role in keeping humanity tethered to 
the sentimental feelings it had poured into its metaphysics: “even when the Free Spirit 
has divested [itself] of everything metaphysical, the highest effects of art easily bring 
forth a sympathetic resonance from a metaphysical string, though long silenced or even 
broken” (HAH I §153:117). Young’s study also overlaps with Pothen’s in this regard, 
highlighting the role of art in encouraging humans to value feeling over intellect. He 
traces the privileged role afforded to ‘genius’ and ‘instinct’ in the early writings to a 
“Schopenhaurian reverence for the transcendence of rationality” (Young 58), and reads 
the fourth chapter of Human as an explicit rejection of this ‘mystical pseudo-rationality’. 
Young closely mirror’s Pothen’s arguments on the matter when he says that art  
Enables us to enjoy religious sentiment without the need to subscribe to any conceptual 
content – a point not only admitted but emphasised as constituting its central value by, 
in particular, Kant. Art in a secular age provides, as it were, a catacomb in which the 
religious habit of mind can continue to exist (Young 65) 
As stated before, both critics are – to an extent – correct in this assessment. But this 
view does not pay enough attention to the qualifier ‘in a secular age’ that formed part 
of Young’s summation. The aphorism that he cites as the basis for this critique (HAH I 
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§150) makes it clear that this is an affliction to which art is prone, “when religions 
decline” (116). At such times, art “takes over a multitude of feelings and moods created 
by religion, takes them to heart, and becomes itself deeper, more animated, so that it 
can communicate exultation and enthusiasm, which it was previously unable to do”.  
 The problem then is not with art per-se, so much as with its applications and the 
temptations and afflictions that it is prone to. And if we look to the name of the chapter 
that deals with aesthetic topics in the work, we get an even clearer picture of what the 
problem might be: “Aus der Seele der Künstler und Schriftsteller”; Arts religious 
deformation arises ‘from the souls of artists’. In the 1886 introductions to both volumes 
of Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche discusses the two works as a convalescent’s 
‘remedy’, written a means to rid himself of certain poisons through withdrawal and 
abstention. Critics such as Michael Ure245 and Keith Ansell Pearson246 have highlighted 
the ‘therapeutic’ and ‘diagnostic’ element of the Free Spirit works, and as the 
introduction to the second volume (which we shall discuss shortly) makes clear, one of 
the most pressing maladies Nietzsche felt he had to overcome was the ‘romantic artist’ 
in his soul – that which had made him so prone to the affliction of “pessimism […] the 
cancerous ill of old idealists and habitual liars” (HAH I 10). Part of this convalesce, it 
will be argued, is to diagnose and treat the illness of the ‘artists soul’, not so that the art 
might be done away with, but so it might be ‘saved’ from its misuse at the hands of vain 
and deceptive ‘old lairs’. Viewed in this light, the critique of art offered in Human 
becomes an extension of the project that the “Attempt” identifies in Birth: that of 
“[looking] at art through the optic of life”. But here, that view is reversed, and instead 
of “viewing science through the optic of art” (AC §2:6), it is art’s turn to fall under the 
scrutiny of science.  
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Nietzsche Contra Wagner 
 
In calling for a revised look at the status of aesthetics in the Free Spirit works, Duncan 
Large follows Young’s example247 in drawing a line between the first and second volumes 
of Human. In doing so, he follows in the footsteps of that critical tradition he wishes to 
go against, by choosing to skirt around the difficulties posed by the first volume of that 
work. However, this may well be a case of ‘the better half of valor’. Arguing that the first 
volume of Human is anything but an outright denunciation of the aesthetic seems like 
a hopeless undertaking, especially given the way that the work’s chapter on art ends: 
with a pair of aphorisms declaring the “Twilight of art” – after which we will “view the 
artist as a magnificent relic” (HAH I §223:152) – and heralding “the scientific human 
being [as] a further development of the artistic one” (§222:152). Art, it seems is destined 
to die out. And though Ridley is correct to say that “even in its alleged dotage, art may 
have its uses” (2007 46), it seems from the general tenor of the work that art’s most 
helpful act would be to assist in its own euthanasia. However, the claim that the 
scientific human is a ‘further development’ of the artistic one should give us pause for 
thought. At the very least it seems to argue against Pothen and Young’s impression that 
Nietzsche forwards science as an ‘antipode’ to the aesthetic. Indeed, it seems that 
Nietzsche is going out of his way to assert lineage between the two: the ‘scientist’ as the 
‘heir’ to the artist. 
 To understand the nature of this line of decent, it is necessary to look at the 
criticisms that Human levels at art and artists. The broad sweep of this has already been 
touched on: that art is complicit in enabling humanities ‘religion’ habit. But this 
generalized criticism can be broken down into two elements that feed into and 
exacerbate one another. The first of these is a belief in the ‘genius’, and the pre-
eminence of ‘inspiration’ and ‘improvisation; topics that are recurrent touchstones 
throughout “From the souls of artists”248. The idea that great art comes from “great, 
superior, fertile spirits” owes its lineage to the “religious superstition that those spirits 
                                                 
247 See Young pp.73-5 
248 These themes are addressed in §145-6, 155-165,170-2, 212, 221-2 among others  
~ 183 ~ 
 
are of superhuman origin” (HAH I §164:125). The ‘cult of revelation’ is appropriated and 
the artist becomes a seer of the mysteries. She is attributed with ‘prophetic insight’; 
[an] immediate vision into the essence of the world, through a hole in the cloak of 
appearance, as it were, and […] that they can communicate something definitive and 
decisive about the human race and the world by means of this miraculous prophetic 
vision, without the toil and rigor of science (HAH I §164:125). 
This quasi-religious belief in a privileged insight ‘gifted’ to an elect few keeps alive the 
superstitious mindset and accustoms us to write off as blasé and mundane the more 
honest insights reached through ‘merely human’ means.  
It appears to be a problem with art per se that it encourages this sort of mystical 
thinking. In the art chapter’s opening aphorism, Nietzsche notes that before great works 
of art like the Paestum, we are prone to “almost feel as if a god had playfully built his 
dwelling one morning […] as if a soul had been suddenly, magically transformed into a 
stone and now wants to speak from within” (HAH I §145:114). This observation, 
combined with the aphorism’s sardonic title - “What is perfect cannot have come to be” 
– harkens back to Nietzsche’s observations on the aesthetic nature of the organism, and 
his critique of Kant’s ‘intrinsic perfection’249. We saw there how the analogy of the 
artwork assists the science of biology, recalling to us that the ‘Truth’ of organic form is 
just another of the aesthetic constructs we give form to in the world around us. But the 
emphasis now seems firmly on the obfuscatory element of our aesthetic sense: that 
which confounds and seduces us into forgetting that what we are looking at is a work 
of human artifice. Why this transition? The answer partially lies in the other element of 
the artistic that the work takes issue with; its privileging of passion, feeling, and ‘effect’.  
Human sees Nietzsche turn on the enchanting, transporting effect of art. It is 
portrayed as a dangerous and regressive narcotic, under whose influence the artist 
“more and more comes to worship sudden stimulations, believes in gods and demons 
[…] becomes changeable in his moods” (§159:120). This image of a twitching, 
hallucinatory ‘enervation addict’ is presented alongside descriptions of audiences whose 
ears and eyes have grown dulled from overstimulation and who “learn to grab with ever 
more satisfaction for what is intrinsically ugly and disgusting […] that is, what has a 
vulgar sensuousness” (§217:145). But more significant than the detrimental effect it has 
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on our senses – “the sensory organs themselves become dull and weak, the symbolic 
more and more takes the place of what exists” – is the tendency it helps perpetuate in 
us of taking the ‘strength’ of an impression for the ‘validity’ of an impression. As §15 
reminds us, the fact that we can only relate to the world through sensation means that 
we are accustomed to take more powerful impressions to be more ‘real’ than subtler 
ones. This is true for pain and fear, but also for ‘spiritual’ feelings: ‘deeper’, more 
‘profound’ feelings are often held to be ‘truer’, when really “a strong belief demonstrates 
only its strength, not the truth of what is believed” (§15:26)250. The goal of a ‘scientific 
culture’ is to combat this faith in the pre-eminence of intuition and feeling – to ‘cool’ 
the passions that cloud and distort our judgments and teach us to be ordered and 
methodical in our beliefs. 
Esteem for grand, intoxicating effects feeds belief in the genius – in the 
‘supernatural insight’ of those who can profoundly affect us through their work – and 
is, in turn, fed by the nature of the art object. The ‘complete’ nature of the work of art, 
its existence as a unified whole in which everything is ‘sublime and perfect’ and ‘nothing 
could possibly be changed’ serves “in majorem artis gloriam”251 (§171). It engenders in us 
the impression that it leapt, fully formed from the artist’s ‘divine imagination’: 
Everything finished, perfected, is viewed with amazement […] nobody looking at the work 
of the artist can see how it came to be; that is his advantage […] the perfected art of 
representation turns aside all thought about becoming; it rules tyrannically as perfection, 
here and now” (HAH I §162 pp.123-4) 
Artists have become adept at hiding the ‘chisel marks’ of their process and have both 
fueled and fed upon a culture that praises “the greatest possible effect” (§162:126). 
Pothen sees this emphasis on the finished totality in art as something incurable, arising 
from the very nature of artistic representation. A life of creating fixed, static ‘images’ 
that profess to capture something ‘real’ and ‘essential’ about their subjects enforces the 
belief in permanence and stability – that there is something ‘essential’ there that can be 
captured and held. Pothen sees this as arising first in the concept of the artist as 
‘sovereign creator’: of an ‘I’ that is the ‘agent’ of these creations. And “if we imagine 
ourselves as self-identical entities, then it is not surprising that we imagine others the 
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same”, ultimately arriving by “but a short step […] at the fictions of art in general”: that 
the world and its objects have ‘identity’ and a fixed ‘character’ (Pothen pp.51-4).  
Of course, it is not only artists who make the mistake of assuming stable self-
identity. But Nietzsche does seem to see art, with its emphasis on impassioned portraits 
that capture the ‘soul’ or ‘idea’ of their subjects and its cult of the great individual 
creator, as critical to preserving and proliferating this delusion. We see this in 
Nietzsche’s decision to frame his discussion of “Appearance and thing in itself” in terms 
of a sort of philosophic art gallery: 
Philosophers are given to placing themselves in front of life and experience - in front of 
what they call the world of appearance - as in front of a painting that has been unrolled 
once and for all and shows the same incidents unalterably fixed: they think that one has 
to interpret these incidents correctly in order to draw any conclusion about the entity that 
produced the painting (HAH I §16:26). 
Because we view the ‘painting’ as an ‘art-object’ – something fixed that we ‘stand before’ 
and ‘contemplate’, something with determinate features to be examined and artifice 
that we take to be indicative of a ‘creator’ - we have developed a warped impression of 
existence. However, Nietzsche’s answer to this is not that we cease to understand the 
world as a work of art, but that we become more informed art critics. We must come to 
realise “that the painting -what we human beings now call life and experience - has 
gradually come to be, indeed, is still wholly becoming, and therefore should not be 
considered as a fixed quantity” (HAH I §16:26). Moreover, this realisation is intimately 
bound up with the Dionysian aesthetic perspective that collapses the difference 
between spectator and artwork, or more pertinently, between artwork and ‘artist’. 
Nietzsche reminds us that it is only through our interpretation of it that “this world has 
gradually become so wonderfully bright, terrible, profoundly meaningful, soulful, and 
has taken on color-but we have been the colorists: the human intellect has made 
appearances appear and carried its erroneous views over into things” (28). We do not 
‘spectate’ the painting, but rather have an active role in affording it form and 
colouration. 
We should here recall the epistemic formulation offered in the force-world notes: 
the stupid being stands before the painting, and it exists for him only in so far as he is 
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an artist, who caries forms around in his head252. The interconnectedness of 
observer/creator/observed outlined in the early aesthetic writings is still clearly an 
important part of Nietzsche’s philosophic vision. The aphorism “Delusion of the 
contemplative ones” from “St. Januarius” makes this quite clear. The ‘thinker’, the one 
who mentally engages with the world instead of just ‘drifting’ through it, passively 
‘existing’ is stalked by  
A delusion [that] remains his constant companion: he thinks himself placed as spectator 
and listener before the great visual and acoustic play that is life; he calls his nature 
contemplative and thereby overlooks the fact that he is also the actual poet and ongoing 
author of life (GS §301:171). 
Humans, as “thinking-sensing ones, really and continually make something that is not 
yet there: the whole perpetually growing world of valuations, colours, weights, 
perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations” and wherever ‘qualities’ appear in the 
world, it is because “we were the giver and granters” of the perspectives that engendered 
them (GS §301:171). “Only we have created the world that concerns human beings!”. This 
realisation is the greatest achievement of knowledge, but also its most difficult to keep 
hold and make use of; “and when we catch it for a moment we have forgotten it the 
next”. But it is nevertheless critical to understand that knowledge about the world 
cannot be considered a passive, objective process of observation and absorption.  
Pothen’s vision of the scientist as taking ‘knowledge of the world, without 
distortion and embellishment’ seems to misunderstand the reality of Nietzschean 
knowledge. As Grimm puts it, “we are not patrons in an epistemological movie house. 
Reality and our knowledge with regard to it are processes in which we are actively 
engaged, not separate realms of being which we passively observe and comment upon” 
(148). But it also seems that Nietzsche has, by the time of Human, come to see art’s 
capacity to use illusion to reveal illusion - to break the spell of ‘identity’ through 
conjuring gods onto the stage in the form of “a solemn, stiff, masked puppet” (GS§80:80) 
– as severely compromised. Art, according to Human, would rather revel in its ability to 
befuddle and spellbind.  
In the later works of the Free Spirit, we see a less uncompromising stance 
towards art in this regard. An aphorism from book two of Gay Science, entitled “Art and 
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Nature” sees Nietzsche return to his early estimation of tragic drama and his praise for 
its alienating, anti-natural effect. He contrasts the anti-naturalism of the tragedy - 
where “the vulgar charm of illusion is supposed to give way to a higher charm” – with 
“the beautiful unnaturalness” of modern opera (§GS 80:80). The latter is portrayed as a 
mutated offspring of the former, which has the effect of solidifying rather than effacing 
the gap between the ‘unnatural’ affectedness of art and the ‘unmediated’ nature world 
(81). This historical perspective is, however, missing from Human, which sees the 
Hellenic artist as a drunken, primal child revelling in intoxication, spreading it like a 
disease to other cultures253. Art is based in deception and can only perpetuate deception 
– never reveal it. Clearly there is a sharp disconnect between this and the Gay Science 
aphorism, which characterises Hellenic art as driven by “industriousness” and 
“sensitivity” – “certainly not the aim of overwhelming the spectator with emotions” – 
and which therefore “[did] everything to counteract the elemental effect of images that 
arouse fear and compassion” (80). In this respect we see Nietzsche offering the likes of 
Sophocles as ‘coolers’ of emotion, as quiet, industrious workers towards an art that 
“deprived passion itself of its deep background and dictated to it a law”. Instead of 
encouraging and profiting from a ‘saturnalia’ of uncontrolled emotion, ancient art 
served to educate the emotions.  
It may seem that this possibility is strictly precluded in Human, with its 
understanding that art can only enflame passion and teach it to gorge itself on vulgar 
excess. But a closer look at the work shows that this is not strictly the case. In the 
opening aphorism of “From the Souls of Artists” we see Nietzsche not only diagnose the 
problems of art, but also identify a cause:  
The artist knows that his work achieves its full effect only if it arouses the belief in an 
improvisation, in the seemingly miraculous suddenness with which it came into being; 
and so he helps this illusion along […] as a means of deceiving and thereby attuning the 
soul of the spectator or listener so that it believes in the sudden springing forth of 
perfection (HAH I §145:114). 
Having identified this cause, he then proposes a remedy: “[a] science of art […] to 
contradict this illusion as distinctly as possible and to point out the erroneous reasoning 
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and self-indulgence that lead the intellect into the artist's net” (114). What we find, in 
this ‘science of art’, is a sort of scientific education for the aesthetic sense. 
 
A Scientific artistry of self 
 
The whole of “From the Souls of Artists” serves as an exercise in the science of art, 
critically examining the artist’s pretentions and their effects in the world of art objects. 
But if we are looking for a programmatic distillation of this science, its aims and 
methods, we should look to a ‘triptych’ of aphorisms on the problem of genius: §162, 
163, and 164. In the first of these, “The cult of genius, from vanity” Nietzsche offers a 
psychology of faith in genius and inspiration. Belief in this cult is argued to rest on a 
pact of mutual vanity between the artist – whose ego is swelled by adoration for her 
‘supernatural insight’ – and an audience who wish to be deceived – likewise for the sake 
of their egos. For, “to call someone ‘divine’ means ‘here we do not need to compete’”: if 
greatness comes from genius and genius is ‘gifted’ only to an elect few, then we are 
absolved of responsibility for our own lack of greatness (§162:123). In diagnosing this 
prejudice on behalf of both artists and audiences, the science of art strives to demystify 
artistic creation and prepare the way for a more honest understanding of its process.  
 Once we have understood that that it is a combination of our intense feelings 
and our pride that attributes to art a special status, we come to appreciate that  
Apart from those insinuations of our vanity, the activity of the genius [is not] something 
fundamentally different from the activity of the inventor in mechanics, of the 
astronomer or the historical scholar, of the master tactician. All these activities can be 
explained if we imagine people whose thinking is active in a single direction, who use 
everything as material, who are always eagerly watching their inner life and that of 
others, who glimpse models and incitements everywhere, who do not become weary of 
seeking new combinations of their technical resources (HAH I §162:123). 
The work of the artist is stripped of its special status, a levelling that is further re-
enforced in the subsequent aphorism “The seriousness of craft”. Here we are told that 
all the great artists of history produced as they did, not because of “natural gifts or innate 
talents”, but because “they all had that diligent earnestness of the artisan” (§163:124). 
The rest of the aphorism then gives advice on how to cultivate one’s artistic powers 
through the rigorous and earnest practice of one’s ‘craft’, before we move on to the third 
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aphorism with its warnings about the “Danger and gain in the cult of genius”. We are 
here reminded that while the artist gains prestige from the belief in genius, it becomes 
incredibly damaging once she (inevitably) buys into it herself.  
 When an artist comes to believe that talent is an innate supernatural gift, “he 
ceases to criticize himself, [and] one pinion after another finally falls from his plumage: 
that superstition digs at the roots of his strength” (§164:125). The myth of innate, 
inspired artistic ability instills complacency and leads to the artist slowly abandoning 
those practices and qualities that made them great at their craft. Such a reflexive, 
uncritical belief in the pre-eminence of one’s ‘inherent instincts’ seems to mark the 
difference between the artist and the scientist, and Pothen sees this lack of critical 
reflection as inherent to art: “scientists can be said to have a knowledge about their 
knowledge that is specifically denied the artist” (Pothen 55). But Nietzsche appears to 
argue that it would be the task of a science of art to offer a means to precisely this 
knowledge; or perhaps to lead the artist back to this knowledge. By revealing the vanity 
at the heart of their belief in inherent ability, science shows the artist the truth: that it 
was not talent but diligence and self-criticism that gave rise to their abilities. Science 
gives back to the artists the honesty and clarity to “gain insight into their strength and 
whence it came, […] what purely human qualities have flowed together in them”. This 
leads to a strengthening of those qualities that Nietzsche argues gave rise to the great 
artists of history; attributes like courage, dauntlessness and “resolute attentiveness” 
(§164:126).  
It is no coincidence that Nietzsche also sees these as the attributes of the 
philosopher (HAH I §618) and the scientist (§37). For, stripped of its pretentions, it 
seems the artist is not much different to these two. All great people in each field proceed 
through an esteem for “small, unpretentious truths” – with even the great artists 
becoming great “because they took more pleasure in making small, incidental things 
well than in the effect of some dazzling whole” (§163:124). When art is made ‘honest’ 
again – encouraged to look at itself for what it is, rather than what contorting 
psychological demands make of it – it will come to realise that its strength and greatest 
achievements flow from the same source as all ‘higher culture’. It is this culture, with its 
“esteem [for] the small, unpretentious truths found by rigorous methods” that Human 
is concerned to promote (§3:17). In moving towards this culture, the old aesthetic values 
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“with their measuring stick for the beautiful and the sublime” will be effaced; humanity 
will develop an “eye” for “the charm of the simplest form” to replace our current passion 
for “the most sublime construction” (pp.17-18). Nietzsche is clear that this will be of help 
to artists as well, since it will serve to efface the culture “the greatest possible effects” 
that he sees as damaging to the creative process. Self-reflection is discouraged in the 
artist by this culture, which has “at all times admired and envied precisely that strength 
in them that enabled them to deprive other people of their will and to sweep them away 
with the delusion that supernatural guides were leading the way” (§164:126). To do away 
with such an estimation for grand spiritual delusions would allow the artist to 
concentrate on that which she truly values – the intricacies of her craft – while weeding 
out the megalomaniacal tendencies that separate the ‘grand artist’ from the aesthetic 
artisan.  
 By the light of our new science of art, it becomes clear that “all the great artists 
were great workers, tireless not only in inventing, but also in rejecting, sifting, 
reshaping, ordering” (§155:119). We come to appreciate that “the imagination of a good 
artist or thinker continually produces good, mediocre, and bad things”, but that what 
truly sets the great artist apart from others is a capacity that, “rejects, selects, ties 
together” these ideas (118). Pothen interprets this as Nietzsche claiming that “as in 
Kant’s and Hegel’s accounts, […] it is reason as much as invention that is responsible for 
the greatest [productions]” (46). But it is notable that Nietzsche does not ascribe this 
‘sifting, editing’ process to reason: rather it is “the power of judgement, highly sharpened 
and practiced” that is responsible for shaping and refining in art, poetry, and philosophy 
(HAH I §155:118). This is a critical distinction and one that casts the role of science in a 
very different light. Moreover, it throws into focus just what Nietzsche means when he 
calls the scientist a ‘development’ of the artistic human.  
 In Tragic Age, Nietzsche makes much of the etymological root of philosophy. He 
points to the designation ‘sophós’254 as indicating that “the peculiar art of the 
philosopher” is based in “a sharp savouring and selecting, a meaningful discrimination” 
(PTA §3:43) – “taste” as “we speak of [it] in the arts” (PP §2:9). Sophíā is thus contrasted 
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with “ἐπιστήμη”, (epistḗmē) the scientific accumulation of “anything that is worth 
knowing” (CW 11 19[86]:32)255. But rather than indicating a division between science and 
philosophy, Nietzsche envisaged a pact between philosophy and the “low level of 
empiric insight” (PTA §3:39) available to the ancients:  
Philosophical thinking is, specifically, of the same sort as scientific thinking, only it directs 
itself towards great things and possibilities […] philosophy maintains a bond with the 
drive to knowledge, and therein lies its significance for culture. It is a legislating of 
greatness, a bestowal of titles […] [it says] ‘this is great’ and in this way humanity is 
elevated (PP §2:pp.8-9, n.6) 
Science is portrayed as a blindly lumbering beast in need of guidance, and it is the 
philosopher who provides this. As a close Kin to the poets, “the philosopher seeks to 
hear within himself the echoes of the world symphony and to re-project them in the 
form of concepts” (PTA §4:44). The thinker is a ‘mirror on the world’ who “searches out 
the tones of the world to test their resonances” (PP§2:9): their manifestation as 
sensations. The ‘genius’ of the philosopher then lies in their ability to take these 
sensations and ‘compose them’ into a vision of the “collective sound” that is existence. 
The thinker’s ‘feelings’ for the world become a macrocosm for the world itself256.  
 Pothen (55) and Salim Kemal (pp.273-5) are right to note that the critique of the 
genius we find in Human appears written in direct opposition to this construction. 
Clearly, the idea that grand imaginative leaps based in nothing but a faith on innate 
talent should not relied upon to steer the ship of knowledge. Nevertheless, science, in 
and of itself, cannot steer that ship either. As the next section of this chapter will seek 
to show, Nietzsche’s epistemology still rests in an understanding that cannot permit of 
‘Law based’ sciences, and as such, it cannot ‘direct’ itself. Science remains epistḗmē, - 
the accumulation of data - and it still requires structuring and forming into something 
that is not simply fragmented ‘facticity’. Because there are no ‘natural laws’ - no eternal, 
predetermined ‘correct’ way for everything to fit together, which science must simply 
arrive at – science is still directionless. However, what science gives, to the philosopher 
as to the artist, is the tools for introspection and understanding how certain outcomes 
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were arrived at. Nietzsche could be speaking directly of Anaximander257 when he says 
that metaphysical condemnations of life arise  
due to a series of errors in reasoning […] it was the fault of the mirror if their nature 
appeared to them so gloomy and hateful, and that mirror was their work, the very 
imperfect work of human imagination and judgment (HAH I §133:102) 
The Pre-Socratic artist-philosophers felt themselves able to act as ‘mirrors of the 
world’ on the grounds of a “certain self-possession, an ability to maintain themselves, 
coldly, as mirrors” (PTA §3:44). But as the critique of genius makes clear, this belief was 
ill founded. Just as “a certain false psychology, a certain kind of fantasizing in the 
interpretation of motives and events, is the necessary prerequisite for becoming a 
Christian” (HAH I §135:104), we can trace the emergence of the philosopher’s false 
judgements to “a feeling of self-contempt due to certain errors, that is, due to a false, 
unscientific interpretation of his actions and sensation” (§134:103). It is because of this 
that we now require science to give us insight into how we construct our interpretations 
of the world: 
Humanity cannot continue to be spared the gruesome sight of the psychological 
dissecting table and its knives and forceps. For what rules here is the science that inquires 
about the origin and history of the so-called moral sensations and that as it advances has 
to pose and to solve complicated sociological problems - the older philosophy is not at all 
familiar with these problems […] if it is certain that the superficiality of psychological 
observation has laid the most dangerous snares for human judgment (HAH I §37:45) 
Ruth Abbey, in her 2015 overview of the Free Spirit notes that despite “making allusions 
to or comparisons with natural science”, the vision of ‘science’ forwarded “during the 
middle period is more a combination of history and psychology than anything 
resembling the natural sciences” (17). However, given the nature of the force-world that 
ground Nietzsche’s physics, it is easy to see why he understood this psychology to be an 
extension of the natural sciences. 
If the outcome of force interactions are not fixed and inherent, but rather arise 
from the interrelation of systems, each determined by their own ‘internal politics’, then 
beyond the fundamental recognition of this fact, traditional physics (conceived 
mechanically) has nothing more to contribute. Nietzsche’s force physic then becomes, 
at this point, a sort of ‘force psychology’: an attempt to understand why an event was 
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‘interpreted’ into existence the way it was. We should understand this with an eye to an 
aphorism from Gay Science: 
Let us introduce the subtlety and rigour of mathematics into all sciences to the extent to 
which that is at all possible; not in the belief that we will come to know things this way, 
but in order to ascertain our human relation to things. Mathematics is only the means to 
general and final knowledge of humanity (GS §246).  
It is by the light of this demand that we should understand Human’s call for a 
“chemistry” of concepts: a series of rigorous, honest experiments258 into the way we 
interpret our sensations and form our concepts (HAH I §1:15). We can see Nietzsche 
offering near identical advice to aspiring artist: 
make a hundred or more outlines for novels, none longer than two pages, yet of such 
clarity that every word in them is necessary; write down anecdotes daily until you learn 
to find their most pregnant, effective form; be indefatigable in collecting and depicting 
human types and characters; above all, tell and listen to stories as often as possible, 
keeping a sharp eye and ear upon how they affect others who are present; travel like a 
landscape painter and costume designer; […] reflect upon the motives of human actions, 
scorn no instructive hints about this, and be a collector of such things day and night (HAH 
I §163:124).  
The work of art, like the concept, is a construct of our artifice. But by ensuring that this 
artifice is grounded in the reality of sensations and effects, instead of arising from a 
concatenation of erroneous reasoning and prejudicial conflations, we can arrive at what 
is ‘necessary’ in in these constructs. 
 Under this model, knowledge is conceived of less as the accumulation and 
collection of facts – dead artifacts cast off by the world of becoming as it endlessly ‘sheds’ 
its forms to become something new. Instead, it is a store of information about the way 
we interpret and process becoming. Knowledge gives us no insight into anything ‘in-
itself’, but into the way that we ‘give form to’ the stream of becoming. We see this 
reflected in the force-note’s presentation of what the ‘progress of knowledge’ and an 
‘objective’ viewpoint would mean. Any understanding of the world attained by our 
senses “is only a reflection” in the mirror of our ‘self-ness’, but “one that keeps getting 
clearer” (CW 11 19[158]:51). In our attempts to “adequately” understand our phenomenal 
world in terms of the sensations it imparts upon us, “we see an effort to make the mirror 
ever more adequate: science takes over where the natural process leaves off – in this 
way, things are reflected ever more clearly: gradual liberation from what is all too 
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anthropomorphic”. The ancient philosophers’ belief in their self-knowledge and 
possession clouded their judgement and their ability to discern the difference between 
mirror, and reflection. Now, with the aid of scientific rigour, the ‘natural’ process of 
constructing images and impressions of the world has a means of improving the process 
of interpretation. Yet for all the rigours of science, there is no indication that Nietzsche 
believes that ‘knowledge’ leads us ‘True’ or universally valid concepts. Instead, its role 
is to point out the missteps we take in interpreting our sensations into concepts – a 
process that is, for Nietzsche, undertaken not by rationality, but by judgement. Science 
helps to improve and refine what remains an essentially aesthetic process. 
 
§4.2: Knowledge against Genius 
 
Salim Kemal interprets Human as representing a diametric shift in Nietzsche’s 
conception of genius. He sees the work as Nietzsche’s shift from an emphasis on the 
‘elitist’ status of art, to a more egalitarian viewpoint: where before, only a privileged few 
were able to truly ‘create’, creative invention is now the common property of all 
humanity. The critique of genius in Human is seen as an explicit disavowal of the 
“artist’s metaphysic” and its model of artistic production. Both the philosophers of 
Tragic Age and the artists of Birth and “The Greek City State” are depicted as having 
special status afforded to them by “a metaphysics of mysterious presences in a supra-
human world from where, by some arcane process, these geniuses bring their rarefied 
insights into our reach” (Kemal 286).  
This understanding is based on the idea that “beauty, the end state of aesthetic 
activity” as that which justified existence (272). In the absence of True meaning and 
order, the beautiful ‘semblance’ of order gives value to life because it gives pleasure, and 
“pleasure is the end in itself in this [aesthetic] world”. It is the genius’ task to ‘intuit’ 
beauty and thus provide evidence (albeit fabricated evidence) for the ‘lesser creatures’ 
that the world is not “a morass with no inherent meaning”. Under this interpretation, 
Human replaces the imperative towards the creation of beauty – the justifying ends of 
existence – and instead values the act of creation itself, lauding works that “[promote] 
the continuing and diverse activity of human agency” (Kemal 273).  
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Kemal’s reading of Human is astute, and elements of his reading of the early 
works are also well observed. He is absolutely right to note that Human was on guard 
against the way “[creativity] thwarts itself by inventing new and insightful ways of 
preventing its own development […] [when] exercised in the service of a need to remain 
the same” (272). This, to his eye, is the role of critical self-reflection and HAH I §3 
appears to back this up: it is the aim of the ‘Higher culture’ to break the cycle whereby 
old forms are endlessly recycled – lazily, perfunctorily, and badly. His argument that 
even in the early works, art was heralded as a means to ‘self-creation’ is critical for 
understanding the continuity between these works and the Free Spirit period. The ‘self-
generative’ element of the force-constellations presented in the early works was 
discussed at length in §3.3 of this study (and will be discussed further across the course 
of this section). However, the misreading of the early aesthetic just described stunts this 
insight – and the insightfulness of the article as a whole. Our readings of the Dionysus 
myth (see §1.2 and §1.3) clearly shows that Nietzsche did not regard beauty as a stable 
or suitable grounding for either a robust culture, or a justification of existence (see also 
the discussion of Anaxagoras in §2.1, 2.2). Similarly, the idea that Nietzsche forwards a 
hedonistic justification of life was argued against extensively in chapters 1 and 2. 
Together, these ideas do a great deal of damage to the critical insights that the article 
offers, and lead to Kemal instituting a divide where one does not exist. Because of this, 
he fails to see that the aesthetic project he attributes to the Free Spirit works is a 
development, not a refutation, of the early aesthetic writings. 
To understand the nature of this continuity, and the misunderstanding that 
Kemal’s article falls into, we can point to Nietzsche’s treatment of artistic creation in 
“The Dionysian Worldview”. We are told that the “image-making arts” aim at the 
communication of “the form floating before [the artist’s] mind as authentic telos” (DW 
II:87). The ‘goal’ of the work – the beautiful form ‘intuited’ by the artist – is apparently 
the ‘instigating cause’ of the work, arrived at through ‘mystical’ means. It seems as 
though this vision ‘appears’ to the artist, and she then embodies it as a means of 
communicating and disseminating her privileged gaze into ‘the beautiful’. However, a 
closer look reveals that this is only one-half (and perhaps the lesser half) of a process of 
creation. Against the previous definition – which simply outlines the ‘plastic’ work of 
the artist, we find that “real art is the ability to create images, no matter if this is fore-
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creation [Vor-Schaffen] or after-creation [Nach-Schaffen]”. Ira Allen’s recent translation 
of the essay reads this Vor-Schaffen as “making up”259 and this translation, more than 
Crawford’s earlier one, brings with it the motion inherent in the German verb form. 
Read in this way, Vorschaffen might mean to ‘bring forth’ an image, while Nachschaffen 
would mean to replicate an already existing one. This is why Nietzsche diminishes the 
work of art itself as ‘mere media’, as “ways to artistic creation, not arts in themselves […] 
only artificial means” (DW II:87). Instead, it seems that the real value of the art object 
is not the communication of an ‘idea’: rather the ‘social meaning’ of the artist is “as the 
one who, through artistic means, forces others to art”.  
We could read this by Kemal’s model as the artist ‘disseminating’ forms for others 
to copy, but this is not what Nietzsche appears to mean here. Instead, the point of a 
work is not to share the artist’s (specific) vision, but for the recipient to be “transposed” 
into the “dream situation” in which the image was first created. We are not ‘forced’ to 
create art ‘objects’ – rather, when confronted with a piece of marble, we are called to 
the artistic process whereby our mind interprets this piece of stone to be a figure. 
Nietzsche describes the way that a storyteller can give rise to images in our head by 
“[narrating] how that character manifests its life in movement, tone, word, action; he 
forces us to trace back a multitude of effects to their causes; he forces us to an artistic 
composition”. This is not the artist proliferating her own ‘genius’ images. Rather, she is 
‘spreading’ genius to others. She imposes upon her audience the ‘necessity’ of art, of 
image creation: an ability “common to all humans”.  
We can see an evident link here with the effect that art is supposed to have on 
the cognitive faculties, as discussed in the second half of “On Truth”. It is the 
fundamental supposition of that essay that the drive to form sense experience into 
ordered images and concepts – the drive to create ‘metaphors’ for sensation – is the 
fundamental human activity (TL 146, 150). We practice ‘art’, in the ‘Vor-Schaffen sense 
of ‘calling forth’ images in every moment of our lives, as sense information streams into 
the mind and is ‘composed’ into images. ‘Science’, here meaning the formalisation of 
images into concepts, is framed as little more than the habitualisation of these 
interpretations: the fact that, because we have previously interpreted something a 
                                                 
259 “The Dionysian Vision of the World”, trans. I.J Allen, Univocal Press, 2016, 40 
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certain way means we take this to be ‘correct’ (149). It is therefore art’s task to remind 
us that there is nothing essentially ‘True’ about any of these constructs – that they are 
our artistic creations.  
Art reveals the arbitrary nature of this process, “smashes this framework, jumbles 
it up and ironically reassembles it, pairing the most unalike things and separating those 
that are most alike” (152). Just as in the Dionysian experience of the theatre, art serves 
to remind us that the boundaries between things are constructs of the ‘illusion world’: 
of the Apollonian cybernetic. But where in that case it was the boundary between 
audience and artwork that was dissolved, now we come to realise that in looking upon 
art – or any object – we are not merely spectators, but artists. The very process of 
cognising our world – of transferring sense data into mental images – resembles the 
work of the poet, who, through narrative allusion, leads us to ‘compose’ lives and worlds 
in our imaginations260. 
The question now is whether Human continues to work with this construction. 
Kemal argues yes; or, rather, he argues that this conception of creation only arises in 
Human (Kemal pp.268-285). However, we need not rest on his authority: HAH §3 clearly 
states that we are still dealing with a Heraclitean world without set conceptual 
boundaries, and §12 and 13 discuss the ‘artwork’ of dreams in a way profoundly 
reminiscent of “On Truth” (see TL pp.144-5): 
 
The brain produces a host of impressions of lights and colors, probably as a sort of playful 
afterimage and echo of all those effects of light that press upon it during the day. But the 
understanding (in combination with the imagination) immediately reworks this play of 
colors, in itself formless, into distinct figures, forms, landscapes, animated groups (HAH 
I §13:24) 
Just as in “On Truth”, Nietzsche here foregrounds the groundless nature of the process 
by which we take formless sense-impression and turn it into the forms of objects and 
concepts: “How arbitrarily these borders are drawn, how one-sided the preference for 
this or that property of a thing!” (TL 144). Nietzsche does go from here to contrast the 
logic of dreams to that of the waking mind – “so sober, so careful, so sceptical in regards 
to hypothesis” (HAH I §13:23) – but critically does not attribute to the waking mind any 
                                                 
260 This concept is discussed at length by Nehamas, esp. pp.91-5 
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special faculty261. It is simply that, when awake, we are more ‘cool’ and reflective, we 
check assumptions against memories, and above all, we take our time with our mental 
formulations.  
This marks the great difference between Human and “On Truth”. In the earlier 
essay, Nietzsche makes it clear that habit is the enemy of innovation. To this end, we 
are encouraged to break apart old concepts and reform them into new ones. We should 
rely for this on our ‘instinctual’ artistic capacities: Nietzsche here differentiates between 
the person of reason – the one who clings to her conceptual frameworks for safety – and 
the person of intuition. This latter pays no heed to the ‘laws’ contrived by reason for the 
‘proper’ interpretation of things. She relies instead upon her ‘genius’, her innate, 
instinctual ability to create images. She lives in rapid, near epileptic vibrancy, “a 
constant stream of brightness […] and release” (TL 153), exercising the creative power 
that is “hardly even tamed by the process whereby a regular and rigid new world is built 
from its own sublimated products” (151). However, in Human, Nietzsche has come to 
recognise that this automatic, instinctual process can just as much harm innovation as 
spur it: 
Habitual, rapid associations of feelings and thoughts are formed, which finally, when they 
follow after one another with lightning speed, are no longer even sensed as complexes, 
but rather as unities […] in truth, they are streams with a hundred sources and tributaries 
(HAH I §14:25) 
The demand that we ‘cool’ our aesthetic-creative processes of interpretation originates 
in just this problem. As Kemal points out, the instinctual genius is just as likely to invent 
new ways to keep repeating old patterns, as she is to find new ways of interpreting the 
world. The first step on this road is to slow down and think critically about the way we 
put our world-images together.  
 Although Human opposes the formulation offered in “On Truth”, we should not 
take this as an indication that it wholeheartedly favors its opposite. “On Truth’s” 
formulation of the person of reason as one who wishes to use knowledge to insulate 
themselves against “the chief calamities of life by providing for the future” (TL 152) is 
incompatible with the sort of science that Nietzsche advocates for. We cannot use 
                                                 
261 “[dream] is continually thrusting images upon the mind, imitating the way that visual impressions are produced 
during the day” (HAH I §13:24-5) 
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concepts to ‘map out’ and “rule over life”: to render it stable, safe, and predictable. 
Rather, we should understand the role of science in the work along the biographical 
lines put forward in the introductions to the two volumes of Human. The introductions 
speak of the works as a form of “convalescence” in which science helped to structure a 
“discaplina voluntatis” (HAH II 5). They are portrayed as a time in which Nietzsche 
“sought shelter somewhere to recuperate from myself” (HAH I 5) as part of “a long war 
[…] I waged at that time against the pessimism of weariness with life” (HAH II 9). We 
see Nietzsche admitting that the ‘heroic affirmation’ of life’s suffering that he had 
embodied in Zarathustra and proclaimed in the ending of “On Truth” had failed him. 
Indeed, he cites the ethos of unbridled experimentation forwarded in the latter work as 
driving him to a form of nihilistic “scepticism and dissolution” – “into the deepening of 
all previous pessimism [I] already believed ‘in nothing any more’” (HAH II 4).  
Against this despair, he claims to have set himself “the task of defending life 
against pain and breaking down all the inferences that tend to grow […] out of pain, 
disillusionment, annoyance, isolation”: 
I waged a wearingly patient campaign with myself against the unscientific basic tendency 
of every Romantic pessimism to puff up and interpret individual personal experiences 
into general judgements, indeed, into world-condemnation… in short, it was time I turned 
my gaze around (HAH II 8). 
We see here that Nietzsche regarded himself as having fallen victim to precisely the 
failure of judgement we saw manifest in the Pre-Socratics: he has forgotten Heraclitus’ 
injunction not to ‘make a morality of it’. Left free to interpret life according to his states 
of mood, he found himself following Anaximander, allowing his feelings of despair to 
take the role of a hermeneutic key in his interpretations of life. The advocacy of science 
becomes as a sort of ‘regrouping’: an attempt on Nietzsche’s part to do precisely what 
he advises to aspiring artists; stop trusting your habitual, instinctual paths of world 
formation; concentrate on perfecting your ‘small, unpretentious truths’, arrived at 
through secure and tested methods; polish your stories and aphorisms until you learn 
what is ‘necessary’ in them. This is what ‘knowledge’ means for the Nietzsche of the 
middle period works: a bank of experiences and practices in which we learn how to 
create new values. Not wildly and erratically, according to some ‘innate’ talent – because 
genius is a lie. Instead, ‘science takes over where nature ceases’ - not in order that it 
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might lead the understanding, but that it might ‘train’ the understanding in the art of 
interpreting life.  
 
How to build a world  
 
It is at this stage in the study that we too must pause and re-group. The final section of 
this chapter (and this study) will look at the way Nietzsche’s aesthetic ‘experimentation’ 
unfolded across the three books of the Free Spirit, and ended up in the experimental 
prose poem Thus spoke Zarathustra. But first, we must gather together all that has been 
discussed so far and conclusively arrive at an understanding of what ‘aesthetic’ means 
in the works under discussion.  
Kemal marks a transition in the meaning of ‘art’ at the inauguration of the Free 
Spirit project – a broadening of what is to be considered the remit of aesthetics:  
Aesthetic genius must now satisfy a new consideration […] art serves as a model for 
construction, but instead of understanding only works of fine art as created objects, he 
now thinks of all values as if they were art. These constructions all generate new values, 
providing relations between elements to signify new features […] and novel issues that 
can be considered in other works (Kemal 272) 
A similar approach is taken by Nehamas in his seminal and much cited work Life As 
Literature262, which maintains that Nietzsche  
Looks at the world in general as if it were a sort of artwork; in particular, he looks at it as 
if it were a literary text. And he arrives at many of his views of the world and the things 
within it […] by generalizing to them ideas and principles that apply almost intuitively to 
the literary situation, to the creation and interpretation of literary texts and characters 
(Nehamas 3)263 
Where Nehamas justifies characterising this process as aesthetic by appeal to elements 
that structure literary works, tracing them as principals that Nietzsche uses to organise 
his worlds, Kemal appears to regard the aesthetic dimension as simply an analogy, 
illustrative of the mediated, creatively constructed nature of our mental architectonics. 
Neither of these approaches are inherently wrong, but both also appear to miss 
something that is far more central to Nietzsche’s conception of the aesthetic – 
                                                 
262 Michael Ure’s work Nietzsche’s Therapy also explores this idea, and is heavily indebted to Nehamas’ study.  
263 Nehamas pays little attention to Birth in his work, and, like Kemal, traces this conception back to Human (117) 
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something that goes back to its roots in the Heraclitean conception of kosmos and the 
image of the ‘world-artist’.  
 If we look once more at “On Truth” and its conception of the way we construct 
our world-images, we see a modified version of the Kantian model of cognition. In 
Kant’s system of empirical cognition, the imagination is responsible for reconstructing 
sense data according to laws provided by the understanding. These are derived a-priori 
by reason and used to govern the imaginations schematising activity. For Nietzsche 
however, this system is reversed, and the concepts – the apparent ‘laws’ that are 
supposed to guide the imagination in its reconstruction of sense data – are themselves 
nothing but the ossified remnants of this process. Concepts are simply the worn 
afterimages264 of the imaginations constructive activity that have persisted as ‘memory’, 
existing “only by virtue of the fact that a mass of images, which originally flowed in a 
hot, liquid stream from the primal power of the human imagination, has become hard 
and rigid”. The “artistic translation of a nervous stimulus into images is, if not the 
mother, then at least the grandmother of each and every concept” (TL pp.147-8). This 
then raises the question of how the mind organises its sense impressions, and 
Nietzsche’s answer is that they are ‘aesthetic’ which, in Kantian terms, means that they 
are the ‘purposive yet purposeless’ play acts of the imagination: that which arises when 
the imagination is left free to construct in ‘free play’265. 
 The conception of free play allows for the creation of mental representations that 
are not determined by any set conceptual law, yet are nevertheless not random, 
arbitrary, or incomprehensible to our understanding (as would be the case with, say, a 
demented or schizophrenic experience – one without the order or cohesion to stand as 
a viable mental image). Its play is without ‘law’, yet remains ‘lawful’: “the imagination, 
left to itself, would freely project in harmony with the general conformity to law of the 
understanding” (CJ§22:71). For Kant, this is possible because the imagination’s usual 
activity of producing according to conceptual laws leaves it with a ‘general feeling for 
lawfulness’ – a residual impression of how law governed cognition takes place that can 
stand in to order its creations when no specific law is provided. For Nietzsche however, 
                                                 
264 “coins which, having lost their stamp, are regarded as metal and no longer coins” (TL 146)  
265 For discussion of Kant and the aesthetic free play, see §3.1 
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this is cannot be the case: if all concepts arise after the ordering process, then they 
cannot be said to have informed the construction that gave rise to them.  
In this regard “On Truth” taps into a significant problem with the Kantian critical 
project- one that Heidegger claims Kant himself was aware of, but did all that he could 
to avoid facing up to266. By introducing the conception of play to his model of the mind, 
Kant made of the imagination a ‘rogue faculty’ capable of creating autonomously, “free 
from the rule of understanding” (Kukla pp.11-12). This eventuality introduces a weakness 
into the division of powers on which the whole of Kant’s model is based, and opens up 
the possibility that all products of the imagination might, in fact, be aesthetic: “Kant 
has now apparently ceded crucial responsibility for successful, objectively valid 
experience away from the understanding, and into only contingently trustworthy 
hands” (20). We have, in effect, the imagination both producing and checking its 
own work. If our world-images are  
formed by aesthetic activity by the time it even makes it to the understanding, and if we 
have no argument for the objective validity of the principles by which it does this, then 
it’s not clear why we should think that this forming is proceeding in a way that is truly 
account able to the sensible world, rather than based on merely subjective standards 
(Kukla 17).  
The question that we are left to face, in this example, is how we can judge if a mental 
construction adheres to objectively valid principals of construction when those 
principals are derived only from the constructions themselves. Can we tell if a machine 
is doing what it is supposed to if we can only decide on what it is supposed to be doing 
by looking at its productions? 
 For Nietzsche, the question of objective (correspondent) validity is not an issue 
(TL pp.147-150).  However, the question of why there is ‘lawfulness’ in these ungoverned 
creations needs to be explained. Our mental representations are ‘contingent’, in so far 
as they could be constructed in any number of ways. Nevertheless, they must also 
exhibit lawful necessity: they are ‘orderings’, not the scrambled, broken messes of the 
severely deranged. What then are the ‘rules’ that govern the way we put together our 
                                                 
266 See Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Martin Heidegger, Bloomington UP, 1990, pp.110-15: A similar 
argument is forwarded by John McCumber: See “Unearthing Wonder: A ‘Post-Kantian’ Paradigm in Kant’s 
Critique of Judgement”, Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Philosophy, ed. R. Kukla, Cambridge UP, 2006, 
pp.266- 290 
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mental images: that which we are supposed to gain ‘knowledge’ of? It seems that these 
must have some form of ‘necessity’ in themselves – some set of defining possibilities 
that we are working towards, not necessarily a ‘grasp of’, but a fluency in. This 
imperative is reflected in Nehamas’ study, which takes the ‘literary’ as the skeleton of 
fixed necessity around which the contingencies of events are brought into orbit. He 
forwards “the abstract view that one should strive to become a united, consistent and 
unique whole, but the actual content of that whole remains radically indeterminate” 
(Ure 38). In this, Nehamas’ theory runs up against various problems, not least that it 
presupposes the existence of a ‘sovereign creator’ – an ‘I’ that conducts the “narrative 
appropriation of ‘all that I have done’ into a coherent whole” (Ure 38). For Keith Ansell-
Pearson, this is the great stumbling block of Nehamas’ theory, which devolves into   
a classic, archetypal account of the artist of genius, the genius who is in control, who is 
master of his own destiny, and who is able to construct for himself a coherent identity in 
the absence of a stable 'metaphysical' self (Ansell-Pearson 1994 145)  
This is not, however, an inherent problem with the aesthetic analogy. As Magnus Et.al 
point out, this issue instead arises from a failure to appreciate the unique contribution 
that Nietzsche’s theory of aesthetics made to literature.  
 Nietzsche’s Case notes that the great strengths of Nehamas’ study are 
undermined by the “highly abstracted version of ‘the literary work’” that he operates 
from:  
There is a sense in which Nehamas’ very choice of the term ‘aestheticism’ betrays a desire 
to stay within the idealising realm of aesthetics and to avoid crossing over into the domain 
of literary criticism, where virtually all recent theories (many inspired by Nietzsche) 
project a far more fragmented and problematic image of the text (Magnus et.al, 135). 
The primary issue with this as far as Case is concerned is that the greatest strength of 
Nehamas’ theory – the insight that “literary texts can be interpreted equally well in 
vastly different and deeply incompatible ways” (Nehamas 3) – is degenerated into a form 
of hermeneutics. In “the formalised hypostatisation of the literary text as a discrete 
object of interpretation” Nehamas renders the world as an ‘art-object’ that we ‘apply’ 
our interpretations to: “literature is the necessary digression by means of which we are 
returned once again to the world as a discrete object of our knowledge” (Magnus et.al 
135). The “condition of textualisation” (134) provided by the formal features of the novel 
– character, narrative, the pathos imparted by satisfying story or thematic arcs etc. – 
~ 204 ~ 
 
provide the lens through which we can bring into order the world under our 
observation. But as Case points out, Nietzsche expressly wishes us not to look at the 
world “securely from without (as if it were a sort of artwork) but rather assuredly from 
within an unfolding text, whose alienness must find a way to make our own” (135). 
 This ‘within-ness’ speaks to the quality that Nietzsche identified in his image of 
the world-artist, who is both ‘contemplatively above’ and ‘actively within’ its work. It 
also speaks to why Nietzsche is justified – against Nehamas’ reading – in calling his 
aesthetic process one of knowledge: how knowledge escapes the orbit of (purely 
solipsistic) ‘self-knowledge’267. Against the ‘hermeneutic’ model we find in Nehamas – 
the world as an ‘object’ which we study and assign meaning to - we should view the 
interpretive process as one of ‘poetics’, in the sense outlined by Johnathan Culler268. To 
Culler, hermeneutics rests on the assumption that a text inherently has a meaning – or 
a ‘field’ of meaning – and it is the interpreter’s task to pick out and define this meaning 
through examination of features, translation into various interpretive languages etc 
(pp.4-5). Poetics, on the other hand, rests in the assumption that a work is not 
something that ‘has’ meaning, but is instead a ‘space’ for meaning to ‘generate’. A lyric, 
for example, ‘calls us to art’ in the way described by Nietzsche – providing a ‘pregnant’ 
set of relations from which meaning emerges as a reciprocal relation between the work 
and its reader. Poetry relies on certain formal tropes, but is ultimately a form of address 
in which meaning is not ‘communicated’ from an artist to her audience. Rather, the 
reader participates in the play of meaning creation through their own experiences, 
combined with their knowledge of the way that the formal tropes work to ‘incite’ 
meaning and feeling.  
 By this reciprocal model of interpretation, the reading subject joins with the 
work in a ‘collaboration’ that gives rise to meaning. The work never ‘contains’ meaning 
in itself, but is the space in which meaning emerges through a mediation that takes 
place within the subject – the meeting of stylistic tradition, formal features etc. (none 
of which contain anything more than the incitement to, and possibility of, meaning), 
                                                 
267 This characterisation comes from Magnus et.al (134) and finds correspondence in Nehamas (pp.45 -7). Ure is 
also of the opinion that “Nehamas's model fails to see how Nietzsche conceives self-fashioning not as a narrowly 
private, individualistic project, but as a means of refashioning and modulating the affects that shape the self's 
relationships with others” (47) 
268 Johnathan Culler, Theory of the Lyric, Harvard Up, 2015 
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and that which the reader brings to the text. And so where hermeneutics seeks to ‘close 
in on meaning’, narrowing the multiplicities of possible readings down into an 
‘interpretation’, poetics is an engagement with the process of meaning. It not only 
resists the ‘closing down’ of avenues of alternate meaning, but operates precisely 
through the ‘opening’ of meaning - the way that the process of giving rise to meaning 
generates ever new ‘nodes’ for the process of interpretation to work with. 
Nietzsche identifies precisely this quality in the literary style of Heraclitus, a 
quality that renders his work ‘immortal’. “Like the Delphic god” his ‘Sibylline’ speech – 
cryptic, fragmentary, contradictory – “neither enunciates nor conceals” but presents a 
place where meaning “can force its way through the millenniums of the future” (PTA 
§8)269. They reveal the essence of meaning – that it is a living process, rather than a static 
object – through the confusion of ‘mere communication’ and the active resistance to 
“historical men” who believe that knowledge is the ‘collecting’ (“sammelnden”) and 
‘questioning’ (“fragenden”) of mere facticity. More than this however, they remain ‘alive’ 
by resisting the completion and totalisation that would render them as ‘art–objects’ – 
self-enclosed ‘atoms’ of meaning. Each new context in which they are received will bring 
to them new life, in the way that Nietzsche describes in §126 of Assorted Opinions and 
Maxims:  
should we deny to those who come later the right to animate the older works as their own 
souls see fit? No, for these works can continue to live only if we give our souls to them: it 
is our blood that first lets them speak to us. A truly "historical" speech would speak in a 
ghostly way to ghosts. We honour the great artists of the past less by the barren awe that 
leaves every word, every note lying where it was placed than by active e orts at helping 
them come back to life again and again […] the living are right, as our Schiller says (HAH 
II §126 pp.56-7) 
Heraclitus’ fragments stand as the essence of what Nietzsche valued in the aesthetic. 
They live, not as artworks (objects of artistry) but as art-works; deliberately fragmentary 
‘events’ that embody and enact the ‘becoming’ of those ‘artistic powers that flow from 
nature itself’.  
 
 
                                                 
269 Cf CW 11 19[76]:28, HAH II §19:18 
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Art’s Becoming what it is 
 
In contrast to Kemal’s interpretation, the Free Spirit does not see a sudden collapse of 
interest in the ‘art-object’ in favour of a model of artistic analogy: ideas and individuals 
suddenly coming to be viewed, in a nebulous and fairly ill-defined way, as ‘like art’. 
Rather, we see a re-orientation back towards the fundamental insight of the early 
aesthetic – the idea that all things (individuals, organisms, discrete objects of our 
experience) exist only as ‘borderless, duration-less, quality-less events’ in a creative 
process: ‘quanta’ of ‘art-working’ in a great ‘art-work’. This understanding serves to offer 
a counter to the problem of ‘heroic agency’ that both Ure and Ansell-Pearson level at 
Nehamas270. This is a persistent problem of so called ‘Aestheticist’ theories; “that of 
specifying the identity of the inventor: he must, it seems, invent himself” (Havas 121). It 
was this problem that lead Hill to posit the world-artist as ‘noumenal perceiver’ – “it 
could not be that the agent of the construction, and the act of constructing, belonged 
only to the world of appearances and were themselves constructions. One’s bootstraps 
have only finite strength”271- and that appears to ground Kemal’s interpretation of art as 
simply ‘an agent ordered work of artistry’. Nehamas’ problems in this area both arses 
from, and feeds into, the problem of the ambiguity he reads in Nietzsche’s presentation 
of self-formation. 
 Nehamas’ work continually strikes up against a version of the subject-object 
issue, which he formulates in terms of a “paradoxical interplay between creation and 
discovery, knowledge and action, literature and life” (168). The issue he identifies is that 
“Despite his constant attacks on the notion that there are antecedent existing things 
and truths waiting to be discovered, despite his almost inordinate emphasis on the idea 
of creating”, we are nevertheless told that we should be “becoming who we are”: as if 
this were the ‘discovery’ of a truly existent ‘self’ (174). The answer he gives to this is 
similar to the one that we arrived at when discussing the ‘illusion of self-ness’ in 
reference to the force world: we must ‘posit’ a fictional self that can then act as the locus 
and agent of the process. However, this formulation does not seem to answer the 
                                                 
270 Ruth Abbey similarly reproaches the aestheticism element in the notion of ‘self-creation’ for re-introducing 
troublesome ideas of autonomy and free will back into Nietzsche thought (31-2)   
271 Ralph Walker on Kant, cited Hill pp.98-9 
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‘bootstrap’ objection offered above, and leaves us dealing with “a complicated, almost 
compromising relationship. Our creations eventually become our truths, and our truths 
circumscribe our creation”. We are still left, however, with the question of where this 
process started: who, or what, posits the initial ‘self-ness’? The Answer that we gave in 
our examination of the force-world was that the play of forces somehow posits the self 
out of its play: out of the intrinsically aesthetic character of this world and its process.  
 Nehamas’ theory privileges the ‘textualising’ element provided by the literary as 
a mediating structure of organisation. Through its structuring elements it provides a 
framework by which we can ‘make of the world’ a text, imparting the organisation, 
coherence, meaningfulness, narrative motion etc. inherent to novels and the like onto 
the disordered ‘content’ of our world. The ‘self’ is the ‘writer’ who imparts order on this 
structure, but it is, as it were, a ‘de-centred subject’ – one that only emerges through the 
mediation of these rules. And this is, on a certain level, what we do find here. In this 
regard, Nehamas identifies in Nietzsche what Jürgen Habermas called the move to “post 
metaphysical thinking” in which “world-constituting capacities are transferred from 
transcendental subjectivity to grammatical structures”272. Language (or the ‘literary 
language’ of written works for Nehamas) provides structuring that can allow for the 
emergence of subject-hood under its ordering, delineating auspices. But as Sloterdijk 
observes, the Dionysian realisation serves to precisely undermine the veracity of such 
an ordering hermeneutic ‘skeleton’ (1989 pp.80-82). The observation that language 
structures our thinking found in “On Truth” is not an indication that it thereby 
represents something ‘essential’ or ‘irreducible’ to the way that the human comes to be. 
It is not the necessary pole around which the vine of humanity grows: rather, it is the 
point of the essay that we have simply uncritically accepted it to be necessary. By 
Sloterdijk’s reading of Nietzsche’s ‘decentring’ move, it is precisely by ‘dethroning’ the 
constituting power of language and custom that we come to a more ‘authentic’ version 
of self-ness:  
“Whereas the centred subject is the effect of a grammatical system that harasses to death 
the living consciousness between ‘Thou shalt’ and ‘I want,’ the decentred subject would 
                                                 
272 Nachmetaphysisches Denken cited Bowie 185. As Jochen Schulte-Sasse notes, Habermas (in Postmoderne) 
identified Nietzsche as a destructive example of this tendency, and viewed his ‘decentred’ subject as an engine of 
social disintegration (see Sloterdijk 1989 x-xi) 
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perhaps be the first to have the right to say in reference to itself: I am” (Sloterdijk 1989 
82). 
 The ‘freedom of choice’ inherent in Nehamas’ ‘heroic’ application of narrative 
order to chaos is, for Solterdijk, a part of what keeps us bound to inauthenticity:  
only a decentring of the subject, which bids a respectful adieu to the fiction of autonomy, 
could lead to a legitimate constitution of subjectivity – beyond ego and will. What seems 
at first a bitter expulsion from the centre could be viewed on second glance as an 
adventurous enrichment – if it is correct that, in becoming conscious of having been 
decentred, the subject is anyway only giving up what it never possessed – its autonomy – 
and is gaining what it would have to lose to the illusion of autonomy: the play of its body 
and its dialogic-ecstatic status (Sloterdijk 1989 82) 
It is precisely in abandoning the ‘self-ness’ constituted for us by the ‘thou shalt’ which 
orders the grammatical subject that we arrive at a ‘real’ vision of what ‘self-ness’ means: 
existing as “a great force within the play of subjective forces”. The myth of the 
autonomous, ‘sovereign’ individual that things like literature and grammar foist upon 
us are a part of the problem, and it is for this reason that Pothen argues passionately 
against Nehamas enthroning the work of art as a model for self-creation273. Rather, we 
should re-locate the ‘source’ of the de-centred subject in the ‘dialogic-ecstatic’ play of 
the force-world. Self-ness is constituted by this interplay. In this respect, Havas’ reading 
comes closer to the mark than Nehamas’: 
I submit that what Nietzsche had in mind when he talks, for example, of giving one’s life 
‘style’ is that one should overcome the resistance to recognising the life one actually has. 
What has been ‘invented’ here, therefore, is a kind of self-recognition […] becoming what 
we are is a matter of properly understanding what we have become (Havas 121) 
This interpretation, left in the way it is formulated by Havas, seems to lead us back to a 
model of ‘discover’ of the sort puzzled over by Nehamas. But when we place it within 
the context of the aesthetic we have laid out here, then we see that this is not necessarily 
the case.  
 It is here that our previous discussion of Adorno’s theory of the aesthetic274 comes 
back into play. For Adorno criticises Hegel’s interpretation of art on much the same 
ground that we have had recourse to criticise Nehamas’. The relationship identified by 
                                                 
273 Pothen §2, esp. pp.51-5. Pothen’s interpretation is also based on an inadequate understanding of what 
‘aesthetic’ means to Nietzsche (as we have been learning) and so in making use of this pertinent critique we should 
also see that it does not, necessarily, lead to the conclusions that Pothen follows it to- Nietzsche’s declaration of 
the ‘death of art’ 
274 See §3.1 p.118-20 
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this latter - form mediates content, while content mediates form – fails in Adorno’s eyes 
in that it falls into a privileging of ‘form’ (the ‘organisational structuring’ of a work): 
“form becomes that by which the appearing determines itself and content remains what 
is self-determining” (191). This necessarily leads to the division between content and the 
‘forming force’ we saw in Nehamas: it perpetuates “the primitive notion that content or 
material is formed or "worked over" by the aesthetic subject”, and therefore “the work 
becomes something objective, that is, Other” (Adorno 356). For Adorno, as for 
Nietzsche, this fails to respect the actual order of the relation between form and content: 
“form that befalls content is itself sedimented content” (191). Just as in Nietzsche’s 
epistemology, the ‘formal concept’ that supposedly ‘informs’ the process is, in fact, a 
result of the process. Adorno suggest that while we must still recognise the difference 
of form and content – of that which orders and that which is ordered – we must do so 
in a way that does not make them distinct and subject the one to the other. Rather, we 
should recognise content as the ‘becoming’ of the work of art through its own process 
of determination – its unfolding as the document of a creative act. He contextualises 
this in terms of Schoenberg’s characterisation of music as “the history of a theme”: 
content is the ‘material’ of art (the theme) but more than this it is “that whereby it is 
organised, and that whereby it is transformed” (356) – “content is everything that 
transpires in time” (194).  
 Under this model, form too becomes an aspect of content, simply one that has 
‘stepped back’ and now takes on a shaping role in content’s self-becoming: “as this 
stepping back, art is knowledge” (194)275. Form arises from the interactions of content 
and is re-used to shape content: but all the while remains a part of the ‘field’ of content, 
of the material that art engages with in its creative becoming. This is an insight that 
Kemal grasps at in his assessment: “[mental] constructions all generate new values, 
providing relations between elements to signify new features […] that can be considered 
also in other works” (273). Art is as much the artistic play with ordering forms as it is 
the ordering of play by forms. In much the same way, Adorno sees the role of the 
‘sovereign artist’ diminished to just another part of art’s self-becoming play. The 
                                                 
275 “Empathically, art is knowledge, though not knowledge of objects. Only he understands an artwork who grasps 
it as a nexus of truth, that necessarily involves its relation to untruth; its own as well as that which is external to 
it” (Adorno 341) 
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‘intention’ of the artist is nothing more than a minimal, mediating ‘taste’ that facilitates 
the continuation of play. Artistic ‘choice’ is simply “everything that artists must 
encounter about which they must make a choice” (Adorno 194), not the ‘agency’ that 
gives rise to choice: “The intervening individual subject is scarcely more than a limiting 
value, something minimal required by the artwork for its crystallization” (220). The self, 
far from being the ‘organ’ that gives rise to art, is nothing more than a delineation of 
perspective- the means by which the ‘internal’ relations of the work of art are established 
and through which they flow. 
 There is a sense, then, by which Adorno views the work of art as ‘giving birth’ to 
itself – through the inner mechanisms of contradiction and relation that is its content. 
Adorno is clear, however, that this process should not be seen as “degeneration [of 
content] to a positivistic given” (194): the content of a work does not play itself out 
‘mechanically’, as the determinate interactions of substances with basic properties. Its 
unfolding is ‘necessary’ but not ‘law-bound’ and is, at each moment, something wholly 
contingent. To illustrate this process in practice, we can turn to a beautiful description 
of the artistic process offered by Henri Matisse, in his Notes of a Painter:  
If I put a black dot on a sheet of white paper, the dot will be visible no matter how far 
away I hold it: it is a clear notation. But beside this dot I place another one, and then a 
third, and already there is confusion. In order for the first dot to maintain its value I must 
enlarge it as I put other marks on the paper […] Let me put a green near the red, and make 
the floor yellow; and again there will be relationships between the green or yellow and 
the white of the canvas which will satisfy me. But these different tones mutually weaken 
one another. It is necessary that the various marks I use be balanced so that they do not 
destroy each other. To do this I must organize my ideas; the relationships between the 
tones must be such that it will sustain and not destroy them. A new combination of 
colours will succeed the first and render the totality of my representation. I am forced to 
transpose until finally my picture may seem completely changed […] the red has 
succeeded the green as the dominant colour. I cannot copy nature; I must interpret […] 
from the relationship I have found in all the tones there must result a living harmony of 
colours (Matisse 40) 
We see from this how from the most basic multiplicity – three dots – confusion arises. 
From the moment that multiplicity and difference are introduced into the painting, the 
referential interplay of colours feed and contextualise relations, giving birth to new 
constellations that radically change the painting. His ‘vision’ of the work is quickly 
overtaken as the process, through the necessity of its internal relations, takes on a life 
of its own. Yet all the time this remains wholly contingent and referential. Matisse is 
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clear as to what drives this process is the meeting of the painting’s necessity and his own 
‘taste’. There is nothing ‘mechanically’ stopping him from forcing a work to go another 
way. Yet his ‘painters eye’ and the ‘joy’ that the act of balancing engenders, forbids him 
to mutilate the ‘spirit’ of the work as it emerges (Matisse pp.39-42). 
 
Gardeners and Sailors 
 
In light of this description of the artistic process, we can adapt Havas’ theory of ‘self-
recognition’ to one that no longer takes as its object a discrete object/identity that we 
are ‘discovering’. The image of the gardener that we find in Dawn offers an instructive 
illustration, since it emphasises the ‘living’ nature of the work. In Nietzsche’s garden of 
the soul, (D §560:277) it is our task to tend and prune, cultivate and discourage the 
various plants that grow there. We may choose to ‘impose’ a design upon the garden - 
as it were, in the French or English or Dutch or Chinese style– or one can allow the 
garden to grow wild: “let the plants, in keeping with the natural advantages and 
disadvantages of their habitat, grow up and fight it out among themselves”. “This we are 
free to do”; but Nietzsche also offers advice to us to be gardeners, even if our ‘style’ of 
gardening is this hands off approach. D §382 shows the importance of active knowledge 
in this process: “out of our damp dreary days […] conclusions spring up like mushrooms: 
one morning they were there, we know not where they came from, and stare at us, 
peevish and grey” (210). “Woe to the thinker […] that is only the earth for the plants that 
grow in him!” We may only be the ‘tender’ of this living artwork, but it is beholden on 
us to examine that which we find living in our garden, to understand what unfavourable 
conditions gave rise to it, to not just be the passive soil from which anything – even that 
which would bring rot and decay to the rest of the garden – might spring up and take 
over. 
§87 of Gay Science offers an alternative angle on this matter in its critique of the 
‘vanity of artists’, who  
often do not know what they can do best because they are too vain and have set their 
minds on something prouder than these small plants seem to be that are new, strange, 
and beautiful and really capable of growing to perfection on their soil (GS §87:87) 
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In what seems to be a thinly veiled allusion to the ‘miniaturist’ Wagner, we are offered 
the image of a creator who ‘thinks himself’ a master of grand works, “great walls and 
bold frescoes” – a master of grand effects (GS §87:88). But “his spirit has a different taste 
and disposition and likes best of all to sit quietly in the corners of collapsed houses”, 
where “he paints his real masterpieces”; perfectly sculpted visions of “some very small 
and microscopic features of the soul”. But this master is ‘ashamed’ of that talent, and 
works forever to make plants grow that will not, while hiding away those that flourish 
in him. In this regard, knowledge becomes the stripping away of self-deceptions that 
prevent us from realising ‘who we are’. The difference we see Nietzsche highlight here 
is one between the ‘taste’ of the “spirit”, and the ‘desires’ of the “character”, a problem 
that further discourages us from interpreting the art-work of the self as a product of 
willed volition: a “kind of Baudelairean-inspired idea of unrestricted, open-ended self-
invention”276. We cannot simply ‘dictate’ our willed ‘character’, imposing an order upon 
its multiplicity that it cannot accept. 
 The notion that simple thoughts can change one’s personality and approach to 
the world denies that these thoughts are the product of that personality: that “opinions 
along with proofs, refutations, and the whole intellectual masquerade are only 
symptoms [of taste] and certainly not what they are so often taken to be, its causes” (GS 
§39 pp.55-6). Embodied existence, the ‘dialogic’ life of the forces that comprise our 
materiality, precede and shape thought. As, again, do the pressures placed on the 
‘grammatical’ subject by various social powers (themselves only complex, all-too-
human elements of that play of forces). We must accept that “[our] judgement, 'that is 
right' has a prehistory in your drives, inclinations, aversions, experiences, and what you 
have failed to experience” (GS §335:187). The first step we must take, accordingly, is to 
“have the courage to own up to [our] physis and to heed its demands down to its subtlest 
tones” (§39:56). From there, we must then examine why we take certain approaches to 
life – why, in the analogy of the garden, we value certain plants and shun others. The 
idea that a certain element of our personalities is something we ‘ought’ to exclude 
“shows that you haven't yet discovered yourself or created for yourself an ideal of your 
very own” (GS §335:189). The critical element of ‘becoming what one is’ is the honesty 
                                                 
276 Keith Ansell-Pearson, “Editor’s Afterward” Dawn, Stanford UP, 403 
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to live up to and apply the artistic ‘taste’ that arises in us, and to purify that taste through 
reflection on what belongs truly and wholly to ‘us’, and what we have allowed others (or 
our expectations of others) to dictate to us.  
 By returning to the analogy of the painter, we can see how this honesty feeds into 
the ‘becoming’ of the work of art. When faced with a choice, the painter can either do 
what must ‘honestly’ be done, or she can stick the illusion of her ‘artistic autonomy’ and 
the abstract vision of an ‘ought’ for the way the painting should be. Matisse is clear that 
it is not simply ‘authenticity’ that is at stake here: the painting itself will become 
something other than ‘art’ if its limbs are broken and forced into conformity with 
something that it is not. Knowledge allows us to more genuinely and fruitfully ‘become 
what we are’, to immerse ourselves in the processes of becoming, and to experience our 
creative relationship with existence, as something that is both artist and artwork. 
 
Conclusion: Towards New Aesthetic Horizons 
 
Nietzsche’s 1886 Introductions to the two volumes of Human All Too Human speak of 
the works as a period of ‘convalescence’ in which Nietzsche. Yet this was only a 
temporary stop, one that allowed Nietzsche to regain confidence in his philosophic 
ability (HAH II 9). The knowledge of self we see emerging as a priority in the works of 
the Free Spirit are necessarily a means to knowledge of the world, to the continual 
honest interpretation of life undistorted by the traps that we set ourselves, by the 
distortions and blemishes that disfigure the reflecting ‘mirror’ that is our self-ness. As 
Nietzsche puts it in the aphorism Whither do we Travel, self-knowledge is sought 
because under the right conditions “self-knowledge will become universal knowledge 
[…] self-determination and self-education could, in the freest and most farsighted 
spirits, one day become universal determination with regard to all future humanity” 
(HAH II §223). The point of this knowing of self is not simply to ‘fortify oneself’, to build 
a temple of heroic pretentions and thus ‘make oneself beautiful’. Emphasis on aesthetic 
improvement is central to The Gay Science, with aphorisms like One Thing is Needful 
advocating for a ‘beatification’ of the self (GS §290). But we should understand this only 
as a means to what that aphorism casts as the most ‘needful’ thing: “that a human being 
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should attain satisfaction with himself - be it through this or that poetry or art; only 
then is a human being at all tolerable to behold!” (162). For “as long as you are in any 
way ashamed of yourselves, you do not yet belong amongst us!” (§106:106). The goal of 
an ‘art of the self’ clearly has pregnant Eudaimonic elements to it. But the anti-hedonist 
basis of Nietzsche’s philosophy means that we must always preserve a focus on the 
worth of knowledge for its own sake, and the subjugation of comfort and ease to the 
‘sanctified’ quest for knowledge. The search for a beautiful self is a part of the search for 
a world we can affirm and is born of “a genuinely deep desire to rise beyond, at least 
look beyond, the ugliness and clumsiness” that keeps us from that. (§105:103). It is an 
indication that we wish to ‘dance’.  
 Across the course of this study, I have sought to demonstrate a line of continuity 
that marks Nietzsche’s early aesthetic writings as a critical key by which to understand 
the idea of knowledge in the middle period writings. Through an examination of The 
Birth of Tragedy and its companion works, I argued that Nietzsche began his 
philosophic career with a declaration of naturalistic affirmation, against metaphysics 
and life denial. Through a reading of these works and their aesthetic outlook, I sought 
to lay the ground works for showing how Nietzsche’s conception of science grew up 
enmeshed with his interest in aesthetics to such a degree that any attempt to read them 
in antithesis to one another damages and deforms our understanding of them both. In 
forwarding this view, it became necessary to engage with and to seek to dispel the 
orthodox narrative that divides Nietzsche’s corpus between the ‘pessimistic 
metaphysics’ of his aesthetic philosophy, and the affirmative scientism of the Free Spirit. 
My contribution to exploring where this new approach might lead was regrettably 
limited by the scope of this thesis, which chose to focus its efforts on challenging this 
restrictive and overly simplified epochal understanding of Nietzsche’s relationship to 
aesthetics. Against such a ‘hermeneutic reading’, I hoped to offer an interpretation that 
would open up the scholarship to the idea of looking past the monolithic ‘break’ that 
Human, All Too Human has come to represent. My brief engagement with the 
predominant alternative to this vision has, I hope, gestured towards the possibilities 
that might be opened up through reading the Free Spirit’s science as an outgrowth of 
Birth’s aesthetics. It is my belief that this approach will prove fertile ground for future 
scholarship, providing a framework to work through problems that have emerged for 
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scholarship out of, I believe, the damage done by the narratives and divisions that I have 
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